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Discussion of New Law on USSR Council of Ministers

90UN0298 Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 22, Nov 89 p 4

[Article by V. Zvekov and L. Okunkov, candidates of juridical sciences: "Government And Parliament: Principles Of Their Interaction"]

[Text] Our newspaper has already reported (PV, No. 18) that, on the instructions of the Supreme Soviet, a new Law on the USSR Council of Ministers is being drafted. Readers ask if the law will reflect the mechanism of interaction between the government and the Supreme Soviet, the Congress of People's Deputies, and their agencies. The principles governing this interaction are the subject of the article published below.

Yes, today the existing statutes defining the relationship between the legislative and executive authority are in need of a "new reading." Whereas, in the recent past, this relationship largely amounted to the review of draft plans and draft national budgets that were submitted by the Council of Ministers and assumed an "animated character" only during the brief sessions of the Supreme Soviet, today they are assuming the importance of a permanent factor that influences the pulse of state and public life.

What major principles should define this interaction? First, the government should be accountable to the Congress of People's Deputies and to the Supreme Soviet and report only to them, and the latter should oversee the activities of the government on questions of strategic importance. Second, the exercise of powers by the Council of Ministers—the supreme executive and administrative body of state power—must be ensured by legislatively codified guarantees that enable it to fully realize its competence and that rule out petty tutelage and interference in its actions.

And now let us examine in greater detail certain aspects and forms of the relationship between the country's government and our parliament—the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Formation of the Government. The first session of the Supreme Soviet offered examples of the profound interest of People's Deputies in the formation of a government in keeping with the tasks of renewing Soviet society. Apparently, this also accounts for the fact that certain Deputies' speeches were devoted not so much to a review of the virtues and shortcomings of individual nominees as to discussion of the state of affairs in the branches concerned. Without disputing the usefulness of broad discussions of the composition of the Council of Ministers, let us point out that the procedure for its formation must be kept within the "bounds" of a reasonable period of time (in our view, no more than a month) that rules out the possibility of a protracted period in

which the executive power finds itself in a "suspended state" (in foreign parliamentary practice, this period is often even more limited).

Under the USSR Constitution, a newly formed Council of Ministers submits a program of its forthcoming activities for its period in office to the Supreme Soviet for consideration. In the event of disagreements with the Supreme Soviet over the program of activities, drafts of highly important legislative acts, and other fundamental decisions, the government must have the right to pose the question of their discussion at the Congress of People's Deputies (in which case consideration of the matters in question by the Supreme Soviet is ended).

Participation of the Government in the Work of the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet, Its Committees, and Commissions of the Chambers. It follows from the USSR Constitution that persons who hold posts in the USSR Council of Ministers, with the exception of its Chairman, cannot be People's Deputies, or, consequently, members of the USSR Supreme Soviet. At the same time, members of the government, in managing the spheres of state administration with which they have been entrusted, bear responsibility for their development. The new law should explicitly define the status and basic powers of members of the government, and in particular their right to attend sessions of the Congress of People's Deputies, sessions of the Supreme Soviet, sessions of its committees and of the commissions of the chambers, and to be heard. By the same token, it would be possible to legislatively codify the right of USSR People's Deputies to attend sessions of the Council of Ministers and of its Presidium and standing bodies.

We should give some consideration to new approaches to regulating the special powers of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers that take into account his special status at sessions of the Congress of People's Deputies and at sessions of the Supreme Soviet (while being a USSR People's Deputy, he simultaneously represents the USSR Government). To what rights do we refer? First, the head of government has the right to raise the question of urgent consideration by the Supreme Soviet of a draft law or other proposal submitted by the Council of Ministers. Second, we refer to the right to insist that a People's Deputy provide explanations in connection with a speech that he delivers and that touches on the government's activities.

The Norm-Establishing Activity and Legislative Initiative of the Government. In many foreign countries' Constitutions, the powers of the government are formulated in general outline. Under the French Constitution, for example, the government sets and carries out the nation's policies, and administrative agencies and the armed forces are at its disposal. In the FRG, the Federal Chancellor (the head of government) establishes the basic provisions of policy and is accountable for them.

The USSR Constitution does not define the competence of the government in an exhaustive manner. As mentioned earlier, the government has the right to decide all matters of state administration with the exception of those under the jurisdiction of the supreme legislative bodies. The chief difficulty in delimiting competence is that a large sphere of social relations are regulated simultaneously by both legislative acts and decisions of the government, and resolutions of the government are often the primary (if not only) regulator of economic life.

As the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers observed at the Supreme Soviet session this past summer, the absence of laws has forced the government in a number of instances to essentially assume law-making functions itself, in order to fill in gaps in the law. It is no accident that government resolutions account for more than half of the contents of the multivolume Code of USSR Laws. In our view, the efficacy of the USSR Council of Ministers' work is directly dependent on powers explicitly defined by law in the sphere of managing the economy, finances, social development, and science and technology. We think that, as before, the government's competence should include the drafting of basic guidelines for the country's economic and social development and their implementation following consideration and confirmation by the Congress of People's Deputies.

The substance of the government's norm-establishing activity is not confined to the adoption of its own decisions. The Constitution grants the USSR Council of Ministers the right of legislative initiative in the Congress of People's Deputies and in the Supreme Soviet. The government's law-drafting work, which encompasses a broad range of questions relating to the development of the economy, the social sphere, and culture, is assuming ever-greater significance. Today this is one of

the most important areas of the government's activity. The government also prepares a sizable share of draft laws on behalf of the supreme legislative bodies. Thus, the USSR Council of Ministers has submitted to the Supreme Soviet a whole package of draft laws that the Deputies are discussing in detail.

Responses to Inquiries From USSR People's Deputies.

During the sessions of the Congress of People's Deputies and the session of the Supreme Soviet held this past summer, the USSR Council of Ministers received several hundred inquiries from People's Deputies. As practice shows, constitutional requirements that it respond to these inquiries within no more than three days are unrealistic, in a number of cases. The preparation of responses to Deputies' inquiries requires flexible and prompt action, a professional approach, a knowledge of the state of affairs at the local level, and the consideration of issues from the standpoint of the state as a whole. In our view, legislation should provide for the possibility of extending this period. Moreover, as analysis shows, some inquiries essentially amount to petitions and requests that have no direct bearing on the government's activity. It is apparently necessary to clearly define requirements that a Deputy's inquiry must meet.

Resignation of the Government. Vote of Confidence. One of the forms of parliamentary control of the activity of the executive authority and of the government's accountability for the program it pursues is the institution of resignation known to foreign constitutional legislation. A no less common instrument of parliamentary control is the vote of confidence (no confidence); the initiative to call a confidence vote can come from both the government and a group of Deputies. In preparing the draft law, some thought should be given as to what forms of these institutions can serve the purposes of parliamentary activity in our country.

Causes of Political Indifference in Estonia Analyzed
18150115A

[Editorial Report] Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian on 20 October 1989 carries on page 2 a 2100-word interview with Jüri Raidla, first secretary of the Estonian CP Pärnu Region Committee headlined "Indifference About Elections. Why?" by Ingrid Eylandt. It cites rapid changes, insecurity, and lack of confidence in the Supreme Soviet among causes for such indifference. Lack of confidence is also seen as a polarizing factor between national independence groups and Intermove-ment clamoring for the restoration of "chauvinistic order." Raidla says:

"Apparently one of the reasons why the election campaign has remained so passive is that a great number of people who, as individuals, are competent and in every way qualified and capable of being deputies to the local organs of self-government, do not wish to participate, because the system of Soviet power organs up until now has compromised itself in their eyes. They also lack faith that the new organs of self-government would develop into anything different, qualitatively speaking, than the previous soviets that did not have any power at all, much less competence in making decisions on matters regarding the region."

Other factors cited are reluctance to assume a constructive rather than a critical role, reluctance to enter a newly formed political system, the inherent difficulties in activating such a system, general apathy, and the absence of an alternative system. Raidla maintains:

"There should be a certain amount of coordination and collaboration between the different political forces: they should agree, at least, to actively participate in the elections. Otherwise, a situation might arise where elections could not be held at some locations because no candidates were named." Turning to the issue of independence from the Soviet Union, Raidla states:

"And even if the organ of administrative self-government, strictly speaking, is not a true organ of state power yet, in one way or another, Estonia's independent statehood could only be built on the foundation of such administrative organs. There are no other options that I can see today." He also raises the following questions:

"What has been the manifestation of all the political activity taking place in Estonia over the last two years?" and "Where do we go from here?" His projections for further development include: two completely democratic elections; a complete reform of the leadership structure in Estonia, both as a vehicle for IME [Self-Managing Estonia] and as a prerequisite for political sovereignty; and—most importantly—land reform.

Raidla also predicts a sudden "explosion" of activity to get ready for the elections of administrative self-government. He adds:

"Once the transition to the new administrative system has been accomplished, the proponents of any of the alternative power-leadership- or what-have-you- structures will inevitably be left behind. The reason for that is that, after the democratic elections are held for the administrative organs, it will, in principle, no longer be possible to say what is being said now, and what is also valid to a great extent—that the organs of self-government are not elected considering and expressing the will of the people. At any rate, elections for the new soviets will reflect the will of the people."

Raidla concludes: "I am convinced that once elections to the organs of local self-government are successfully carried out on that principle, all organizational difficulties in the democratic elections for the supreme soviet will be lessened considerably."

Tajik Plenum Information Report

90US034A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 7 Dec 89 p 1

["Information Report for Tajik CP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] On 6 December 1989 the regular 15th Tajik CP Central Committee Plenum was held in Dushanbe. It considered the following questions:

1. The practical measures for implementing in the republic the decisions of the September 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the question "The Party's National Policy Under Present-Day Conditions."
2. The convoking of the regular 21st Tajik CP Congress.
3. The rate of fulfillment of the resolution of the 11th Tajik CP Central Committee, entitled "Measures for Political-Organizational Support in Implementing the Republic's Planned Zhilye-93 [Housing-93] Housing-Construction Program."
4. Organizational questions.

The participants in the plenum's work included the following categories of persons who are not part of the Tajik CP Central Committees: first and second secretaries, and secretaries in charge of matters pertaining to ideological work, at obkoms; first secretaries of party gorkoms and raykoms; chairmen of ispolkoms of oblast, city, and rayon soviets of people's deputies; deputy chairmen of the TaSSR Council of Ministers; secretaries of Tadzhiksovprom [TaSSR Council of Trade Unions] and Tajik Komsomol Central Committee; managers of republic ministries and departments, public organizations, and creative unions; scientists; USSR people's deputies; rectors of higher educational institutions in the city of Dushanbe; individual secretaries of primary party organizations; representatives of labor collectives; party and labor veterans; responsible workers in the apparatus of Tajik CP Central Committee and the People's Control Committee; and workers in the mass media.

A report on the first question was given by K.M. Makhkamov, first secretary of Tajik CP Central Committee.

The following persons took part in the discussion: D. Kh. Karimov, first secretary of the party's Dushanbe Gorkom; T. N. Nazarov, TaSSR minister of public education; T. M. Mirkhalikov, first secretary of the party's Leninabad Obkom; A. N. Maksumov, director of the Institute of Botany, TaSSR Academy of Sciences; Ya. A. Musssayev, chief agronomist, XXIV Partsyезд [24th Party Congress] Sovkhoz, Ilichevskiy Rayon; G. V. Koshlakov, first deputy chairman of TaSSR Council of Ministers; R. Z. Mirzoyev, first secretary of the party's Dangarinskiy Raykom; S. B. Beknazarov, first secretary of the party Gorno-Badakhshan Obkom; Z. Sh. Davletaliyeva, first secretary of the party's Dzhirgatal'skiy Raykom; Sh. R. Rustamov, department head, Institute of Language and Literature, TaSSR Academy of Sciences; I. Kh. Khalimov, first secretary of the party's Khatlon Obkom; A. Tursunov, director of the Komsomoli Todzhikiston [Tajik Komsomol] Sovkoz, Zafarobod'skiy Rayon; A. Yakubov, first secretary of the Tajik Komsomol Central Committee; M. R. Rakhmatov, party and labor veteran; G. S. Savriddinova, first secretary of the party's Isfara Gorkom; V. Kh. Khodzhiyev, first secretary of the party's Tursunzade Gorkom; M. S. Salikhov, chairman of Tadzhiksovmprof; N. G. Savchenkov, chief of construction administration, Rosungestroy; Yu. F. Ponosov, first deputy chairman of Dushanbe City Ispolkom.

The final statement on the first question was made by K. M. Makhkamov.

A resolution dealing with the discussed question was enacted.

On the second question, the plenum listened to a report given by K. M. Makhkamov and enacted an appropriate resolution, according to which the next, 21st Tajik CP Congress will be convoked in September 1990.

On the third question, the participants listened to an informational report given by G. G. Veselkov, secretary of the Tajik CP Central Committee.

The plenum enacted a resolution dealing with the discussed question.

The Central Committee Plenum considered organizational questions. The plenum released P. K. Luchinskiy from his duties as buro member and second secretary of the Tajik CP Central Committee as a result of his having been elected first secretary of the Moldavian CP Central Committee.

By secret vote, the plenum elected G. G. Veselkov as second secretary of the Tajik CP Central Committee.

By secret vote, the plenum elected as secretary of Tajik CP Central Committee Sh. D. Shabdolov, who had

previously worked as deputy head of the Party-Organizational and Cadre Work Department, Tajik CP Central Committee.

A. B. Karakulov was released from his duties as head of the Agrarian Department, Tajik CP Central Committee, as a result of his transfer to other work.

B. B. Ashrapov, who previously worked in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, was approved as head of the Agrarian Department, Tajik CP Central Committee.

T. A. Dzhrabayev, who previously worked as the head of the Mass Media Sector, Ideology Department, Tajik CP Central Committee, was approved as editor of the SOVET TOZHIKISTONI newspaper.

The plenum released Yu. Ye. Sukhov from his duties as buro member and head of the Party-Organizational and Cadre Work Department, Tajik CP Central Committee, as a result of his transfer to work in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.

Thereupon, the plenum completed its work.

N. K. Dolgushkin, responsible organizer, Party-Construction and Cadre Work Department, CPSU Central Committee, and R. G. Abdulatypov, consultant, Interethnic Relations Department, CPSU Central Committee, took part in the plenum's work.

Chairman on Armenian People's Control Committee Elections

90US0277A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
24 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with G.A. Martirosyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Committee of People's Control, by S. Babadzhanian: "Elections in the Organs of People's Control"]

[Text] Reports and elections of the people's control committees and groups began on 20 November in the republic's labor collectives. There have already been several days of meetings for the presentation of reports in the workshop groups.

A correspondent for Armenpress met with G.A. Martirosyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Committee of People's Control, and asked him to answer a few questions involving this important social and political campaign.

[Correspondent] Comrade Martirosyan, how appropriate is it to carry out such a measure right now, given the complex economic and political situation which has arisen in the republic?

[Martirosyan] Actually the situation is indeed complex and fairly unsuitable for such a matter. But there are circumstances which leave us no other choice. The term of office for these committees and groups has run out, and the groups in the disaster zone do not function because many of the collectives have been disbanded.

Thousands of people have left the republic for various reasons, especially from the countryside, which also exerts its influence.

In addition, life is raising new demands and revealing new phenomena. An increase in the activity of the masses has allowed new people to come forward and has given birth to new social forces, including informal organizations that want to participate effectively in the administration of the country and in people's control. We must give them the opportunity to make their contribution to perestroyka and to the resolution of the tasks facing us by drawing them into the work of the organs of control.

There is another circumstance. The emerging situation is presenting the organs of control with complex tasks. The very groups that were elected 3 years ago during the previous campaign, under completely different circumstances, are no longer able to pass a serious examination today. We are convinced that the committees and groups formed in the course of these elections will more actively participate in the resolution of the problems facing our republic.

[Correspondent] What is distinctive about today's campaign?

[Martirosyan] The campaign is distinctive in that it is being conducted, as I already noted, under complex social and political conditions. People are reacting sharply to unresolved problems, and they want to know about the reasons causing them. They demand firm guarantees that the difficulties arising now will be eliminated.

It is very important that an informal approach be manifested in the course of conducting the report-back election meetings and conferences and forming the committees and groups. In addition, all this must take place under conditions of complete democracy.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, what must be done so that the reports and elections contribute an increased role for people's control in the political system? That is very important.

[Martirosyan] First of all, the members of society who are elected to these organs must have principles, know economics, and be implacable foes of deficiencies, abuses, and anything that restrains perestroyka. It should not be said that these same qualifications had no meaning at the time of the previous election. But at the last election of people's controllers the formal approach had prevailed for years and specific political and practical qualities were not always taken into account.

I believe another important factor is the freeing of people's control from a number of groups and posts. It is hardly expedient and effective when all the social organizations—trade unions, Komsomol, etc.—have their control sections in one and the same collective. Such groups only create needless trouble at work, distract

people, and waste time without justifying their existence in any fashion. In such conditions there can be no thought of a single correct evaluation of the state of affairs or a genuine, uncompromising struggle against deficiencies and abuse. Now the collectives have been given the right to determine for themselves whether or not they will retain the groups, commissions, and analogous subunits that operate in parallel and enjoy the right of control.

[Correspondent] And how is that put into practice? Can you offer an example?

[Martirosyan] Certainly. Over the last 2 years an experiment was conducted concerning the introduction of unified control at more than 40 of the republic's major industrial enterprises, including the production association "Luys," the Institute of Precision Organic Chemistry of the Academy of Sciences, the collective farm in the town of Urtsadzor in the Araratskiy Rayon, the Yerevan medical association No. 2, and at other locations. The essence of it is that all the remaining social organizations relinquish their right of control and give it to the people's control groups in exchange for nominating their own representatives to the staff of the groups. This has reduced by several times the number of examinations and examiners and raised the quality of examinations. It would probably be sound if, at the time of the reports and elections, the process of centralizing social control were to receive further development in the people's control committees and groups. As the experiment demonstrated, this practice meets with approval and support in the collectives.

It is very important that the newly elected groups and committees occupy themselves with fundamental issues, even if it means that fewer of them are considered. And, most importantly, these issues must be resolved once and for all. We propose that this is also one of the conditions for increasing the authority of the control sections.

[Correspondent] In the field of medicine there is the concept of preventive measures. Their purpose is to keep the disease from developing, which is far easier than healing it afterward. If this could be applied to control...

[Martirosyan] Of course it is better to forestall deficiencies than to permit a man to become entangled and stumble or commit an ill-intentioned action, and then to punish him. I do not wish to spend time on the positive aspects of such a position, but I do wish to stress that the prevention of deficiencies and neglect has taken on prime importance these days. What is meant by this? Comprehensive measures that will help erect a screen in front of violations and abuses even as they spring up. During the report-back period the arsenal of control is replenished with effective resources, the most important of them being glasnost. The appearance of people's controllers at meetings of labor collectives, social organizations, dispatcher conferences, and other meetings with their reports on the state of affairs, the legalization

of work plans, and the broad use of a local press and local radio stations—the workers of our system consider these the result of the beneficial influence of glasnost. We attach great importance to the conduct of joint examinations with the standing commissions of the local soviets, the deputies' groups, and social organizations, which amounts to effective control over the execution of resolutions adopted by the administration. From now on more importance will be given to close cooperation with the soviets, which is an important guarantee that democratic principles will be introduced into the work of the organs of people's control. In a word, the scope of perestroika is growing in the country at large, and now it must also penetrate deep into the system of social control and permeate the activities of its subunits and of each controller and give them new sense and content. This must become the motto of the report-back election campaign.

[Correspondent] What kind of changes in the structure of people's control organs are intended?

[Martirosyan] Earlier I noted that the final word rests with the labor collective. With due regard for its opinion, we must determine locally what kind of groups are proposed for a given institution, enterprise, organization, or their subunits. A meeting of the collective should determine their numerical strength and the type of structure. The main thing is not to create numerous groups, but rather genuinely functioning groups with a good staff. Under conditions of worker control of the trade unions it is not advisable to have groups and posts at the small trade, public catering, and service enterprises. In such cases people's control is fulfilled by the appropriate groups created at trusts, directorates, associations, and trade firms.

These days as the authority of the soviets grows it is worth examining the proposal that amalgamated people's control groups be created under the rural soviets with the agreement of the labor collectives. This is being done primarily to avoid having a great number of controllers where there are a small number of collectives, which gives a good result. Such groups may be formed not only during the report-back elections campaign but at the forthcoming elections to the local soviets and at their organizational sessions.

[Correspondent] Do we need people's control groups in the administrative organs (the court, the procuracy, the militia, and the arbitrage)?

[Martirosyan] In this case the Law on People's Control in the USSR does not offer any interpretation. However, it seems to us that in such an instance it is necessary to proceed from specific conditions and take into account the opinion of the collective. This primarily involves the cities and rayons. The administrative organs of the republics and capitol cities should have such groups.

People's control groups should be created at the major cooperatives and lease enterprises and organizations. Their primary tasks should be defined at meetings or

conferences of those collectives. And as for the disaster zones, I can say that reports and elections will be held at those enterprises and institutions where production is functioning. Where production has not yet been fully restored, it is recommended that the issue be put off until after they have been put back into operation.

[Correspondent] Which accomplishments, in your view, will the people's control workers discuss, and which issues are supposed to cause a particularly bitter conflict of opinions?

[Martirosyan] First of all I will talk in general outlines about our work. About 90,000 workers, collective farmers, and office workers are involved in the more than 10,000 groups and posts operating in the republic. They make up the main force of people's control, and for the last 3 years they have made a significant contribution to the implementation of social and economic objectives. They constantly verify the execution of planned tasks and the application of the achievements of science and technology and progressive methods to production, and they uncover reserves in the various branches of the national economy and watch over their use. They struggle bitterly against mismanagement and waste, red tape and bureaucratism, misappropriation of socialist property, and phenomena creating favorable conditions for any sort of non-labor income. The destructive earthquake and an economic state of siege have confronted the people's controllers with many complex problems. Today the top priority in their work programs is the preparation of houses for those who are suffering, the unloading of railroad wagons, construction efforts, and verification of the timely and sound implementation of all these things.

I could speak for a long time about all these efforts. In order to complete the picture, I will introduce the following figures and facts. In addition to preventive measures against deficiencies, in 1987-1988 and the first half of the current year the republic's organs of people's control called 7,935 officials to account for various violations. Of those officials, 143 were dismissed from their positions and 1,549 were fined for a total of more than 371,000 rubles. And 204 cases were handed over to the organs of the procuracy.

During the report-back election campaign we need to analyze thoroughly all of this and, proceeding from the situation arising in the republic, clearly define concrete objectives for the controllers. The main thing is for the newly created groups to be energetic and not stop at merely ascertaining the facts. They must not pursue quantity of examinations but rather follow a matter to the end and obtain a result. Such prerequisites have already been created in many places: The candidacies of the controllers will be announced in advance of the meetings. And the severest clash of opinions, as it seems to me, will occur in connection with the elections. People will try to free themselves from those leaders of committees and groups who have not proved their value and do

not enjoy the trust of the collectives. Under the conditions of democratization and broad glasnost which are important features of this campaign, people will condemn passivity, carefree attitudes, and indifference to the cares and needs of the workers.

We must create the opportunity for all who wish to reveal deficiencies and advance proposals to have access to the speaker's platform at the meetings. We must encourage reports and speeches that are concrete, practical, and have a critical tendency. Only with such an approach will we be able to hear an animated, spontaneous discussion. Only then will fundamental, topical questions and evaluations based on principle be advanced.

We put our trust in the groups and committees being elected, and we express confidence that they will work more energetically and purposefully and that they will make a serious contribution toward accomplishing the tasks that face the republic. They must be constantly helped, supported, and encouraged by the leaders of the enterprises and institutions, the soviets of workers' collectives, and the other organizations responsible for this matter.

Information Report on 23 Nov Tajik Supreme Soviet Session

90US0278A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 24 Nov 89 p 1

["Information Report on Tajik Supreme Soviet 12th Session", 23 November 1989]

[Text] On 23 November in Dushanbe, the 12th Session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet began work in the republic's Supreme Soviet chamber.

It is 10:00 A.M. K. M. Makhkamov, G. G. Veselkov, A. D. Dadabayev, G. V. Koshlakov, G. P. Pallayev, V. V. Petkel, Yu. Ye. Sukhov, I. Kh. Khayeyev, D. Kh. Karimov, and M. S. Salikhov, members and candidate members of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee buro, and members of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the republic's government are taking their seats in the presidium.

M. S. Tabarov, chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, opened the session.

The deputies paid tribute to R. Dzhalil, A. Rakhmanov, and M. R. Salikhov, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet deputies, who have passed away in the period since the eleventh session.

The agenda and procedure for the session was approved.

At the behest of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and with the approval of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Council of Elders, the following items were entered on the agenda:

1. The Tajik SSR State plan for economic and social development in 1990 and the progress toward fulfilling the Tajik SSR State plan for economic and social development in 1989.
2. The Tajik SSR State budget for 1990 and the administration of the Tajik SSR State budget for 1988.
3. The introduction of changes and addenda to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Tajik SSR (concerning problems in the electoral system).
4. The Tajik SSR draft law on the election of Tajik SSR people's deputies.
5. The scheduling of elections for Tajik SSR people's deputies.
6. The formation of a Republic election committee for the elections of Tajik SSR people's deputies.
7. Changes in the structure of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers.
8. The Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet commission's findings on the results of the investigation into the petitions of the workers at the cotton cleaning plant in Voseyskiy Rayon, Khatlon Oblast (translator's note: probably was formerly Kulyab Oblast).
9. Ratification of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decrees.

The agenda for the session also included the inquiries to the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers from deputy B. N. Pshenichnyy and the group of deputies including K. Amrikhudoyevoy, M. Gulomnasirova, D. Imatovoy, G. S. Saidnasimovoy, Ye. I. Turgunova, D. A. Shoyeva, and Sh. D. Shabdolova.

Deputy B. B. Karimov, deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic's Gosplan, delivered a report on the Tajik SSR State plan for economic and social development in 1990 and on the progress toward fulfilling the Tajik SSR State plan for economic and social development in 1989.

Deputy D. L. Lafizov, Tajik SSR Minister of Finance, delivered a report on the Tajik SSR State budget for 1990 and on the administration of the Tajik SSR State budget for 1988.

The deputies heard a supplementary report from the Planning and Budget Commission and other Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet permanent commissions, which was given by deputy T. G. Gafarov, chairman of the Planning and Budget Commission.

Deputies V. I. Abdusamadova, secretary of the Tajik Trade Union Council and chairman of the republic's committee of agroindustrial complex workers; A. Mirzoyev, chairman of the Khatlon oblispolkom; N. G. Savchenkov, chief of construction management at the Rogun hydroelectric power station construction project; M. P. Yermatova, a collective farmer at the Telman

kolkhoz in Kabodiyenskiy Rayon; B. S. Sirozhev, general manager of the Tajikehnergo industrial conglomerate; Ya. N. Mirzoyev, chairman of the board of directors of the Tajik Union of Consumers' Societies; Eh. Babadzhanov, director of Dzh. Rasulov sovkhoz in Ilyichevskiy Rayon; D. R. Shokirov, first deputy chairman of the Leninabad oblispolkom; Kh. Nasredinov, the Tajik SSR Minister of Land Reclamation and Water Resources; Yu. F. Ponosov, first deputy chairman of the Dushanbe gorispolkom; A. Rakhmonova, first secretary of the Leningradskiy raykom; A. Baymatov, the Tajik SSR Minister of Local Industry; G. S. Saidnasimova, a worker at the Shugan sovkhoz in Shuganskiy Rayon; R. Gafurov, first deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Gosstroy; M. Asomidinov, a machinist at the Ordzhonikidzeabad machine repair plant; A. V. Lyapinov, a diesel locomotive driver at the locomotive depot of the Dushanbe branch of the Central Asian Railroad; and B. R. Makhmadaliyev, the Tajik SSR Minister of Social Security; participated in the discussions of the reports.

Deputy B. B. Karimov, the deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic's Gosplan, delivered the closing remarks on the first item on the agenda.

The Supreme Soviet adopted the resolution on the Tajik SSR State plan for economic and social development in 1990.

Deputy D. L. Lafizov, the Tajik SSR Minister of Finance, delivered the closing remarks on the second agenda item.

The Supreme Soviet passed the law on the Tajik SSR State budget for 1990 and approved the resolution on the administration of the 1988 budget.

The Supreme Soviet supported the proposals of deputies R. M. Mamurov and N. G. Savchenkov concerning the formation of a deputies' commission to consider the problems of training skilled workers for the building trades and of developing the republic's construction industry base.

The session resumes its work on 24 November.

24 Nov Tajik Supreme Soviet Session Information Report

90US0293A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA* in Russian 25 Nov 89 p 1

["Information Report on the 12th Session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation"]

[Text] On 24 November the 12th Session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, continued its work in Dushanbe.

The deputies proceeded to consider draft laws dealing with changes and additions to the Tajik SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) and the Law on Elections of the Tajik SSR people's deputies.

Deputy G.P. Pallayev, chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, delivered the report.

A co-report regarding the matters under discussion was delivered by Deputy N.Kh. Khuvaydullayev, chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet's Commission for Legislative Proposals.

The following deputies took part in the discussion: A.A. Cherepanov—second secretary of the Leninabad Party Obkom, D. Imatova—worker at the 50 Years of the USSR Sovkhoz, Vanchskiy Rayon, D. Latifov—editor-in-chief of the journal *KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTON*, V. Khodzhiev—first secretary of the Tursunzadevsk Party Gorkom, Ye.N. Dedova—rotary-kiln operator at the Dushanbe Cement Combine, I. Khodzhayev—chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Court, G.B. Bobosadykova—deputy board chairperson of the All-Union Society for Knowledge, S. Karimova—milkmaid at the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin, Leninskiy Rayon, and Z.D. Usmanov—academic secretary of physics and mathematics, chemical and geological sciences of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences.

The Supreme Soviet adopted the Tajik SSR Law on Introducing Changes and Additions to the Tajik SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law).

The delegates then discussed the Draft Law on the Elections of Tajik SSR People's Deputies and, taking into account the amendments introduced by the Commission for Legislative Proposals and by the deputies, they passed the Law as a whole.

In connection with the introduction of changes and additions to the Tajik SSR Constitution, the Supreme Soviet introduced appropriate changes in the Law on Elections of local deputies to the republic's soviets of people's deputies.

In connection with the expiration in February 1990 of the term of office of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, and in accordance with Article 81 of the Tajik SSR Constitution, as well as Articles 14 and 15 of the Law on Elections of Tajik SSR People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet adopted a decree scheduling elections of the Tajik SSR People's Deputies.

Then the deputies proceeded to discuss the sixth item on the agenda.

After considering the proposals of the ispolkoms of the Tajik SSR Soviets of People's Deputies and those of the republic-level organs of public organizations, as well as taking into account the opinions of the labor collectives, and guided by Article 19 of the Law on Elections of Tajik SSR People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet formed the Republic voting commission for elections of peoples deputies of the Tajik SSR.

The session examined the matter of changes in the composition of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the republic's government. The appropriate decrees were adopted.

The Supreme Soviet listened to a reply to a question put by Deputy B.N. Pshenichniy. A response concerning the measures being taken with regard to ensuring the employment of this republic's labor resources was provided by B.B. Karimov, deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic's Gosplan.

Yu.P. Zatsarinnyy, deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, replied to questions from a group of deputies from the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. In response to requests from the deputies, the Supreme Soviet adopted appropriate decrees.

In discussing the next item on the agenda, the deputies examined the conclusion formed at the 10th Session of the Deputies' Commission headed by Sh.D. Makhmudov, the Tajik SSR Minister of Justice, concerning the results of checking out the statements made by officials of the Voseysk Cotton Mill, and they adopted a decree regarding this matter.

The Supreme Soviet listened to a report by Deputy A.T. Kasimova, secretary of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, concerning the approval of ukases of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and it adopted the appropriate laws.

Taking part in the session's work were prominent scientists, veterans of party and soviet organs, as well as representatives of public organizations.

With this, the 12th Session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, completed its work.

Makhkamov on Tajik Decision-Making, Nationality Representation, Joint Ventures

90US0341A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 8 Dec 89 pp 1, 3

[Speech by K.M. Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajik CP Central Committee, at the 15th Tajik CP Central Committee Plenum: "National Policy—A Component Part of the Perestroika Concept"]

[Excerpt] Today it is clear to every unprejudiced person that, despite the distortions that occurred in carrying out the Leninist national policy, within the family of Soviet nations Tajikistan has acquired its statehood and national independence, has put an end to its age-old backwardness, and has achieved considerable progress in all spheres of economic, social, and cultural life.

Industry has become a leading branch of the economy. Its share is more than half the gross national product produced and one-third of the national income. The output of many of our enterprises has gone out to the world market. In addition to the increase in industrial production, working-class cadres have been formed and new cities and worker settlements have sprung up. Our agriculture has been changed into large-scale multi-branch mechanized kolkhoz-sovkhoz production. The

republic is making an increasingly important contribution to the nationwide division of labor and to the single national-economic complex. Solid economic ties exist with practically all the parts of the country.

Parallel to the social restructuring of the economy, there has been a process of the birth and development of science, culture, public health and education, and the rebirth of national literature and art. An entire galaxy of cadres in the national intelligentsia has grown up.

There is absolutely no doubt that all this is the direct result of the party's course in national policy and of the selfless labor performed by representatives of all the nationalities inhabiting our republic.

In all this we see the fruits of the unselfish assistance provided by all the Soviet nations, whose friendship and cooperation withstood the most difficult tests that proved to be the lot of our Soviet multinational Motherland. And underestimating all this, failing to see the tremendous positive changes that occurred during the years of the Soviet authority in all spheres of our republic's life, and appealing for national isolation means distorting the truth of history and the reality of life, means inflicting damage on the unity of the Soviet nations and our own nation.

But, without belittling what has been achieved, it must be noted that in the sphere of interethnic relations, as in other spheres, a rather large number of acute problems and contradictions accumulated over the years. In the seminal article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika," which was published on the pages of PRAVDA, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman M. S. Gorbachev writes with complete justification: "Yes, our past is diverse. It absorbed victories and failures, discoveries and mistakes, the bright and the tragic, revolutionary zeal, heroic labor, and sacrifices, great hopes and disappointments. We cannot reject our history. It is precisely in the past that we find the roots of many of our current problems."

So it is necessary for us today to overcome and correct much of what that past has left to us.

Democratic processes have stirred up the broadest segments of the population of Tajikistan, bringing into the foreground the just resolution of economic and social questions and the renewal of spiritual life. The events of the year that is ending, as well as of the previous years, attest to the fact that practically the majority of the negative situations that are occurring in the republic affect in one way or another the relations among people.

The fact of the matter is that in our republic, as in other parts of the country, complicated socioeconomic, political, and ecological problems have arisen in a more critical way than ever before. Society has started talking loudly about the need for the rebirth and preservation of the values of the national culture.

The political situation in the republic has also been definitely influenced by the demographic processes that have occurred in recent decades. The high rates of population increase have led to a shortage of jobs and have given rise to a number of additional social difficulties. Our republic is also feeling the effect of distortions, the lack of sufficient thought, and the hastiness in carrying out national-territorial demarcation in Central Asia, the results of which did not completely take into consideration the historic realities.

Events that could not fail to have an effect on the republic's further development and people's frame of mind were the mass repressions in the 1930's and 1940's, when there occurred the destruction of national cadres, especially the administrators and a considerable number of the Tajik intellectuals, including those who had taken direct part in the establishment of the Soviet authority, in the fight against the anti-Soviet movement in Central Asia.

We see that the party is restoring justice. The cases of repressed party, Soviet, Komsomol, and economic workers, specialists, and representatives of the creative intelligentsia are being reviewed. As of today, 7044 persons have been rehabilitated. The honest names of prominent figures in our republic, such as Abdurakhim Khodzhibayev, Nusratullo Maksum, Shirinsho Shotemur, and many others, have been restored. As you know, the bureau of Tajik CP Central Committee has enacted a decision to perpetuate their memory. This work is continuing. The cases of everyone who was subjected to repressions during those years will be reviewed.

A definite negative stamp was left on our republic's socioeconomic situation by the distortions in the period of stagnation and the system of government by administrative fiat, which distortions led to the limitation of our republic's independence in resolving of the vitally important problems, to the ignoring of the specific peculiarities of our historic development, to considerable disproportions in the development and placement of productive forces, and to the lagging behind of the social infrastructure.

For example, the mania for gigantic projects that seized our country's national economy during the years of the 7th through 10th five-year plans in placing and building industrial enterprises without taking into consideration the prospects for development of the demographic situation in those regions made it impossible during that time to create the small-scale and medium-sized enterprises that are more efficient on the republic's territory. That was one of the basic reasons why we were unable to create new jobs promptly (other than in agriculture) in sufficient quantity to guarantee that the rapidly growing labor resources would find employment.

It was until the second half of the 11th Five-Year Plan that the situation began to improve. There was extended construction of small-scale and medium-sized enterprises and branches of industrial associations, mainly in

the production of consumer goods. For example, a spinning factory and garment factory in Kurgan-Tyube, a stocking factor in Ura-Tyube, the second phase of the Leninabad Shoe Factory, branches of garment and knitwear production entities in Shaartuzskiy, Moskovskiy, Dangarinskiy, Ganchinskiy, Khodzhentskiy, and Nauskiy rayons, and a confectionery factory in Isfara. A branch of the shoe association in Kulyab is being readied for turnover, and branches are being built in Pendzhikent, Isfara, and in a number of other rayons.

From 1983 to the beginning of 1989, dozens of new production entities were also activated in other branches of the national economy. During that period a total of 227,400 persons got jobs. Those figures would have been considerably higher if we had been able to make complete use of the capital investments that were allocated for those purposes.

With the purpose of increasing the production of food products and improving the structure of land use in agriculture, a resolution was found for the question of the gradual reduction of the plan for raw-cotton production by 1993 to 820,000 tons a year. Finally, a resolution was found for the question of beginning the construction in 1990 of the Kurgan-Tyube—Kulyab railroad line, with the termination of that construction in the 13th Five-Year Plan. It must be noted that, out of the 260 million rubles that it will cost, half—or 130 million rubles—will be financed at the expense of funds from the union budget.

Questions of deductions paid into the local and republic budgets from profits received by enterprises of union subordination are now being resolved most justly. Next year they have been defined in the amount of 20 percent, as compared with an average of 6 percent during the current year.

Our republic's inhabitants are justifiably concerned about our falling behind the average national level in the production of national income per capita of population and in providing the public with housing, schools, children's preschool institutions, and public-health and cultural facilities.

As a result, acute problems have accumulated, especially in educating and indoctrinating the upcoming generation, in the development of science, national creativity, and the creation of centers for the national cultures of the nations that inhabit Tajikistan, and in satisfying their national-cultural and religious needs.

Therefore, in the 1990 plan, in the structure for use of the national income, the resources for current consumption and nonproduction construction have been stipulated in the amount of 89 percent, as compared with 86.7 percent for the union as a whole.

Today one of the chief tasks of the party, Soviet, and economic agencies and of public organizations is the elimination of the shortcomings that were allowed to happen, the implementation of the CPSU platform, and

the exerting of an dynamic influence on the development and harmonizing of the interethnic relations.

It is understood that much will have to be resolved here on a nationwide scale. This work, as all of us can see, is being carried out in an increasingly dynamic and meaningful manner. Step by step, political, economic, and social justice with respect to all the peoples of the USSR is being restored.

USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a declaration entitled "Recognition of the Illegality and Criminal Nature of the Repressive Acts Against the Peoples That Were Subjected to Enforced Resettlement, and the Guaranteeing of Their Rights." This removes yet another prolonged and acute conflict situation that has disturbed practically the entire country.

But if one speaks about the republic aspects of this work, it must be carried out in close interaction with the center, with a consideration of everything new that is being introduced into Soviet legislation and the reforms in the economic and social sphere.

The perestroika process is creating all the necessary conditions for this. In the course of the nationwide discussion of a number of legislative bill during the current year, a large number of recommendations were received from the republic's workers and public organizations. All those recommendations have been studied and a number of them have already been taken into consideration in laws that have been enacted.

However, there were also a rather large number of recommendations that go beyond the confines of the republic's competency. In particular, many persons feel that the step that has been undertaken to achieve the partial improvement of the USSR Constitution by means of amendments and additions is insufficient, and they recommend enacting a new USSR Constitution, in which they would like to see a clear-cut definition of the competency and the reciprocal obligations between the Union and the union republics.

It must be said here that the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies has formed a Constitutional Commission headed by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman M. S. Gorbachev. Our republic is represented in that commission by USSR people's deputies Yu. B. Iskhaki, rector of the Tajik Medical Institute, and K. M. Makhkamov, First Secretary of Tajik CP Central Committee.

The recommendations made by the republic's workers relative to the USSR Constitution are being summarized by us and will be made known to the Constitutional Commission.

But if one speak in concrete terms, as is stipulated by the CPSU platform, the Union must retain the legislative powers that are necessary for the foundations of and for the development of the political and economic system,

for guaranteeing the country's defense and security, and for conducting foreign policy.

That is, the list of the powers of the USSR must be of an exhaustive nature. At the same time, the republic must be granted the rights to resolve all questions with the exception of those have have been voluntarily transferred by it to the competency of the Union.

It must be noted that in 1989 much was done by our legislative agencies. They enacted the Language Law; Laws governing the election of the republic's people's deputies and local soviets; and amendments and additions to the TaSSR Constitution. The incompatibility of the status of deputy with a definite job assignment was stipulated for the first time. We rejected the election of deputies from public organizations without okrugs, the conducting of okrug pre-election meetings, and many other things that did not withstand the test of practice.

For purposes of improving the quality of the preparation of the legislative acts and the rendering of efficient legal assistance to the republic's Supreme Soviet, we are currently studying the question of creating under it the Institute of State and Law—for the time being, on public principles.

Within the confines of the reinforcement of our federation, a factor of great importance is the expansion of the rights of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast with regard to state, economic, and sociocultural construction and the reinforcement of its economic independence. There have already been substantial changes in this matter. In particular, the chairman of the oblast soviet of people deputies from now on will represent the oblast, while having the status of deputy chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet. The autonomous oblast has been granted the right of legislative initiative. Obviously, it will be necessary in the future to provide for a definite quota of representation by deputies in the republic's Supreme Soviet from GBAO [Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast].

An inseparable feature of the sovereignty of Tajik SSR is its right to maintain relations with foreign state and international organizations. In this regard the republic has definite powers in developing cultural, scientific, and economic contacts with all the foreign countries within the channel of the USSR foreign-policy course.

There has been a considerable expansion of the rights and competency of TaSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It would be desirable to use the opportunities that are opening up in this direction to create joint enterprises with foreign companies, to train and raise the proficiency level of specialists in the national economy and representatives of the humanities, selecting for that purpose, naturally, the young people who are worthy of representing our republic abroad, who are devoted to the cause of perestroika. There is a vital need to take specific steps to bring our science out to the world, including those taken on a commercial basis. Such areas could be seismology, mathematics, Eastern studies, etc.

Today we have approached an understanding also of the fact that one of the decisive conditions for the equalization of our republic's socioeconomic development and for increasing its economic independence is the guaranteeing of its changeover to self-government and self-financing. If, from the very beginning, we carry out that work correctly, in the final analysis, simultaneously with the resolution of our most critical economic and social problems, this will undoubtedly lead to a noticeable rise in the public's standard of living and a rise in the cultural level, and will alleviate the tension in many questions, including those that pertain to the interrelationships among people of various nationalities.

The draft version of the concept for the republic's conversion to self-government and self-financing is being developed and will soon be published for nationwide discussion. This makes it unnecessary for me to paraphrase it, or to give any descriptions or evaluations of it, especially since it will be the subject of special discussion at a Central Committee plenum and at a session of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

It is well known that one of the peculiarities of the national question in the republic is the movement to satisfy the spiritual, linguistic, cultural, and other demands of the Tajiks who are living compactly on the territory of other union republics. This is a completely natural process that evolves from the realities of our life.

However, it is our profound conviction that the resolution of this problem must be approached in a well thought-out manner, without excessive emotions, without allowing this to worsen the traditional friendship and brotherhood with the peoples of our neighboring republics.

The Tajik CP Central Committee sees the resolution of this question primarily in the complete and steadfast fulfillment of the requirements of the CPSU platform with regard to the national question.

Soviet citizens must feel that they are at home anywhere in their country, irrespective of their race, religion, or nationality. We shall be guided by these principles in conducting the national policy in our republic and we are convinced that administrators will also be guided by them in the other fraternal republics.

What kind of practical questions, then, are arising? On the whole, they can be summarized by their attempt to satisfy as completely as possible the needs of the representatives of any nationality, and especially those who do not have their own national-territorial formations.

An important political factor is the guaranteeing of their proper representation, both in the republic-level and in the local agencies of state authority and administration. The republic's legislative agencies and the appropriate oblast ispolkoms must develop immediately the specific recommendations for creating republic-level national councils of citizens and commissions to deal with interethnic questions in the multinational local soviets of

people's deputies. The definition of the scope of their powers, in our opinion, should fall within the competency of the local soviets themselves.

It is necessary to direct the proper attention to problems of satisfying the sociocultural and spiritual demands of the national groups. Recently, the party committees have begun dealing with these questions in a more meaningful manner. Something that deserves approval, for example, is the experience of creating a society of friends of Jewish culture under the Tajik Department of the Soviet Cultural Foundation. Work is being done to create similar societies for the other nationalities living in Tajikistan. These societies help people to preserve and develop the culture and language of their people. And we, as has been stipulated by the CPSU platform, must increase our efforts in this direction and must help these organizations in their activities.

In a word, the problems that pertain to the home that we share in common must be resolved by everyone working together. The key to their resolution is not to be found in exclusivity, in separatism, but in unification, in the expansion of mutual aid, in friendship and mutual understanding.

Comrades! The September CPSU Central Committee Plenum has noted that, without the aggressive activity of a party that is capable of scientifically interpreting the new social process and of developing a correct policy, without the organizing actions of the party organizations at all levels, the renewal of socialist society is impossible.

In this regard, especially at the present time, on the eve of the election to the local soviets, there has been a tremendous increase in the responsibility borne by the Tajik CP Central Committee, its buro, secretariat, and the local party committees for developing and carrying out the correct, effective political line. The party committees at all levels must become effective political centers that are open to constructive recommendations, regardless of whoever submits them. They must become centers that react sensitively to the changes in all spheres of social life, that develop well-substantiated concepts both for the long-term period and for the current one.

What are the main areas in which the work of the party organizations should be concentrated today?

First of all, in the further democratization of intraparty life as a whole, in the education and promotion of capable party leaders who think in a nonstandard way. We also need new ideas and improved work forms and methods for the party committees and the primary party organizations.

Therefore, questions that are taking of exceptionally great importance are those that pertain to the steadfast observation of Leninist principles in cadre policy.

We have all been witnesses to the way in which miscalculations in the work with cadres, the incorrect evaluation of the managers' on-the-job, political, and moral

qualities, and the ignoring of the national makeup of the population in a particular area have contributed to the arising of distrust and enmity among people of various nationalities.

For example, despite the fact that our republic's inhabitants include representatives of approximately 60 nations that are taken into account by Goskomstat [State Statistics Commission], within the makeup of the republic's Supreme Soviet only ten of them are represented, while, true, 44 are represented in the local soviets. In order to give a complete knowledge of the interests and demands of the republic's citizens, it is necessary at all levels of authority to guarantee their proper representation in the soviet and economic agencies and public organizations.

In order to correct this omission, the party organizations must carry out the cadre line in a more flexible manner and must seek the advice of the Communists and non-party members when assigning managers and their deputies. And, first of it, it is necessary to reject formalism in cadre work and to depart from nomenklatura canons.

The democratization and glasnost have opened up vistas for the initiative and creative of the masses for the activities of every party committee and primary party organization. In this situation it has become vitally necessary to increase the independence of the republic's party organization.

The Central Committee sees this necessity in resolving the questions of the structure of party committees, tables of organization, finance, the formation of administrative agencies, the development of program actions, and the training of personnel.

Simultaneously we must state precisely and unambiguously that the Tajik CP is and will continue to be a component part of CPSU, rejecting the idea of federalism in its structure. Today all the Communists in our republic must feel a sharpened sense of responsibility for preventing any demarcation, any isolationism on the basis of nationality, whether it be in the party ranks, in the Komsomol, in the labor collectives, or in public organizations.

In order to fulfill its vanguard role, the party, beginning with the primary party organization and up to the Central Committee, is obliged to have a firm position with regard to all the questions of perestroika, and especially those pertaining to interethnic matters. A large responsibility is borne by the elected agencies for promptly analyzing and evaluating the situation that is developing in the labor collective, rayon, city, oblast, and republic. Much depends upon the ability to evaluate that situation correctly and promptly.

The situation is changing rapidly. Qualitatively new problems are appearing, particularly those that are linked with the changeover in the future to self-government and self-financing, with the concepts of the development of each nation and nationality, with the

growth of various public movements, and with the normalization of interethnic relations.

All this requires the party organizations to seek new approaches in political, ideological, and organizing work, to seek mobile, flexible programs for exerting an influence on people's psychology and feelings, for constantly studying public opinion and people's attitudes with regard to the main problems of life.

This real demand pertains not only to the party committees, but also to the party and economic agencies and the public organizations. I must say that many of the extreme situations could have been avoided in our republic if appropriate steps had been taken by those agencies upon which the resolution of the critical questions depended.

An example of passivity in its work can be provided by the primary party organization at the 40 Let Oktyabrya [40 Years of October] Kolkhoz, Kolkhozabadskiy Rayon, as well as the party's raykom itself. If, last year, it had correctly evaluated the situation, given a well-principled evaluation to the actions of the farm management, and had corrected it, it would have been possible, of course, to avoid the situations that disturbed the entire rayon and the oblast for a prolonged period of time. The same thing can be said about the primary party organization at the Ittifok Sovkhoz, Isfarinskiy Rayon.

The practical carrying out of the Leninist national policy, the implementation of the plenum's decisions, largely depend upon the work performed by all the republic's ideological institutions and the ideology departments of the party committees, upon their ability to see the new problems in social phenomena and events from party positions, their ability in a well-argued and comprehensible manner to propagandize the ideas of perestroika and the party policy in the national question.

When evaluating today the level of ideological work on the whole in the republic, we must admit that, despite the positive changes that are occurring here, that work does not yet completely meet the present-day requirements. The work of implementing the party's national policy is frequently carried out unsystematically, without any thorough study of the question, and frequently the most important factors are overlooked. Some individuals rely only on recommendations and instructions from higher administrative echelons. Today this entire situation must be decisively restructured.

For that purpose there is being created in the republic a republic-wide system of administering national and interethnic relations, and the international and patriotic education of the population. Commissions or departments, working groups, and sectors are beginning to function under the party committees, the Supreme Soviet, the local soviets, trade-union, Komsomol, and creative organizations, and scientific institutions; their

purpose is to study national and interethnic problems and to resolve them within the confines of their competency.

However, for the time being, all these formations are operating in isolation from one another, without any clear-cut programs. As a result, the effectiveness of their work is not great. They have not yet taken a single recommendation to the appropriate agencies for resolving problems of interethnic relations or of patriotic and international education.

Many party committees and soviet, trade-union, Komsomol, and public organizations rather frequently consider questions of the international and patriotic education of the workers, but this is done in a formal manner, without any careful analysis of the state of the interethnic relations or locating and interpreting the tendencies that are arising.

For example, in 1988-1989 those questions were the object of discussion at plenums of the Asht, Kanibadam, Isfara, and Kolkhozabad party committees. You can judge from the previously cited examples what those measures yielded.

As you know, in September 1986 the Tajik CP Central Committee developed long-term measures and a target program for the republic's party organization for the international and patriotic education of the workers, which measures and target were planned until the year 1990.

Similar measures were developed by almost all the party committees. However, their fulfillment, unfortunately, has been proceeding slowly. Frequently the good beginnings are not being brought to their completion. It would seem that, taking into consideration the great importance of resolving the problems that have accumulated in the sphere of interethnic relations, it is vitally important to create in the Tajik CP Central Committee a special department that would deal meaningfully with them and would become the coordinator of all the questions arising in this very important sphere of party work.

In the course of preparing for the forthcoming reporting and election campaign, the party committees are supposed to analyze in detail the fulfillment of these measures in each rayon, city, and oblast. This must find the appropriate evaluation also in the reports given.

The problems of the national question, as everyone knows, cannot be resolved without any scientific elaborations dealing with general theory and general methodology. But it is no secret to anyone that our social sciences have frequently lagged behind, and currently they are lagging behind in resolving the vitally important tasks of national and interethnic relations. Although I am convinced that our social scientists could not fail to see the increasing seriousness of these problems. I would like today to hear their opinion on this question.

Time persistently demands of the scientists at the Institute of Party History, under Tajik CP Central Committee (Comrade Sh. M. Sultanov), the scientific-research institutions of TaSSR Academy of Sciences, and the social sciences departments at institutions of higher learning the active elaboration of the problems of national relations under the conditions of our republic, the history of the Tajik nation, the carrying out of the Leninist national policy, and the recommendations aimed at the decisive improvement of international and patriotic education. They must also be specifically addressed—to a specific collective, rayon, city, or oblast, or to definite social groups.

A special role here belongs to TaSSR Academy of Sciences (Comrade S. Kh. Negmatullayev) as the coordinator of scientific research. But this function is being carried out weakly by the Academy. The funds allocated to study the problems of interethnic relations are being scattered and are being used ineffectively. The republic continues to lack such a trend in the social sciences as political science. The creation of a center for research on interethnic problems has been drawn out. The Academy of Sciences ought to think a bit about accelerating the resolution of these questions and about dealing thoroughly, jointly with TaSSR Gosplan, with the questions of training sociologists, psychologists, ethnographers, and political scientists, and of organizing broad scientific research on these problems.

Interethnic relations are a very delicate sphere that, essentially speaking, encompasses the entire spectrum of human interrelationships. And we must remember how important it is, in communicating with people, in articles that are published, and in works of art that are being created, to respect not only the dignity of one's own people, but also of other peoples.

It must be noted regretfully today that the level of culture in discussing interethnic questions in the republic is not high. This manifested itself noticeably during the discussion of the draft of the Language Law. Many participants in the discussion that ensued showed a lack of restraint, of good will, and of elementary mutual respect.

The preservation and development of the cultural and spiritual values of the Tajik nation, as well as all the other nations living in the republic, are becoming today a very important area in the activities of the party and state agencies, public organizations, creative unions, and all the cultural workers. Today it is necessary to assimilate firmly the knowledge that the struggle for the international brotherhood of nations is the providing of active assistance in developing the national culture of every nation.

At the present time a rather large number of heated discussions have been in progress concerning the questions of the paths and rates of developing the national culture of the Tajik nation. But these arguments have not yet yielded very much. The creative unions, the Ministry of Culture (Comrade N. T. Tabarov), and other

state institutions, obvious, must unite their efforts, coordinate their positions, and define their goals and priorities.

The job of propagandizing national culture is limping along seriously in our republic. This is obvious from the fact that, from discussions with students who will very shortly be supplementing the ranks of our intelligentsia, it was ascertained that many of them cannot give the names of our best authors, painters, composers, etc., that is, the people of whom we should be proud.

Here I cannot fail to direct the attention of the plenum participants, the republic government, and the oblast and city authorities to what can be called in unvarnished terms the lamentable state of theaters, houses of culture, and certain museums and artistic collectives which have been called upon to be centers for forming the spiritual outlook of the modern Soviet man.

Comrades, whatever difficulties we might be having with finance, resources, and limits, we are obliged to seek and to find ways to improve their material base, to satisfy the vital needs of those institutions and their workers. We ought not to economize here. The expenses will be justified.

The all-encompassing processes of renewal that are occurring in our society have brought the questions of language into the forefront. And that is completely natural. Without resolving the problems of the national language, without defining its status, it is impossible to get any closer to the resolution of the national question in general.

For many years the linguistic policy in our country was reduced simply to supporting the proclaimed language of interethnic communication, as a result of which the Russian language began to crowd out the languages of the indigenous nationalities. But for the sake of objectivity I must say that it is first of all ourselves who are to blame for that, and one would scarcely think that it would be worthwhile to seek any other culprits today.

I would like to direct your attention to the fact that when we dealt thoroughly with this question it was ascertained that more than 10 percent of the Tajiks had absolutely no fluency in their native language, and approximately 70 percent do not know the literary language, have only the haziest idea of the history of their nation, and are extremely poorly acquainted with its ancient culture.

Under the conditions of perestroika it was necessary not in words, but in deed, to restore complete linguistic equality. A large step has been taken along this path. The republic has enacted the Language Law. But, comrades, we must be completely aware of the fact today that the most important and most difficult things lie ahead, when specific work is brought to the forefront.

The rate of implementation of the Language Law is already causing completely understandable concern. Individual ministries and departments, institutions, and

organizations that were called upon to guarantee that implementation noticeably lost their vigor after the enactment of the Law.

For the time being, work to reinforce the material-technical base for language study is being extended weakly. The situation in this regard causes the most serious concern. In particular, at the present time the rate to which the students enrolled in Tajik groups are provided with textbooks and teaching aids in their native language constitutes from 10 percent to 25 percent.

A similar picture is observed in the general educational schools. Obviously, within a relatively short period of time we cannot resolve the entire set of problems that we have come up against. But they will remain unresolved if we display sluggishness and inertia in this matter.

The Language Law, the gradual introduction of which begins on 1 January 1990, requires all ministries and departments participating in this matter to guarantee the unconditional fulfillment of the planned measures within the deadlines established by the government.

The entire system of teaching the Tajik language in Russian schools requires serious improvement. Because what is happening? Whereas the graduates of Tajik schools, in one way or another, are fluent in Russian, it is completely impossible to say this about their counterparts in Russian schools with regard to knowledge of Tajik. At the same time we cannot be satisfied by the situation with the study of Russian in Tajik schools, especially the rural ones. Both there and here we need creativity and innovation, well thought-out approaches, and high responsibility.

But in order to teach Tajik to the adult population, the Ministry of Public Education (Comrade T. N. Nazarov) should immediately send people to the Moscow Courses to master the methodology and work habits for the accelerated teaching of languages, and should then organize such courses in the republic.

The ministries of housing and municipal management, public health, communication, trade and personal services, social security, and justice, Tadzhikpotrebsoyuz [Tajik Union of Consumer Cooperatives], the procuracy, and other departments in the republic must begin immediately to train their workers to execute their duties under conditions when the Language Law is in effect.

Unfortunately, I must say that a considerable segment of the population is very poorly acquainted with the statutes and articles in the Language Law and the deadlines for that Law's gradual introduction, and that no serious, purposeful work is being carried out in this direction. This creates the grounds for the arising of all kinds of conjectures and rumors, and sometimes also actions, that are incompatible with the spirit and the letter of the Language Law.

Complaints on this score are being received about workers in public health, the militia, personal services, transportation, and certain other departments.

I am not even discussing such things as signs with street names, announcements concerning the operating hours of stores, labels with the names of commodities, or similar items. It might seem that these are petty matters. But we know that the resolution of large tasks begins with small things.

It is clearly stated in the Law that all names, official announcements, trade marks, etc. must appear in two languages. This requirement of the Law, as well as other principles stated in it, must be carried out promptly and strictly.

From the point of view of today's question one also cannot fail to mention the fact that recently people in the republic have been actively discussing the migratory processes occurring in Tajikistan. They cite data, which often is not very reliable, about the considerable increase in the number of persons of European nationalities who are leaving the republic. And almost always this is linked with the enactment of the Language Law.

A large amount of work is being done currently to study the migratory processes that are occurring and to find the reasons for their increase. The obtained data attests to the fact that population migration is caused by various circumstances. In many instances it is caused by the fact that a number of socioeconomic questions are unresolved, and also by the desire of individual persons to realize more completely their needs and personal interests in other areas. A considerable impetus to this process has been provided by the democratization of the procedure by which citizens can leave to go to other countries for permanent or temporary residence.

As for the complication of the interrelationships among people of various nationalities who are living in Tajikistan, as a reason for migration, it is as yet difficult to make any unambiguous conclusions or findings. But one thing is clear. The republic has absolutely no self-interest in the loss of highly skilled workers or engineer-technical and scientific cadres. We must do everything to assure that these cadres do not leave Tajikistan.

When speaking about interethnic relations, it seems to us, we should also dwell on certain aspects of the activities of the public spontaneous movements and initiative groups. The Central Committee's position with respect to them was expressed in a report at the last plenum and there is no need to repeat it. It is not confrontation, but cooperation on a constructive basis in resolving the common tasks of perestroika—that is what we want when we enter into a dialogue with them, in the attempt to help them to find their place in perestroika.

Today the republic has approximately ten such organizations. A number of them are cooperating actively with the Komsomol and are participating in resolving the specific tasks of perestroika in the republic, city, or

rayon. However, not all of them have been registered or have achieved official recognition. What can be said on this account?

First of all, we cannot fail to be disturbed by the circumstance that such organizations frequently absorb young people with political views that are not yet completely formed, people who lend themselves easily to all kinds of appeals, including irresponsible ones.

We are also disturbed by the fact that certain of these organizations, while operating under the aegis of perestroika and even claiming to defend it, are carrying out a line aimed at the destabilization and aggravation of the interethnic relations. Moreover, in individual statements of theirs one can discern far-reaching goals that affect the sphere of state and party activities. Even the most superficial acquainted with the directedness of the steps being undertaken by them indicates that they are not always of a creative nature. So the question arises involuntarily: is this a struggle for real perestroika? Is it concern for the republic's future?

So, in general, let us ask ourselves: is it proper today to raise the question of creating a particular new social organization when we already have more than enough of them?

I think that if the members of such initiative groups are truly attempting to promote perestroika, they can channel their energy, initiative, and desire to serve the nation into practical actions by working through the party, trade-union, and Komsomol organizations, the newly elected soviets, our numerous public organizations and creative unions, and, finally, through the Kontakt group, by expanding its composition and defining its functions, if necessary! The doors of these organizations are open today for any positive initiative.

It seems to us that the desire to serve the nation can and must be implemented by means of active participation in the work of such public formations as the republic's Culture Foundation, Children's Foundation, Charity Foundation, and the recently formed Foundation for the Development of the Tajik Language, which has not yet received broad public support.

Niyazov on Cotton Harvest, Responsibilities of Officials

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[Speech by S. A. Niyazov, first secretary of the Turkmen CP Central Committee, at the 16th Turkmen CP Central Committee Plenum]

[Text] The discussion of the draft of the Turkmen CP platform for the forthcoming election is coming to an end. Each of us has his own opinion, his own evaluations of the documents that were presented for consideration by the Central Committee plenum. This is completely normal and corresponds to the spirit of the times. But,

obviously, you will agree that the discussion that occurred deserves being evaluated as a major event that is of extreme importance for the activities of the Central Committee and the entire republic party organization during this very critical period of perestroika. For the first time we are accepting a pre-election program document. This was caused not only by the tremendous importance of the political moment that we are experiencing. It evolves from the understanding of the new role of the Turkmen Communist Party in the republic's life, and from the hopes that the republic's inhabitants place upon us.

To a greater and greater extent, radical changes are encompassing the economy, the social relations, the political system, the spiritual sphere, and the work style and work methods of the party committees and organizations, and administrators at all levels. The moral atmosphere has become cleaner, there has been an increase in the rate of sociopolitical activity among all population groups and segments, democracy is deepening, and glasnost is expanding.

The economy of Turkmenistan is becoming more dynamic and more socially directed. With regard to the basic indicators of economic growth, the level of the previous five-year plan has been reached, and, for a number of items, surpassed. There has been an increase in the growth rates of national income. A substantial growth has been achieved in industrial production. The agrarian sector of the economy has begun to develop in a more stable manner and more rapidly. There has been an increase in the production of all types of agricultural output. The stability in the work of the cotton growers is truly gratifying.

By demonstrating the maximum amount of self-control, precision and organizational spirit, and a high level of skills, cotton growers have grown and brought in a record-breaking harvest. As of today, they have already turned over to the state 1.36 million tons, including more than 431,000 tons of fine-staple varieties; and almost 75 percent of the total harvest was gathered by machines.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude for all those who guaranteed that result, and especially to commend the workers of Tashauz and Chardzhou oblasts, and of Serakhskiy, Oktyabrskiy, Ashkhabadskiy, Kirovskiy, Kaakhsinskiy, Khodzhabasskiy, Sayatskiy, Sakarskiy, Tedzhenskiy, Leninskiy, Charshanginskiy, and other rayons, who made the largest contribution to fulfilling the planned assignments.

There has been a steady increase in the percentage of capital investments channeled into the development of the social sphere. In the current five-year plan, the amount of housing that will be activated is one-third more than the average amount for the years of the previous five-year plan; the number of daycare centers and schools will almost double; and the number of hospitals will triple.

It is very important that the party committees and organizations stand at the head of the processes that are occurring broadly throughout the republic. While directing and organizing the complicated reform work, they are also restructuring themselves and interpreting their own role in a new way. The party committees are striving more and more persistently to achieve a situation in which every Communist has a thorough and conscious understanding of his personal responsibility for the state of the moral-political climate in each specific labor collective and in the republic as a whole.

We feel that this is the true course and we shall continue to proceed along it and, by each step in our practical actions, to strengthen the vote of confidence given by the nation to the republic's party organization.

But it is also true that the changes are not occurring easily. The well-established stereotypes in the way of thinking and acting, and the people who have become accustomed to living and working in the old way, make it impossible to develop at full capacity, and at times seriously restrain the rates of our forward movement.

We shall have to resolve a large number of problems, and to resolve them on the spot, making complete use of any opportunity that presents itself, and, primarily, the election of the TuSSR people's deputies and the local soviets of people's deputies. Therefore the appeal to the nation with a well-argued pre-election platform will help us to establish closer contact with the masses, and will contribute to the consolidating of all the republic's progressive forces around the party.

Taking into consideration the vital importance of this document, we sent a prepared draft to you ahead of time and asked you to study it. I can remark with a sense of satisfaction that the attitude taken to this assignment by all the Central Committee members and candidate members and by the members of the Auditing Commission of Turkmen CP has been an exceptionally responsible one. The Central Committee's Commission for Questions of Party-Organizational and Cadre Work has received a rather large number of comments and recommendations.

First of all, as the comrades who spoke have correctly noted, this is essentially a political platform that provides a precise and clear idea to all the republic's inhabitants concerning the goals and tasks of the Turkmen CP during this critical time period. Therefore it is necessary to call this important political document that is being considered the platform of the Turkmen CP for the election of TuSSR people's deputies and the local soviets of people's deputies.

In our opinion, it is also necessary to agree with the need to designate more precisely the positions of the republic's Communist Party with respect to the formation of the deputy corps. For the party organizations this question is by no means a matter of indifference, but the posing of this question does not mean the continuation of the practice of issuing individual work assignments or

various sets of regulations. On the contrary, we must continue to promote the development of the process of democratization, the creation of the necessary conditions for the complete expression of the voters' will, and for the voters' active participation in the formation of the deputy corps. But, at the same time, we must strive, by using the forms and methods that are inherent in us, to elect to the soviets at all levels the most active participants in perestroika, who, by their actions, prove their adherence to the course that has been chosen and who are ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of people and their needs and interests.

The formulation that appears to be a valuable one and one that completely reflects one of the most painful spots in our life, the formulation that was proposed by a number of Central Committee members is the formulation of a point in the platform that pertains to the problems of reinforcing the family and rendering assistance to it in fulfilling its social functions. This area actually must become a priority one in the activity of the republic's party organization, since the state of affairs here largely determines the political and moral situation in the republic.

Amendments that are important and timely ones are those that pertain to the need to show constant concern for war and labor veterans, for internationalist fighting men, persons with disabilities, and families with a large number of children.

Our platform must be inseparably linked with the CPSU platform "The Party's National Policy Under Present-Day Conditions," which was developed by the CPSU Central Committee's September 1989 Plenum. The activities to develop interethnic relations, to intensify the patriotic and international education of people, and to improve the exchange of experience and spiritual values with the fraternal republics are exceptionally important today.

The content of the document being considered has been enriched by the numerous amendments dealing with the carrying out of measures to educate people to take a respectful attitude toward the country's Armed Forces and toward the work with youth, which measures are being carried out by the republic's public organizations.

In a word, the recommendations and amendments that you have made put the presented draft into a concrete form, bring it closer to the needs and interests of the republic's workers, and substantially increase its political directedness. They all deserve inclusion in the final version of the document. I am convinced that its realization will enable us to rise to a new level of work and to achieve the maximum implementation of the comments and recommendations that people have expressed.

The chief factor that determines the specifics of the current election and that differentiates it from all the previous campaigns is the fact that it will occur under

conditions of increased social and political tension and the progressing process of the intensification of the politicizing of society.

The working out of the new principles for organizing the electoral campaign and for the participation of the party agencies in it, principles that make it possible to monitor the overall tone and directedness, the critical factors, and the overall course, rather than the partial successes or miscalculations, is becoming today the central question in the activity of the party committee.

Definite specifics are being introduced into our work by the changes and additions to the TuSSR Constitution and by the new electoral legislation. The enacted documents substantially improve the electoral system, and rid it of many formal and bureaucratic accretions.

Summing up all the innovations, one can say confidently that, for the first time in our electoral practice, they legislatively guarantee the real expression of the voters' will and the broad pluralism of their opinions, and the use of a truly democratic mechanism for forming essentially new agencies of state authority.

Now it is a matter of implementing the decisions that have been made. Therefore it is very important at this stage of the electoral campaign to carry out broad work among the republic's population to explain the content of the changes and additions that have been introduced into the republic's Constitution and the new election laws that have been enacted.

The electoral campaign in the republic has been gaining power with every passing day. The staffing of the electoral commissions at all levels has been completed, and the nomination of the candidates for election as TuSSR people's deputies and the local soviets of people's deputies has begun.

However, with the beginning of the electoral campaign, there have also arisen those conditions for organizational and party-political work that have not existed previously.

Take, for example, the procedure that has been approved by the new law for electing people's deputies from public organizations. While granting the right to the public structures to nominate their candidates and to fight for the mandates at the agencies of authority, it stipulates that the final choice will be made by the voters in the specific okrug. This increases the responsibility of the candidates from the public formations, and encourages them to seek the most acceptable forms of electoral work.

As has been demonstrated by experience, no recommendations made by party committed will help or will be completely implemented if Communists do not accept them inwardly, if they are not founded on the situation that has developed. Therefore, before making any decisions, it is absolutely mandatory to seek people's advice. This must become an invariable rule, a law in our life. It is also important for the primary party organizations to

carry out a frank discussion of the Communists' position in the election, and to act collectively to form an opinion and evaluations with regard to all the situations that arise. A very important task is assuring that every party worker and every economic manager come to a clear and completely definite conclusion: the awareness and the mood of the voters is influenced in the most direct manner by the questions of providing people with housing, as well as the organizing of trade and recreation, in a word, by everything that pertains to a person's living conditions.

Much also depends upon the state of affairs in the republic's economy. It must be directly acknowledged that this sector also has a number of problems. One has seen hesitancy in resolving a number of vitally important questions pertaining to economic development. The rates of assimilation of the anti-expenditure mechanism of management and of the introduction of economic methods and incentives have not been satisfactory. Work is being done with insufficient forcefulness to eliminate the losses in production or to reduce the number of unprofitable enterprises and farms. The Central Committee's Commission for Questions of Socio-economic Development, jointly with the administrator-Communists of the Council of Ministers, Gosplan, and the ministries and departments, must intensify their actions to implement the measures that have been set down to assure the financial improvement of Turkmenistan's economy.

It is especially alarming that not all the cadres are attempting to work with a clean conscience. Once again we have found in our ranks people who, for the sake of imaginary prosperity, have taken the path of deliberately distorting the actual state of affairs and have become accomplices in the commission of crimes. Recently the Central Committee Buro considered instances of a shortage of 8250 tons of raw cotton in the 1988 harvest, with a total value of more than 9 million rubles in Iolotanskiy Rayon. In addition to the considerable economic loss, we have been dealt a major political and moral blow. You know that severe conclusions have been made with regard to this instance. This is a serious warning, and I can assure the Communists and all workers in Turkmenistan that we shall do every necessary to assure that this become impossible in our life. In order to achieve that goal, we are ready to take any measures. We will absolutely not put up with frauds and degenerates.

When carrying out the pre-election work, it is necessary to be well aware that our chief strength and support have been, are now, and continue to be the primary party organizations and the Communists. Their position, role, influence, and authority must guarantee the success of the job at hand. We need today, as never before, constructivism and the unification of the forces and actions of all the party links. It is necessary to make known the political essence, the entirely complexity and diversity of the perestroika processes that are occurring in the

country, in the republic, and in the collective, to every party cell, every Communist.

The consolidation of the party forces on a profound and newly recognized political basis, which we attempted to enunciate in the draft of the pre-election platform of the Turkmen Communist Party, will require the fundamental differentiation of the work forms and methods and new points for the application of efforts.

The most alarming symptom that we cannot overlook is the fact that a number of the party organizations are divorced from the masses, and that there is poor knowledge about people's moods and demands. As a rule, the voters do not support the proposals made by such organizations, and take an extremely critical attitude toward them.

The party committees and organizations that act correctly are those that make dynamic use of the democratic principles of the election, that carry out a policy of sociopolitical dialogue with all categories of workers, public organizations, and public-action formations, and that persistently support the acknowledged leaders, the people with initiative, the people who are creative and devoted to the cause of perestroika, people who are able to evoke the voters' interest not in demagogic statements or empty promises, but, by the honesty of their positions, by their persuasiveness and their ability, to take a constructive approach to every question.

It is necessary to be concerned about the close interaction between the party committees and the public organizations, primarily with the trade unions, the Komso-mol, women's organizations, veterans' organizations, and others. It is necessary to determine how to help them to carry out work at all stages of the electoral campaign and to fight for their candidates for election as deputies. We must learn how to carry out our own line dynamically by way of the Communists working in those organizations.

The weakest link in the actions of the party organizations in the electoral campaign has been and continues to be the work at people's place of residence. At the same time, the orientation of the election laws toward the nomination of citizens who, as a rule, work or reside on the territory of the particular election okrug requires the considerable expansion of the work performed by the party organizations specifically at the voters' place of residence.

It is correspondingly necessary to pay attention to such work forms as the preparation and conducting of assemblies and general meetings of citizens. At such time it is very important to take into consideration the fact that the increased force of public opinion, and the level of the politicizing and the self-organization of masses, are not always equivalent to the level of the competency, maturity, or their ability to make a correct choice that corresponds to the interests of perestroika. This is fraught with the most unpredictable consequences. Therefore it is important for the work at the place of

residence to be continued, to a greater and greater extent, on a constant basis by the Communists residing in the appropriate housing areas, settlements, and villages. For that purpose it would be desirable for the party committees to establish dual accounting for them—both at their place of work, and at their place of residence.

And now I would like to discuss questions of propaganda and mass-political work. I would like to devote some attention to them. It is very important to assure, in the actions of the party committees and organizations dealing with the management of the entire pre-election agitation and propaganda work, the effectiveness and the aggressive nature of that work. The Central Committee's ideological commission and department must state the best ways to achieve that goal, how to create an efficient system of agitation and propaganda support for the election campaign. However, one cannot sense the proper initiative on their part. It is necessary, over and over again, to point out the extremely poor work of the agitation collectives. They continue to be left to their own devices, and they are not receiving from us the necessary assistance, or the corresponding concretization of the tasks, forms, and methods of their actions. The attention of the Central Committee's ideological department and of the party organizations to the agitation collectives must be more concentrated and more directed, and the mistakes in this work at the present time are inadmissible. Finally, it is necessary right now to begin to work out the argumentation for those acute problems on which individual candidates or their support groups could rely in the pre-election struggle.

A special role in the election campaign is assigned to the mass media, and it must be noted that, so far, they have not been distinguished by their efficiency or time-responsiveness. The party committees should guarantee the more effective management of their actions, and should use completely the experience that was accumulated in the past. The pre-election competition among the candidates' platforms, the spirit of competitiveness, must be reflected on the newspaper pages and in the radio and television broadcasts. The candidates must have the opportunity to discuss their position, and each of those candidates must be presented under the same conditions. I emphasize this factor because in the past there have been instances when this condition was violated.

It is extremely important to increase the role of the editorial offices of the city and rayon newspapers and of local radio broadcasting, and to use them in order to assure that the public will become completely acquainted with the candidates for election as deputies and their platforms.

In a word, the current election raises many new questions and unusual requirements and tasks. Implementing them requires a serious amount of organizing and political work, and that means not just something in the future, but right now. What we need, as we have never needed before, is a carefully thought-out, purposeful

strategy and tactics that take into consideration the real situation and the interests and needs of the voters and various categories of the population. The basic condition for party-political work is its comprehensive nature, the interconnected nature of the measures being carried out. It is necessary to select from this diversity of problems the chief ones, to bring them to completion, to obtain a concrete result, to make a breakthrough on the neglected sectors—this is the only thing that will enable our voters to get a real sensation of the jobs to be done and the Communists' influence.

All the work linked with the preparation for and the carrying out of the election must rest solidly on a legislative base and must take into complete consideration the situation and the uniqueness of the appropriate legal acts, and must be carried out with the strict observance of the TuSSR Constitution and the election laws. It is important for the party committees and the Communists who are working in the local soviets and election commissions to strive for the implementation of the election rights of every citizen.

An efficiently operating system must be activated everywhere to take into consideration the workers' mandates and recommendations, to react in a time-responsive and efficient manner to them, and to inform them about the steps that have been taken.

Those, comrades, are the questions that I would like to discuss. I think that everything that we spoke about today, and the decisions that we shall make, in the final analysis must help us to reinforce the Communists' positions in carrying out perestroika.

Turkmen Official on Streamlining People's Control Committee

90US0299A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 28 Nov 89 p 2

[Interview with V.D. Deyneku by N. Charukhcheva: "Managing Control"]

[Text] "It seems to me that of late we have gotten carried away with control. It happens that in some organizations, in a year they have five, and even ten inspections. Everyone to his own line, of course; but the collective is having a fit. Can the activities of these organizations really not be coordinated?" writes E. Berenov, from Mary.

They can, as indicated by an experiment conducted by the republic's People's Control Committee. Our correspondent has asked Turkmen SSR People's Control Committee Deputy Chairman V.D. Deyneku to describe it in greater detail.

[Deyneku] The experiment has been completed. Its results were examined at a session of the Turkmen SSR People's Control Committee. It was decided to acquaint all the oblast, city and rayon committees with how the experiment went. And what is more, since time will not permit delay, to take measures to set up, under the

auspices of the People's Control Committee of the USSR and the union republics, a unified coordination system of social and state control, as required by Article 92 of the USSR Constitution, and by the decisions of the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the 19th All Union Party Conference.

The experiment was conducted in 1988 on the facilities of organizations in Bezmein. Its goal was to achieve coordination of actions of all organs of inter-agency control, to eliminate parallelism and duplication. And this in the final analysis increases the effectiveness of inspections.

The gorkom buro established a committee, headed by city People's Control Committee Chairman I.G. Zveryev, which is to assume full responsibility for coordination of activities.

Membership on the council includes 17 persons, including two department chiefs from the party gorkom and the gorispolkom deputy chairman; also, first secretary of the city Komsomol committee; supervisors of law-enforcement and financial organs and the sanitary-epidemiological station; and representatives of other inspection organs.

A regulation was drawn up defining the purposes and tasks of the council, and envisaging a unified inspection plan. The plan considered, incidentally, inspections conducted by republic organizations as well. Upon request of the council they informed Bezmein of what, where and when they had decided to inspect. In short, the unified plan had been thought out to the nth degree. Priority was given to questions of introduction of new management methods and solution of socio-economic tasks in the city—supplying the populace with housing, food, and consumer goods and services.

The results were impressive. Just imagine: last year the city finance department had decided to hold 177 inspections, and the gosbank department, 107. However, the coordinating council, after weighing all the pros and cons, decided to include in the plan only 39 and 31 inspections, respectively. Thanks to such adjustments, every enterprise in the city was inspected one time; on the other hand, several controlling organizations took part in the inspection at the same time. In previous years, there had been from three to eight inspections, at various times.

Here is yet another figure for comparison. More than 100 inspections were conducted in 1987 in the city's construction organizations alone. In 1988, 50 joint inspections were conducted at all the city's enterprises and organizations, including 13 comprehensive inspections, with the participation of all the city's controlling organizations and a number of ministries and agencies.

The coordinated inspection schedule is not kept secret from anyone. Every economic administrator and every working collective knows about the periods of inspection for their enterprise.

The question might arise: And what about suddenness? After all without them it is hard to catch napping supervisors who are trying to "cover their tails."

But you see we are trying to achieve this as well. You see, the purpose of control is not only and not so much to find mistakes and mete out punishment. It is more important to forestall possible violations, which very often, as experience shows, are not committed intentionally; but are the result of ignorance, inattention or other reasons. Therefore, in the council's work, a great deal of attention is given to prevention. Any supervisor or official at an enterprise may approach the inspection commission for assistance or clarification, to include questions which were not in the inspectors' plan. And if the question was important, the controllers would not ignore it.

I'll give you an example: At the Bezmain railroad station, they were inspecting the use of rolling stock, and whether the cars were being unloaded on time. At that time station workers appealed to the commission and informed them of violations of housing and labor legislation.

And at the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Motor Transportation's Motor-Vehicle Enterprise-5, where the commission was inspecting the fulfillment of plans for freight shipment and organization of passenger transportation, the people called to its attention the fact that the procedure for withholding taxes and payment for sick leave was being violated.

Thus, the field of the inspection was expanded, and the shortcomings exposed were quickly eliminated.

The openness of inspections and glasnost on their results are very important. For example, the results of an inspection of the state and the development of subsidiary farms and the cities enterprises and organizations were discussed extensively in the working collectives. Analysis of critical remarks and suggestions permitted finding the causes which hindered the development of the subsidiary farms, and working out practical recommendations. These materials were also discussed at the gorkom party plenum last June.

But if the controllers had been limited to discussing the results of the inspection in a narrow circle, and punishment of the guilty parties alone, they would hardly have achieved results such as these: Eight enterprises in the city concluded agreements with kolkhoses and sovkhoses on mutual cooperation. Six enterprises were able to guarantee a supply of meat, milk and vegetables for their workers; the Material-Technical Supply base of Turkmenglavenergo and the State Regional Power Station imeni V.I. Lenin are already finishing construction of subsidiary farms where they will raise fish; and certain enterprises have taken up bee-keeping. In short, work has become energized.

Traveling sessions of the People's Control Committee have also become a very effective form of strengthening

interaction with other controlling and social organizations. One such example is the session at the Bezmein rug combine, at which gross violations of production and financial-management activities were examined. Taking part in the discussion were representatives of the councils of the working collective, social organizations, supervisors of services and sub-divisions of the combine, and also representatives of the city's party, Soviet and economic organs. Such representation helped to conduct a thorough and open review of the materials from the inspection. While submitting resolutions and making recommendations to correct the situation, the members of the committee took into consideration the opinion of those present in the hall.

Having learned that the director, chief engineer, chief bookkeeper and his deputies, and six chiefs of shops and services at the combine had already been removed from their positions; that criminal cases had been brought against three materially-responsible persons; and that the indebtedness and overpayment of monetary resources had been liquidated and restored, the committee subjected to strict disciplinary and material liability the director of quality control and the chief engineer, the chiefs of production and the production department, and other guilty parties. And it set the date for a follow-up inspection.

Under the conditions of the experiment, the scouts at the lowest level—the People's Control Groups—have begun to work more effectively and in a new way. Today there are already 12 unified-control groups in operation at the enterprises and organizations of Bezmein—and nearly 300 in the republic, which are combining their efforts with the organizations of their enterprises, departments and sections that carry out control functions. And within every enterprise the number of inspections has declined and parallelism has ceased. In the past, you see, all this had for a long time kept people from carrying out their basic responsibilities.

But it would not be fair to keep silent about the errors and problems that were unearthed in the course of the experiment. For example, the coordination council was not always able to observe the dates established for inspections. Nor did their quality always come up to the needs of the day. It happened that the council would "forget" to develop suggestions for eliminating the shortcomings discovered, or would not fully monitor their realization.

But, on the whole, the experiment was given positive marks. Now our task is to switch the work of all oblast, city and rayon people's control committees and groups onto the new tracks.

Reports and elections of people's control committees, groups and posts have now begun; they will be completed in December. This campaign is the first stage in the establishment of a unified system of social control, and

for regulating the structure of the controlling formations at the primary units of production, administration and services.

The Law on the State Enterprise (Association) has significantly expanded the rights of the working collectives. And under these conditions more powerful social control than we have today is needed. But for the time being it is poorly organized—its output is rather low.

People's Control Committees must carefully and thoroughly work out the entire range of questions on establishing a new, unified structure of controlling organs, with party, trade-union, Komsomol and other social organizations, and with the councils of working collectives. And they must come to the reporting-election meetings with their minds already made-up, as to where would it make sense to establish unified people's control organs.

Turkmen Republic Union of Jurists Formed

90US02984 Ashkhabad *TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA* in Russian 28 Nov 89 p 1

[TURKMENINFORM news item: "The Jurist's High Calling"]

[Text] The founding congress of the Turkmen SSR Jurists Union has taken place in Ashkhabad. The matters of the republic jurists union's creation and its missions were discussed, the new social organization's constitution was adopted, and its management organs were elected.

It was noted in the report which Turkmen SSR Minister of Justice Kh. Atayev presented at the congress, and in other delegates' addresses, that increasing professional jurists' sociopolitical activeness aimed at solving perestroika's legal support problems, democratizing all spheres of the society's life, forming the socialist law-based state, and bringing about the legal universal compulsory education is now acquiring particular importance. Because of this, a need has arisen to create in the republic a social organization that may unite within its membership the more than 3,000 professional jurists who work in the various sectors. Limiting the activity of these by departments leads to inconsistency in implementing legal policy.

The Turkmenistan Jurists Union is an independent social organization that enters into the USSR Jurists Union on a voluntary basis. It must take an active part in bringing about court and legal reform, establishing lawfulness, law and order, and social justice, and in increasing the activeness of its every member.

Solution of the problems associated with enhancing lawfulness and stepping up the struggle against criminality has great political importance, demanding a profound, multipronged approach in the development of an

effective system of organizational, legal, economic, preventive-education, and other measures, not only by economic and political means, but also by juridical means.

Jurists, united into a single organization, are called upon to further the improvement of lawmaking activity and the enhancement of constitutional regulations in the republic and country, starting with the necessity to establish the law's supremacy in all spheres of the society's life and increase its role as an act directly embodying the sovereign will of the people.

Maximum support of democratization in the lawmaking process, active utilization of the legislative-initiative right, and study of the existing legislation's effectiveness must become special concerns of the union. Great attention is to be focused on shaping genuine guarantees of protection for human rights and dignity, both in legislation and in its application practices.

An important role will belong to the Turkmen SSR Jurists Union in strengthening every jurist's independence and freedom from influence, in increasing responsibility for the flawless performance of his or her professional duty and the triumph of lawfulness, validity, and justice in the decision of every case, in improving the

dissemination of legal knowledge, and in the citizens' legal indoctrination and legal universal compulsory education.

The congress elected B.K. Nurmukhamedov, the republic's chief state arbitrator, as the Turkmen SSR Jurist Union's chairman. The republic council, the revisory commission, and the commission on ethics also were elected.

Turkmen Party Members Rehabilitated

18300859 Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 2 Dec 89 p1

[Unattributed report: "In the Turkmen CP Central Committee: Reinstatement into the Party"]

[Text] The Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Buro examined the possible rehabilitation into the Party of several persons who had been illegally subjected to repression in the thirties. Among them are D.A. Avksentyevskiy, I.G. Larionov, B. Perengliyev, A. Niyazov, T. Baymamedov, S. Volmamedov, and M. Izmailov. All of them in the past worked in different sectors of economic and cultural development of the Republic.

The identification and Party rehabilitation of victims of arbitrariness and injustice is continuing.

Proposal to Curb Estonian Immigration Offered*18150122A Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian
25 Oct 89 p 1*

[Article by Hans Rassar: "Let's Declare 1990 the Year for Protecting the Indigenous Population"]

[Text] The anti-immigration measures offered up until now have not convinced anyone that the immigration of other-nationals would abate significantly in the years to come. It is obvious that it will take some time to establish and implement any measures that would significantly curb immigration. But time doesn't wait. The existence of Estonians as a nation is in great danger. Yet, we should have the right to defend ourselves.

Considering the foregoing, I'd like to propose—**declaring 1990 the year to protect the indigenous population of Estonia, and to place a temporary moratorium, effective immediately, on the registration of all other-nationals, for whatever reason, till 1 January 1991.**

Priority for apartments in all dwellings completed during the year to protect the indigenous population of Estonia should be given to those who have lived in the same city or community for two or three generations, but who have had to settle for inferior housing conditions.

A regulation should be established, beginning 1 January 1991 that would, for each coming year, permit the registration of other-nationals, wherever justified and within the limits of the law, for up to 30 percent of the number of other-nationals who have emigrated from the same city or community during the previous year.

People's Deputy Falk on Soviet Germans, Equal Nationality Treatment*90US0281A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Nov 89 p 1*

[Interview with P. Falk: "Lieutenant Colonel P. Falk: Equal in Filial Duty"]

[Text] Our correspondent discusses the problems of interethnic relations with USSR People's Deputy Lieutenant Colonel P. Falk, senior navigator at a certain air regiment.

[Correspondent] Petr Petrovich, the editor's mail currently contains a rather large number of letters dealing with one and the same question: What is happening in interethnic relations? Why is it, in the fifth year of perestroika, not only have the old cracks in the walls of the Soviet home that we share not been repaired, but new ones have been formed?

[Falk] I think that it is impossible to give a single answer to that question, inasmuch as we are talking about a multilevel phenomenon. On the one hand, one sees revealed today old contradictions that have not been mentioned for long years. On the other hand, the new conditions that have been engendered or initiated by

perestroika are promoting the increase in the self-awareness of nations, and the striving to express and resolve much of what could previously not be resolved. Democratization and glasnost have smashed the rusty locks of fear and uncertainty. People have finally starting talking at the top of their voice. But inasmuch we are all very different, this discussion has been proceeding along different lines. Sometimes that discussion is excessively sharp and strident. In order to rise to a new level of relations—relations that are truly equal, honest, and respectful—it is necessary for us, first of all, to listen to one another. To understand, to be completely aware of the truth about one another, and to repudiate and reject obvious absurdities. And there are a rather large number of them. Many people, for example, continue to think sincerely that Soviet Germans are persons who, for various reasons, remained after World Wars I and II, as well as their descendants. And they take a corresponding attitude toward them. I remember clearly how neighbors with whom we had lived very closely for many years were literally shaken when they learned that my wife and I are Germans.

[Correspondent] But the situation is changing. Much was discussed at the party's 27th Congress, the 19th Party Conference, and the Central Committee's September Plenum. The mass media and public organizations have actively joined in that work.

[Falk] All that is true. But it is not just a matter of an information shortage. The German nation and the other nations on whom the Stalinist repressions were heaped have a definite need for open discussion about what happened. They need the restoration of their political position in society, and need governmental decisions about their place of residence. A factor of tremendous, decisive importance in this sense is the declaration that was adopted by our country's Supreme Soviet—the Declaration concerning the recognition of the illegal and criminal nature of all the repressive acts against the nations that had been subjected to enforced resettlement, and concerning the guaranteeing of their rights. It would seem that this is only the beginning. Specific decisions lie ahead. Much can and must be done.

[Correspondent] What specifically?

[Falk] For example, by means of special research it is important to ascertain the first-priority needs of various nations and nationalities in various spheres of life. This is necessary in order to develop and carry out a national policy that guarantees the real legal, social, cultural, and linguistic interests of the nations. The appropriate commissions in our parliament are at work. This is reassuring.

[Correspondent] At the Congress you discussed the autonomy of the Soviet Germans. What has changed since then? How is that question being resolved today?

[Falk] It seems to me that we cannot avoid a brief excursion into history. The mass resettlement of Germans from Europe to Russia began during the reign of

Catherine the Great. It was caused by the needs of the Russian state, by the need to settle, assimilate, and secure firmly behind the imperial crown the borderlands in the lower reaches of the Volga, in the Northern Caucasus, and in South Russia. The life of the resettled population never was easy, and so it was not accidental that they took active part in the Pugachev uprising.

The population in the German colonies grew rapidly. With the passage of time, excess manpower appeared and a land shortage began to be felt. As a result, there was resettlement into new areas.

The Germans participated actively in the revolutionary movement, and they fought on the civil war fronts. In October 1918 the 1st Congress of Soviet German Colonies of the Volga Region adopted a decision concerning the formation of an oblast for the Volga Germans. That decision was approved by a 19 October 1918 Sovnarkom [Soviet of People's Commissars] decree, that was signed by V.I. Lenin. The autonomous oblast of the Volga Germans, or, as it was still called, "the Labor Commune," became the first national formation of this type under the Soviet authority.

But, later on, tragic pages were also written into the history of the Soviet Germans. They were unjustly accused of aiding and abetting fascist Germany, and under this pretext hundreds of thousands of people were forcibly resettled to the east, and mobilized into a so-called labor army. Of course, after the war the Germans expected the restoration of justice. However, as persons who had been specially resettled, they were forbidden from leaving their places of residence. It was not until the mid-1950's that the limitations were partially lifted. How pleased the people were to learn that they were authorized to serve in the Soviet Army! But the matter of returning to the Volga area was stymied at that time. Up until 1972. Although the question of restoring the trampled autonomy was raised twice, starting in the mid-1960's.

It was not until now that this question, all things considered, will finally receive its resolution. Recently, together with my co-chairmen of the Vozrozhdeniye [Rebirth] Society that was created in March 1989 (that society has as its goal the restoration of a German republic), I had a conversation with Rafik Nishanovich Nishanov. The conversation proved to be constructive. We met support and understanding.

[Correspondent] Petr Petrovich, you are serving in an area of dense population of Soviet Germans. Is that the reason that, to a rather considerable degree, determines the directions taken in your activities as deputy?

[Falk] Not exactly. Unfortunately, certain party administrators in the oblast interpreted my statement at the Congress in the sense that I intend to carry out the mandates only of the Germans, and will completely forget the Russians, Tatars, and Bashkirs. No, that is not so... This approach once again, one might say in passing, attests to the complexity of the problem, and to the fact

that stereotypes in the sphere of interethnic relations have not yet been eliminated. We subsequently spoke repeatedly about this with the obkom first secretary and with the party aktiv. And the conclusion reached was: in order to remove and discharge the tension, it is necessary to talk honestly to people about the situation that has developed, to ask them for their advice, and to dispel the cautiousness and lack of understanding. For that purpose the YUZHNY URAL newspaper published a message from the oblast's party and Soviet administrators to the population. The subsequent work of the ideological apparatus also proved to be productive and beneficial. It was as though people saw one another in a new light, and had become newly acquainted with them.

Of course I have to delve into the problems that are disturbing my compatriots. There is a rather large number of them. They include the problem of autonomization that we spoke about; the introduction of the German language into the daycare centers in the village of Petrovka, Aleksandrovskiy Rayon; and the analysis of the reasons for the departure of Germans in entire villages from places that they have inhabited for a long time.

[Correspondent] How do you explain these mass departures? Aren't decisions such as this usually rash ones?

[Falk] There are all kinds of reasons. Why, for example, did literally all the inhabitants of the village of Suzanovo, Novosergiyevskiy Rayon, decide to leave? The people were convinced that for the persons remaining there the relations with the new settlers arriving there were developing poorly. The authorities proved to be incapable of resolving with proper tact the conflicts that have been arising. So the family decided to leave. Some to FRG, others to Holland, and still others simply to a neighboring German village.

But there was a somewhat different situation that was told to me by the inhabitants of the village of Staropavlovka, Buzulukskiy Rayon. Several Turkish Meskhet families arrived there to take up permanent residence. Setting up living accommodations for them required the authorities and the residents to exert certain efforts. The people helped in any way that they could. The kolkhoz chairman, drawing on the meager public reserves, allocated a truckload of cement. However, the rayon procurator's office saw in his actions a violation of legality, which is fraught with unpleasantnesses for any kind of person. People do not understand why this happens, and it gives rise to conjectures and grievances. These two situations are in general different, but both of them, it seems to me, require taking well thought-out actions, rather than the making of hasty conclusions.

[Correspondent] To what extent do the national problems affect or interest the military personnel in the garrison?

[Falk] They do affect them, they are of interest to them, and they alarm them. Not too long ago I was visited by soldiers who had been inducted in the trans-Caucasus.

They asked me to comment on the well-known events in Tbilisi. First it was necessary to discuss the situation in Fergana with those who had been inducted in Central Asia. Officer Ye. Kutsenko shared their grievance. Without any convincing explanations the Main Administration of Cadres returned to him, a recent candidate for acceptance at the academy, his personal file. The thing that struck the officer as being unpleasant was the line where his nationality was indicated—Russian. That line was underlined, and had a heavy question mark alongside of it. What was there here that had displeased the anonymous official—the Ukrainian sound of Kutsenko's name? Just try figuring it out. Well, Kutsenko is racking his brain, trying to think of what specific thing prevented him from becoming a student.

In general, it seems to me that this is a topic for a deputy inquiry—the officers and generals of what nationalities are represented in our higher military leadership? This also, I am convinced, determines the effectiveness of the international indoctrination in the army. I also want to say that the officers and warrant officers have accumulated a rather large number of burning questions concerning the determination of their permanent place of residence after getting out of the service.

In general, the interethnic tension is a kind of field of force in which all the public institutions are located, including the army. It is completely obvious that, for the Armed Forces, it is necessary today to have a well-extended program for improving interethnic relations. We must not delay in this matter, we must not act in the old way, and we must not reject anything beneficial that has been painstakingly accumulated and collected. At such time it would be desirable to take a good look at the work experience under the new conditions. That experience does exist.

I know, for example, that in the unit where Lieutenant Colonels V. Balaban and B. Batmazov serve the individual work with the soldiers is always concrete, is always built on a knowledge of the peculiarities of their subordinates' national character. The new replacements are assigned efficiently here, and there is the strictest observance of the proper representation of the nationalities in elected agencies, public organizations, commissions, and groups dealing with interethnic questions. The question of satisfying the soldier's cultural needs is resolved collectively. Films produced by motion-picture studios in the union republics, collections of recordings of musical works, libraries of fictional books in the languages of the peoples of the USSR, bound volumes of newspapers and magazines—all these have an effect on internationalism, on the person, and consequently on discipline and combat readiness.

In conclusion I would like to mention something else. The need to remember that internationalism cannot serve just one or two nations today, and three or four nations tomorrow, depending upon the political situation in the country. This is especially typical of the army,

in whose ranks everyone has always been, and will continue to be, equal in their filial duty—the defense of the Homeland.

Status of Azerbaijani Refugees From Armenia Reviewed

90US0160A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
29 Oct 89 p 4

[Article by Grigoriy Kolodin, SELSKAYA ZHIZN special correspondent, AzSSR: "Refugees: It Was Not in Accordance With Their Own Will That They Left Hearth and Home. How Are They to Live Now?"]

[Text] Let us divide a clean piece of paper in half. On the left-hand side, let's write the words: perestroika, democratization, glasnost, cost accountability, reform, rent, conversion, cooperative action...

On the right-hand side, let's write the words: rationing coupons, racket, Mafia, inflation, banditry, extremists, nationalism, refugees...

Each of the columns could be extended if one wanted to. The left-hand one with hopes for the future, and the right-hand one probably for the reverse. But there are already a few people who are hurrying, while choking on their bile, to prove that the second column is the direct consequence of the appearance of the first one. Fortunately, by no means everyone thinks that way. Even among the refugees. But it is necessary to reflect a bit about their fate.

Rocking back and forth and twisting and turning, the train crept into the center of Baku.

I got off the train onto the platform, took a good look at the passersby, and had an almost physical sensation: the people of Baku had changed. There were fewer smiles and less laughter. There was caution in their glances. A noticeable nervousness. And there was yet another feature: it was considerably infrequent to encounter Armenians in the streets...

Suddenly a noise and shouts distracted me from my unhappy observations. The sounds came from the direction of Ulitsa Lenina, which drops like a radial line from the western outskirts of the city directly to the square in the center of town—the place where demonstrations and rallies are held. In previous years they used to be festive occasions. But times are different now, and confirmation of this is provided by the crowd of several hundred people who have appeared in front of the railroad terminal. Led by people carrying placards, other people were carrying street-wide banners and chanting, "Karabakh! Karabakh!" The demonstration (which, as I subsequently found out, was unsanctioned) was heading for the square, toward the building that the city dwellers call Government House.

"Refugees..." a person standing nearby said, and then he sighed.

The thin attache case that I take on official assignments allowed me to join the other curious individuals and rush after the crowd to the square.

After situating themselves in front of the so-called governmental rostrum, excited people of various ages attached the banners and placards to a prominent place. I shall not attempt here to discuss the content or orientation of those banners and placards, since they were appeals issued by certain hotheaded orators—it's not pertinent, as the expression goes. But I cannot fail to convey the sensation that I got from that rally: people are on the border between the ability to think and act soberly, on the one hand, and despair and an almost fanatical striving to achieve what is their own, at all costs, on the other hand. We ought to help them, to keep them from crossing over that terrible line! But how?

The rally lasted until late at night. It was Saturday. The people of Baku who were rushing by on personal business or who were simply strolling along the seaside boulevard would approach the people holding the rally, would listen to the speakers, and then continue on their way, making remarks that sometimes contradicted one another—from the approving "They're doing the right thing—we will not give back our Nagornyy Karabakh!" to the perplexed "Complicated things like this cannot be resolved at rallies..."

Meanwhile the refugees continued standing under the burning rays of the sun...

My official assignment lasted a month and whatever organization or collective I visited, and whoever I talked to, the discussion invariably came around to the refugee problems. This is not surprising: for Azerbaijan (as it also is for Armenia), this is the most acute social problem of recent times. Judge for yourself: it is possible to encounter here representatives of forced migration from several places simultaneously. More than 160,000 refugees are resettled people of Azerbaijani nationality who left their homes in Armenia. Almost 40,000 are Meskhet Turks, who literally ran from Uzbekistan and found refuge in the rayons of Azerbaijan. Let us add to these the Azerbaijani who were forced to leave the explosive Nagornyy Karabakh. There are enough problems here to make the republic administrators clutch their heads!

"For more than a year and a half," T. Orudzhev, secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, says, "we have been living in a situation of tension and nervousness. It is difficult to evaluate even approximately the damage—economic and psychological—that has been inflicted on the representatives of absolutely all the nationalities living in Azerbaijan. And one of the most painful problems is the refugee problem. I would even say that this is not a problem, but a tragedy. It is necessary to provide families with housing, to provide able-bodied people with work, and to provide children with places in preschool institutions and schools. And all this is with a consideration of the difficulties in the

republic's socioeconomic development! Things are especially complicated in the rural localities. For the time being, unfortunately, out of 65,000 able-bodied persons who have been resettled from Armenia, only every second one has a job. We are creating new kolkhozes and, to the best of our ability, are offering plots of land to anyone who wants land for individual housing construction. In this regard, the refugees have already been allocated a loan with a total of 70 million rubles.

Needless to say, much is being done for the refugees. There has been an especially tangible contribution made by the Gaygy mass popular charitable organization. That society contributed approximately 12 million [rubles] to meet the refugees' needs. But, as one observes the most genuine pilgrimage of the refugees into the buildings of the party and Soviet agencies, one realizes the long path that each of these unfortunate people has to travel in order to create more or less human living and working conditions...

At the party's Kedabekskiy Raykom, R. Guseynov, its first secretary, was showing me some photographs that had been taken during the mass resettlement of the Azerbaijanis from Armenia. Many of them had fled after grabbing up the absolute necessities of life.

"Of course, not all the 160,000 Azerbaijani refugees had been subjected to direct persecution in Armenia," Rafayel Akperovich said. "Many had yielded to panic, had become terrified about the future of those near and dear to them, and had shipped out first of all the old people, women, and children. In our border rayon the attempt was made to give warmth and food to each person who had arrived, to render medical aid, and to provide temporary housing."

In the reception room of the republic's Council of Ministers I was stopped by an old one-armed man who had frontline decorations on his chest. It turned out that he too was a refugee from Armenia—M. Namazov, with category 2 disability.

"What did we fight for, anyway, sonny?", the veteran asked me, scarcely able to keep back his tears. "So that we would lose the right even to die on the land where we were born, where our father is buried? Six hundred families from our village of Bagratashen fled to a neighboring rayon in Georgia. And now they have come to Azerbaijan. We are living anywhere we can, and we are suffering. We are waiting for our fate to be decided." He remained silent for a moment, and then he added, "I would never have imagined that this is possible in our country. Where are our leaders looking?"

Other refugees joined in the discussion. Dozens of questions that it was simply impossible to answer. Many reproaches directed at the center, which, in their view, from the very beginning took an indefinite position in resolving their fate. But the chief question they asked was why the appropriate resolution of USSR Council of

Ministers still remains on paper? They would like to return to their homes, but the conditions for this are not being created.

In order to make the situation more exact, we might say that a definite number of the refugees were subsequently able to replace their apartments and private homes in Armenia by housing in Azerbaijan. But it turned out that the persons who moved to Baku, Sumgait, Kirovabad, and the rayon centers from the neighboring republic had engaged in labor on the land. Naturally, it is no easy matter for them not only to find work, but also to adapt to city life.

I do not think that Armenia proved to be the winner either as a result of such a mass resettlement of Azerbaijanis. I was told that in Krasnoselskiy Rayon Azerbaijanis used to constitute almost half the rural population. Since ancient times they preferred to work in animal husbandry. Currently there is not a single Azerbaijani remaining in the rayon. How does one find a replacement for almost the entire detachment of shepherds, herdsmen, and milk maids?

This is the economic side of the situation. But what about the moral side? What great harm has been inflicted on good-neighborly relations! Can they now be restored within the foreseeable future?

In the mountainous part of Shamkhorskiy Rayon there is a pretty village of Chardakhly, the only one in the rayon with a purely Armenian population. It has a large and economically strong sovkhoz, well-built houses, well cared for and fertile land, picturesque landscape... It was painful to learn, as I traveled through, that there is not a single Armenian in the village today. In a village with a thousand households, not a single one. It was explained to me that they had not been chased out; they had left in order not to share the fate of the other refugees. Many had exchanged homes with Azerbaijanis who had left Armenia. And as though reproaching the instigators of interethnic enmity, there is a round-the-clock police cordon in front of the village museum. I was shown the museum. The main exhibition is devoted to Marshal Bagramyan. His hometown was Chardakhly.

"No, there were no assaults made on the museum," the sergeant explained as he relocked the door. "We are guarding it, just in case."

It is sad to stand outside a museum like this, a museum that is now seemingly unneeded by anyone except the militia men who are performing their duty. And it becomes doubly sad if one recalls that yet another hero of the Great Patriotic War, Azerbaijani General Azi Aslanov, like Armenian Ivan Bagramyan, defended against fascism not just his own people, but all of us.

I must admit that the most difficult part of my assignment in Azerbaijan was the meetings I had with Meskhet Turks. History has ruled in such a way that this nation has twice become an exile. The first time was in accordance with the iron will of the "leader of nations." And

that was repeated as a result of the bloody excesses of the nationalistically-minded extremism and the vandalism of the bandits in the Fergana Valley.

Incidentally, not too long ago I observed in bewilderment the flood of materials and photographic reports that threatened to engulf the pages of the newspapers, a flood dealing with the placement of the Fergana Meskhet Turks on farms in the Non-Chernozem Zone of RSFSR. What were those materials advertising? If it was the kindness and charity of the Russian nation, then it should not have been against that background—the eviction of another nation during peacetime... But the most important thing was that the action proved to be poorly thought out. Many of the refugees could not adapt to the villages in RSFSR. What were the reasons?

"I drove around several oblasts," Kh. Tairov, teacher from the Akhyska Kolkhoz, Sabirabadskiy Rayon, Azerbaijan SSR, says. He is a member of the commission that was created by USSR Supreme Soviet to deal with matters pertaining to the Meskhet Turks. "I visited the refugees and their fellow tribesmen. We have become accustomed to living compactly, but they are scattered among remote villages where a person who is not adapted to the local conditions or the climate has difficulty lasting even a single winter. Therefore they moved toward the south, to get a bit closer to the Meskhet Turkish settlements that had been founded in the 1950's, to their relatives and acquaintances. That is why that chain stretched out toward us. In two rayons alone—our rayon and Saatlinskiy Rayon, where villages of Meskhet Turks also exist, more than 15,000 refugees have accumulated. Their situation is terrible."

We were chatting in the orchard of a village teacher—a long-time and active adherent of the restoration of the rights of the Meskhet Turks. His small home—two rooms and a verandah—gave refuge under its roof to 37 persons. Plus his own family consisting of five people. While the weather is warm, people can sleep at night in tents. But what will happen during the winter?

Later we went for a walk in the village, and in almost every building we could see improvised partitions made of blankets, sheets, or rags that had been hung up; this provided additional "housing space" for those who could not find any room under a roof.

Suddenly, as though in a kindergarten, a horde of children flashed into view.

"Did they have supper today?" I asked a woman.

"Yes, yes!" she answered, nodding hurriedly.

"What did they have to eat?"

"Well, we had tomatoes and apples. But that was all."

It seems that any roofed area in Sabirabadskiy and Saatlinskiy rayons that is suitable for habitation to even the slightest degree is occupied today by families of Meskhet Turks. They live—if one can use that word to

describe their existence here—in service areas, in field camps, on animal farms. One of the families has even set up a temporary camp at the mill on the Akhyska Kolkhoz.

How long will all these temporary arrangements last? No one in the republic was able to give me a reasonable answer to this question. They mentioned the thousands of refugees from Armenia who still have not found any jobs, refugees who, for a year and a half, have been living in extremely difficult conditions and in poverty. They mentioned the shortage of funds and building materials. And everyone agreed on one point: the people here could not get along without help from the center.

The Meskhet Turks themselves, in their conversations with me, stated approximately one and the same thing: "We are deeply thankful and grateful to the Azerbaijani nation and the republic leadership for having welcomed us and for helping us, despite their own problems. We shall attempt in the future to return to our first homeland, the land of our ancestors. But for the time being the government must show some concern for us. It was not in accordance with our own will that we have proven to be in the role of exiles!"

The new school year has begun, and thousands of Meskhet Turkish children are unable to attend school. They used to attend a Russian or Uzbek school, but in the villages of Azerbaijan almost all the schools are national ones. Moreover, even the local children, it has turned out, have nowhere to go with their briefcases: the schools are crammed with refugees...

"No one needs the impression that our nation is superfluous on this earth," Kh. Tairov summed up the conversation in despair. "But how are we supposed to live?"

M. Imamaliyev, first deputy head of the Interethnic Relations Department, Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, when I repeated these words to him, expressed the following thought:

"The refugees have become a stern reality in our time. Obviously, it is necessary first of all to attempt to prevent the spreading of this phenomenon that is so negative in its causal essence. But if there has been such a mass forced migration of a particular part of the population, the government should not count only on emergency measures. We need a social program that has been worked out on a countrywide scale, to provide aid to people who have left their heart and home for reasons not of their own will. We need a special foundation. But for the time being the entire arsenal is meager subsidies and words of sincere sympathy."

Perhaps I should complete right here the notes that I accumulated during my meetings with the refugees. But, remembering how the various sides that came into conflict as a result of the crisis around NKAO [Nagornny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] have been studying, practically under a microscope, and painfully treating, each in his own way, every newspaper line that pertains

even indirectly to the ways to resolve the dispute, I would like to emphasize, over and over again, the following. Unfortunately for all of us, we have refugees not only in Armenia, but also in other parts of the country. At a recent session of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, mention was made of the inconsistency of the attitude taken to the fates of more than 200,000 refugees. Many of these refugees are skilled workers and specialists, and they want to work in the earthquake area and at enterprises. But the executive authorities in the outlying areas have been moving slowly to give the citizens residence permits or to find jobs for them, although working hands are needed everywhere.

Today's reflections were dictated exclusively by sympathy for the sufferings—physical and psychological—of people who have left their fathers' land. Irrespective of nationality, party affiliation, and religious denomination. They were dictated by sympathy and the hope that all of us, working together, will succeed in removing from the vocabulary of our inner life a word that smells slightly of war and discrimination, and a word that is shameful for the end of the twentieth century—"refugees." They simply should not exist.

Editor's note. This article had already been prepared for the press when the teletype brought us two similar reports. The Azerbaijan government has adopted a resolution concerning the payment of lump-sum grants to citizens of Azerbaijani nationality who had left their places of permanent residence and work in Armenian SSR; the total amount of the grant in aid is no more than three months of forced unemployment. Armenia, according to a resolution adopted by that republic's government, has begun to pay lump-sum grants to citizens who left their places of permanent residence in Azerbaijan SSR. The total amount of the grant is three months' earnings.

Of course, for persons who have been left without a roof over their heads, even this support means something. But let's not delude ourselves into thinking that this will resolve the problem. We would like once again to mention the USSR Council of Ministers resolution that pertains to the refugees' fate. The facts indicate that, for the time being, that resolution, as the expression goes, is hanging in the wind. The readers of SELSKAYA ZHIZN would like to receive an answer from the union government about the specific things that are being done to ease the refugees' fate.

Georgian Position in Abkhaz Events Defended

90US0272A Riga ATMODA in Russian No 51, 13 Nov 89 pp 4-5

[Article by Rostislav Yevdokimov-Bogak: "In the Tracks of the Trouble in Abkhazia"]

[Text] *The article presented here is viewed by the editors not as final truth, but as one of the possible points of views concerning the events described. Among the doubtless merits of the article should be included its relatively high professionalism, its precise and unambiguous statement*

of its position, and its avoidance of the false "sovietisms" (references to Lenin, and the like), of which the authors of articles on the "nationalities question" are often guilty. A shortcoming, in our view, is a certain adjustment of the realities of life to fit the scheme of "Christian-Moslem contradictions."

We hope that the article will provoke comments in which other views of the events in Abkhazia will find expression.—The Editors

In the middle of June 1989, ethnic relations in the USSR were shaken by the latest conflict. Dozens of people in Abkhazia were killed and wounded. It would seem that we should already have become accustomed to scandals within the Soviet communal apartment. And, in fact, a large part of world society reacted accordingly: There was a sigh for the dead, condemnation of the terror, an expression of moral support for the ethnic minority (the Abkhazians) and, in some countries, performances by artists, Georgians, were cancelled—especially in the FRG.

At the same time, these events had several extremely remarkable and unusual features. In the first place, this was far from being the first serious blow that struck one of the small "soviet" republics, Georgia, within a short period of time. In the second, this is still the only case in the USSR when it was specifically representatives of a national minority that were the first to take up arms and to use force (moreover in a barbaric way). Further on, we shall see that the events we are examining had many more such special features that do not fit into the accustomed framework. Here I will note only that to consider the minority to be necessarily correct in any ethnic conflict represents harmful prejudice. Most often, in fact, the fate of minorities does provoke sympathy but, and so as not to excite passions by examples from today's political life, I need only recall the actions of English colonialists in South Africa at the beginning of our century and the "problem" of the Sudeten Germans before the Second World War, when the situation was reversed.

I. Usually, when examining the rights of one people or another within any particular territory, it is necessary to weigh two basic factors: historical right and the present state of affairs. Neither one of these can be considered absolute. If one or another people has been forcibly resettled or forced from its own homeland (the Chechens and the Ingush, the Crimean Tartars, the Transylvanian Hungarians, the Greek Cypriots), it does not lose its right to this land as long as at least one person is alive who has not resigned himself to this loss. But also, to the contrary, through the march of centuries the heirs of colonialist conquerors may obtain a no less moral right to a country that has been created by their labor than that which the heirs of the conquered possess. Thus, it seems, there can be no hot heads who might completely deny the right of peoples of European origin in America, Australia, and South Africa, the rights of arabs in North Africa, and so on.

The territory of present Abkhazia is mentioned in written sources, beginning with the middle of the first millennium before our era. Not a single author (Herodotus, Strabon, and later Prokolly Kesariskiy, and others) raises any doubt that the Egers (Megreli) and Lazes, who lived on the Black Sea coast, were the original descendants of the ancient Kolkhovi. Linguistic research by modern scholars shows that the western Georgian tribes lived here at the very least 2000-3000 years before Herodotus. But this was to the south of Sukhumi (ancient Dioskuriya). Incidentally, the modern name of the city derives from the Svan word "tskhumi," meaning "elm." To the north, the population was mixed.

It is noteworthy, however, that it is possible to talk about the mixed character of the population of the northern part of Abkhazia already in the very ancient past. At the same time, if the Abkhazians themselves have retained only dim ideas concerning the arrival of their ancestors in this land from somewhere far away (evidently from today's Adygeya), then for the Georgian Svan tribe, also mentioned in ancient sources as being a people which lived above Dioskuriya, it can be said that the individual groups of these, who settled there, apparently came from the south.

Beginning with the first and second centuries of our era, sources mention the Abasg and Apsil tribes. Their names, similar in sound to the Abkhaz name for themselves (apsua) and to the Abazins and Ubykhs, who are related to them (and who resettled in Turkey following the Russian-Turkish wars), makes a convincing case that they are in fact related to the ancestors of today's Abkhazians. Confusion arose in the middle of the century when, for geographic and political reasons (the dynastic union of the Abkhaz and Megrel rulers), the names "Abkhazia" and "Abkhazians" began to be applied to all of western Georgia and its population.

However, all this in no way gives reason to doubt that Abkhazia has always been the native land of two peoples at the same time—the Georgians and the Abkhazians. Again, history knows similar examples: The greater part of the Russian plain from ancient times was populated alternately by slavic, finno-Ugrian and Baltic (Letto-Lithuanian) tribes, and Palestine has to be recognized as the native land of both the Jews and the Arabs. As to Abkhazia, then the Georgians, as far as we know, have always been the majority and the Abkhazians—the minority within its population, which, however, up until approximately the 17th century, was in no way reflected in their relations, because they professed, as a rule, a single faith, were bearers of variants of what was basically one culture and, through the course of millennia, had helped one another in building a single state. Some of today's extreme nationalists (in any country of the world) are not inclined to believe in the possibility of such happy unions. But, as far back as 6000 years ago, in Mesopotamia, two completely different peoples—the Sumerians and the Semitic Akkadians—lived in deep mutual respect as citizens of the same city-states.

Then, what happened next? As a result of Turkish expansion, a large part of the Abkhazians and, moreover, a certain part of the Georgians, were moslemized. Naturally, this drove a wedge between the two ethno-religious groups. After the war of 1877-1888, Russia, which had always recognized Abkhazia as a part of Georgia and even had condemned attempts by certain zealous assimilators to lead the Abkhaz Christians out from under the jurisdiction of the Georgian exarchate, resettled 50,000 moslem Abkhazians in Turkey, and had resettled another 20,000 persons during the ten years before this. This action, it would seem, altered the correlation of the two parts of the Abkhaz people in the favor of the Christians, but it caused embitterment among all Abkhazians.

Meanwhile, the process of forcing the heirs of the ancient Abkhazians toward the south and of the merging with them of aggressive newcomers from the north, who were related to them in terms of language but were culturally different, still continued in the last century. Thus, around the 1840s, we find a report by the Abkhaz scholar S.T. Zvanba: "Abkhaz lands begin from the river Zhuadzekh (or Zhoyekvara—R. E.-B.), but there are no Abkhaz villages on the right side of the river Bzyb (Bzyb—R. E.-B.), and therefore they were subjected to the continuous danger of attacks by their neighbors (the Dzhigets—R. E.-B.)."

The Dzhigets speak an Abkhaz dialect that differs somewhat from the basic language, but the Abkhazians do not consider them to be of the same extraction as themselves" (S.T. Zvanba, "Abkhaz Ethnographic Notes," Sukhumi, 1982 pp 5-6). It would appear that a large part of those who today call themselves Abkhazians should be considered to be descendants of these very recent northern conquerors.

At the same time, the founder of Abkhaz literature, Dmitriy Gulina, himself, incidentally, a Georgian on his father's side, together with the Georgian Machavariani, was perfecting the first Abkhaz alphabet, created 30 years before this on the basis of Russian script. Later, this same Dmitriy Gulina, jointly with A. Shandze and S. Dzhanashia, would create an Abkhaz writing on the basis of Georgian. But, within the framework of the general slavization of alphabets in 1954, Abkhaz writing was returned to its original version.

Unfortunately, there were historical romantics (a certain professor named Turchaninov) who discovered in Maykopye a stone slab with an account in the contemporary Abkhaz language about King Aiete, the father of Medea and the possessor of the "Golden Fleece." This is approximately as strange as would be to read in the German language a story by a contemporary of the pharaohs, written on papyrus, about a state of Germans in Palestine which had battled with the Semites in the times of Moses...

It is considerably more fundamental that, even 120 years ago, the culturally and politically active part of the

Abkhaz people clearly considered themselves as belonging to a Georgian historical and cultural whole. In the Georgian Central State Historical Archives (f. 545, d. 2784, l. 134) there is a curious document. This is a "Memorandum by deputies of the Abkhaz and Samurzakan nobility of 23 March 1870 to His Excellency, the Chairman of the Tiflis Committee for Social Estate and Land Affairs, Adjutant General, Prince Svyatopolk-Mirskiy." Here are several extracts from this "memorandum." "From the earliest times Abkhazia has comprised a part of the former Georgian tsardom. The last dynasty of the Georgian tsars was the Abkhaz dynasty." "When the Georgian tsar Vakhtang the 5th, at the beginning of the last century (i.e. the 18th century—R. Ye.-V.), undertaking to publish the laws, called together deputies from all the provinces of the former Georgian tsardom to assist him in this labor, then among them were also deputies from the Abkhaz people, which until recent times had preserved the most ancient Georgian customs..." "Boldly counting on justice and gracious attention to our needs by Your Excellency and the members of the committee, we can hope that, in the application of the peasant reforms to Abkhazia and Samurzakan, we will not be excluded from the general family of Georgian peoples, to which we have belonged from time immemorial." Signatures: Gr. Shervashidze, B. Emukhvari, K. Inal-Ipa, M. Marshaniya, T. Marganiya. It is worth noting that Shervashidze or, in the Abkhaz language, Chachba, was a powerful Abkhaz prince and that K. Inal-Ipa, it seems, was a not so distant ancestor of today's Professor Sh. Inal-Ipa, one of the spiritual leaders of the present anti-Russian movement... How did it happen that, in a little more than a century, the orientation of national consciousness has changed so greatly.

II. After the sovietization of Abkhazia in 1921, N. Lakoba and Ye. Eshba emerged as initiators of the idea of creating an "independent" Abkhaz SSR, justifying this by a necessity to alleviate interethnic contradictions. Since, proceeding from Marxist theory itself, the interests of any nation are absolutely foreign to any communist, Georgian bolsheviks supported this proposal without having thought to consider the fact that fewer than 60,000 Abkhazians were living within the future "union republic" (17.6 percent of the population), but that there were almost 90,000 Georgians. And since Lakoba and Eshba themselves perceived the "independence" of Abkhazia as a joke, as can be read in many of Lakoba's writings and speeches ("At first we were constrained from calling ourselves presidents of the republic—people's commissars, and so on, but a day, two, three go by and our shyness passes..."—N.A. Lakoba, "Articles and Speeches," Sukhumi, 1987 p 176), they then, to show solidity with the "Abkhaz SSR," generously tacked on a part of Megreliya (between the Kodori and Inguri rivers) which had almost a purely Georgian population.

But all this pitiful buffoonery did not lead to anything. Already within a few months, having run up against the

total lack of viability of the newborn "union republic," its leaders themselves requested federation with Georgia and later posed the question of giving Abkhazia the status of an autonomous republic, and this was accomplished in 1931.

In today's press it is possible to find extremely detailed discussions, supported by a whole stack of quotations from party and soviet documents, about the legal, economic, political, and even moral expediency of one or another turn in the destiny of Soviet Abkhazia. Meanwhile, all these investigations simply lack any sense, because there has been no basis to even speak of any kind of legality, from the very beginning. In February 1921, having themselves seized power completely illegally and ignoring the treaty they had just signed with the Democratic Republic of Georgia, the Kremlin bolsheviks installed a puppet government in power within this country and, in turn, the puppets (G. Ordzhonikidze, S. Kavtaradze, M. Toroshelidze, and Sh. Eliava, at a meeting in Baku on 29 March 1921), with pretensions to absolute power, handed the reins of government over to pals of their's who had an extremely dark past. Where, in general, is the legality here? Where can it be found in this entire history?

However, the present outburst of aggressiveness rests, it would seem, on a much more prosaic basis. In the 1960s, road barriers and border fortifications of a sort were installed on the border of Abkhazia and Krasnodarskiy Kray in the RSFSR. The purpose was to prevent the export from Georgia of tangerines and other "gifts of nature," which, however, were later to be watered with the blood of peasants. Even in Sukhumi, tangerines could be purchased in the bazaar only by observing the rules of conspiracy. The authorities did not want the residents of the Transcaucasus to export fruits, citrus fruit, and grapes to the markets of Russian and the Baltics in large quantities, and therefore relatively cheaply. What the authorities did want was to take a peasant's entire crop at laughable, symbolic prices (i.e. at prices that symbolize the communist way of rule), and then to use whatever did not manage to disappear in the state storehouses in order to benefit in a grand way two or three of the largest cities—first of all, of course, Moscow.

Out of despair, many began to dig up their tangerine gardens and, something that was totally unheard of in Georgia, even their vineyards, and to plant them with corn as feed for pigs and other livestock. The Georgian peasant suffered, of course, just like his Abkhaz neighbor, but indeed the wealth which was being taken away from people was going to the account of Georgian SSR state deliveries... And here the idea came to people who were not very experienced in politics that all this was the fault of the Georgians. And if Abkhazia were to be joined to Russia, would not normal human logic then dictate that there no longer would be frontier posts between two parts of one republic?

If talk was about plundering the peasants and forcing Moscow and Petrograd to die from starvation, then

frontier posts, as is known, had been erected on every crossroads. This was called the grain monopoly and food surplus requisitioning. But where could the Abkhaz peasants know of this from? In 1968, calls began in favor of unification with the RSFSR's Krasnodarskiy Kray, and these were repeated periodically over the course of a decade. The authorities reacted in their usual way. Free trade was not permitted, but to make up for it a somber joke by the then "master" of the republic made the rounds of half the country: "With regard to Krasnodarskiy Kray—I don't know, but it is possible for them to arrange Krasnoyarskiy..." Even the most illiterate of our countrymen understand what humor like this means, and the remnants of the Abkhaz intelligentsia did not fail to make use of the situation in order to advance ethno-cultural and cadre demands.

Within the republic, school studies (up to the 4th grade), publishing activity, and office work have always been conducted in the Abkhaz languages, along with the Georgian and Russian languages. But, by the beginning of the 1980s, there was a marked expansion in radio broadcasting in Abkhaz, an Abkhaz television channel was established, and in 1979 a university was opened in Sukhumi on the basis of the pedagogical institute. The majority of party, state and, what is extremely significant, militia posts were filled by Abkhazians—clearly out of proportion in relationship to their numbers within the population. It turned out to be impossible to teach higher mathematics and the like in the Abkhaz language and instruction was conducted in Russian, and at the same time a clear shortage of students was experienced.

As a result, within their own native land, many Georgians began to change over to Abkhaz nationality, while those who considered this personally unacceptable joined in the movement for the equality of Georgians within Abkhazia. To a large degree, the question of the possibility of obtaining a university education in one's native language became the symbol of this struggle. Among the paradoxes of Abkhaz life should also be included the absence of a Georgian section in the autonomous republic's department of the Writers' Union.

Evidently such situations are explained by the fact that the leaders of Abkhaz society understand that their own forces are not sufficient for the normal functioning of responsible structures and, by occupying key posts in administration, they are trying in all possible ways to preserve the intellectual potential of Abkhazia, so to say, "unblended and indivisible," in their own hands, so that the republic's inability to exist independently not be too visible. This is the only way that it is possible to explain their nervousness in what would seem to be such a completely inoffensive matter as the desire of Georgians to have their own Georgian-language branch of the university in one of the cities of their own country, without infringing at the same time upon the right of Abkhazians to foster an Abkhaz (albeit, Russian-speaking) university.

Perhaps Georgian nationalists, making use of their own cultural hegemony, are secretly hindering the linguistic and intellectual development of the autonomous republic? The explanation is given that the Georgian "informals" and the humanitarian intelligentsia, to the contrary, have long offered their collaboration in the development of programs and in the creation of an Abkhaz scientific terminology for the purpose of introducing instruction in the Abkhaz language on a full secondary-school scale, and then also for institutions of higher learning. However, strange though it may seem, Abkhaz leaders have not responded to this proposal, having only let it silently be understood that they would get along better without secondary school in their native tongue and will not permit the opening of a Georgian higher educational institution. "I would tear out my own eye, that my mother-in-law will have a one-eyed son-in-law"—such is the comment of a Russian folk-saying on such logic.

Under these conditions, the Georgian leadership nevertheless approved a decision to open a branch of Tbilisi University in Sukhumi in 1989 for Georgian students, while retaining Russian-language instruction for Abkhazians and others who might wish this. The branch was initially housed in the Georgian School No. 1 in the city of Sukhumi. But aroused Abkhaz nationalists, incited by the other nationalist actions of the present day and by pan-islamic tendencies throughout the entire world, did not settle for such a compromise alternative.

III. The most important facts for evaluating subsequent events are that they were well-planned, that there was foreknowledge of them, and that the authorities of the Abkhaz ASSR took a direct part in organizing armed attacks on Georgians.

Tensions grew from the time of publication of the "Abkhaz letter" of 17 June 1988 and of the appeal and resolution passed in the village of Lykhna on 18 March 1989. On the Georgian side, note can be taken of a rally in Gali on 24 March 1989, at which people expressed indignation that a rayon which provides almost 50 percent of the earnings of Abkhazia but is populated exclusively by Georgians is unable to build a school and a kindergarten because the authorities in Sukhumi are taking the funds and directing them to Abkhaz rayons. And also of a meeting in Gantnadi on 1 April 1989 upon the conclusion of which its participants, Georgians, were beaten up and the sounds of shots were first heard.

It is striking that the actions of the Georgian community have been confined to reacting to challenges thrown down by the Abkhazians. Moreover, the sinister coincidence that the Abkhaz Oblast party committee promised to advise the Georgians of its assessment of the attack on them after the meeting in Gantiadi specifically on 9 April looks very suspicious. On that day, the people who had gathered at the oblast party committee, instead of an answer, received news of the slaughter in Tbilisi.

On 28 April, 1200 students and more than 300 teachers announced they were leaving Abkhaz University. On 14 May, the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers approved a decision regarding organization of a branch of Tbilisi State University in Sukhumi. On 12 June, the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ABKHAZIYA published a report on the work of a USSR Supreme Soviet commission that considered it inexpedient to establish a branch of Tbilisi State University. The Georgian segment of the population demanded that a commentary be published in the Georgian edition of this newspaper (SABCHOTA ABKHAZETI) making clear that the opinion of the commission is not a final decision of the question and that the branch continued to function. In the course of this and the following day, Abkhazians and Georgians repeatedly gathered at the printing office, each with its own demands and, in the end, the printing office was blockaded by the Abkhazians and for two days the paper did not appear.

According to data of the Abkhazia MVD (that same pro-Abkhaz MVD which on 15, 16, and 17 June contrived not to register a single violation of the law!), there were at all times far fewer Georgians and they dispersed peacefully, while the Abkhazians as early as 13 June announced that, if entrance exams for the branch began on 16 June, then "all measures will be taken by them to ensure they are not admitted" (addendum to Abkhaz ASSR MVD daily summary No. 194 of 13 July 1989). The next day, the first secretary of the oblast party committee received a deputation of Abkhaz elders who announced an ultimatum, giving notice that they would blockade the oblast party committee and that they "had trained special brigades of young people who are full of determination to oppose the Georgian part of the population" (Addendum to daily summary No. 195 of 14 July 1989). From the side of the "Georgian part of the population" no actions were noted that were even distantly reminiscent of similar things.

Later, at a meeting in Tbilisi on 23 July, the Georgian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Gorgadze, would confirm that there had been advance knowledge that the Abkhazians intended to spill blood. According to his words, he had sent a reinforced detachment of militia from Tbilisi to Sukhumi, as well as a battalion of militiamen armed with automatic weapons from Bolnisi.

However, on 15 June, these subunits were disarmed and, besides this, the entire MVD personnel staff that was of Abkhaz nationality was dressed in parade white shirts, and the Georgians in gray ones. A note was delivered surreptitiously to the oblast party committee: We, a group of young people from the city of Sukhumi, place an ultimatum before you. If by the 13th you do not resolve all our problems, then we will turn Abkhazia into a Fergana!"

On 15 June, in the Rustaveli Park, unarmed Georgians were attacked by a crowd of Abkhazians, who greatly outnumbered them and were armed with pieces of reinforced concrete and weapons other than guns. Then, in various parts of the city, clashes broke out involving the

use of firearms. On the premises of School No. 1, up to ten members of the acceptance commission of the Tbilisi State University branch were beaten up, documents of students taking their final exams were destroyed, and the premises were devastated. During the night of 15-16 June, Abkhazia MVD employees A. Guniya, V. Lagvilava, G. Delba, V. Zukhba, and Tsibulkin fired with automatic weapons from a KamAZ vehicle at Georgians, killing a 19-year old youth and a passenger in a train. At the same time, a group of Abkhaz extremists occupied the House of Soviets, having entered in pursuit of women who reportedly had to seek shelter there. This brave act ended with the devastation of the premises, the destruction of food supplies worth 118 rubles, the tearing down of the flags of Georgia and Abkhazia, and the raising of a flag with the inscription "SSRA."

It should be recalled here that a majority of the residents of western Georgia and the Galskiy Rayon in Abkhazia (populated by Georgians) have relatives living in Abkhazia. Thousands and thousands of them had children on vacation at sanatoriums and pioneer camps located within the autonomous republic. Under these conditions, it is certainly not difficult to understand the high degree of alarm that seized people upon hearing the first rumors concerning massive attacks on Georgians. Crowds moved from Zugdidi to Sukhumi.

After 4 April, hunting weapons were confiscated from the Georgians. The Abkhazians, thanks to control over the local militia, had possession of automatic weapons and even a GAI helicopter. Precisely for this reason, Georgians seized the prison in Zugdidi, where the prisoners showed them the weapons storeroom in exchange for being freed. At the same time, a crowd of Abkhazians took the bridge across the Galidzga River between Galskiy and Ochamchirskiy rayons. It is characteristic that the Gudautskiy moslem Abkhazians, directing the operation, blockaded the road not at the official border of the republic, along the river Inguri, but in a region inhabited by people of Christian orientation who up to this time had maintained neutrality, and in this way provoked their inclusion in the war against the Georgians.

In the early stages, the Georgians were still trying to negotiate by peaceful means. At least twice, truce envoys came out with white flags. However, they were fired upon and several of the envoys, including one who was an Abkhazian on his mother's side, were killed. The situation quickly became extreme, because the Georgians, now already armed, numbered several thousand and on the other side of the bridge there appeared about 50 soldiers, who could easily be swept away by the infuriated crowd. A little farther on, unknown to the people, there was a large military formation and the consequences which followed the attack on the advance post at the bridge were catastrophic.

Fortunately, at about 1400 hours, the leaders of the Society of Saint Ilya the Just, Merab Kostava, and of the Georgian National Independence Party, Irakli Tsereteli, hurriedly arrived on the scene. At the cost of

incredible effort (they also fired on Kostrava, accusing him of betrayal, but somebody managed to knock away the weapon and the shot went into the air), they succeeded in restraining the crowd.

Beginning in the evening of 16 July and continuing to the morning of 17 July, using six cutters rowed by hand and making seven trips, about 900 Abkhazians were sent unopposed from the city of Gudauta to the city of Ochmchira. Among other weapons, they were armed with Kalashnikov automatic rifles, Makarov pistols, and small caliber rifles. According to data from investigations, the loading of the cutters "took place in the presence of responsible workers of the rayon" (MOLODEZH GRUZII, 12 August 1989: "Before and After the Abkhaz Tragedy." The same source published many other official documents, which I am making use of.)

According to reports from Georgian "informals," such persons as the chairman of the Abkhazia Writers' Union, Gogua, the Abkhaz minister of culture, the second secretary of the Ochamchirskiy Rayon party committee, the first secretary of the Gudautskiy Rayon party committee, Ozgan (a Turk by nationality), and others directed these and similar activities and even openly distributed weapons. This is indirectly supported by the fact that the majority of them have now been removed from their posts, and that criminal cases have been initiated against several.

As is known, those struggling against "splitting the Abkhaz university along ethnic lines" tried to achieve this academic goal by firing on trains and buses, children's institutions and medical workers. A Russian nurse spoke on television, telling how she almost died to the sound of shouts of "Kill her: She's a Christian!" I haven't heard from anybody, not even from people who are clearly are ill-disposed towards Georgians, of even one concrete instance of similar actions on their part. The conclusions are obvious.

Less known is the fact that, according to a number of reports, Uzi automatic weapons from Israel as well as firearms of Turkish origin have been found in the possession of Abkhaz terrorists. They assert that they came into their hands along with construction materials arriving at a Turkish construction trust near Pitsunda. The Turkish government denies its own connection to such contraband, but, indeed, nobody is accusing the government... On the other hand, it has become known that, on 7-8 August, several Abkhazians somehow managed to get into Turkey and make contact with their fellow tribesmen there, following which there was a wave of pogroms in Georgian villages (more than 130,000 Georgians and Lazes, who are closely related to them, live in Turkey and, according to some sources, there are many more). Our battlers against Georgian chauvinism have likewise received assurances of solidarity ("Brother Abkhazians! Do not fear: We are with you!") and, at the same time, weapons from Azerbaijan—it must be assumed from those battling Armenian chauvinism

there. It would be interesting to learn against whose chauvinism a similar battle will begin tomorrow.

Unfortunately, official reports do not give any reliable information about the number that have been killed. This is easy to show from quotes from the rubric "The Georgian SSR MVD Reports," taken at random from three different issues of the official republic paper ZARYA VOSTOKA. Thus, in the 21 July 1989 issue, the MVD states: "According to verified data, 406 persons have applied to the republic's medical institutions for help and 94 persons have been hospitalized, of whom 16 are in serious condition and 17 have died. Among the wounded are 31 employees of the militia and 7 representatives of the USSR MVD internal troops."

The 29 July issue reports: "Again shots were heard. A person was killed in the village of Vladimirovka, in Gulripshskiy Rayon at 2015 hours on 27 July. An investigation is being conducted."

On 3 August, under this same rubric, a report in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI about 32 fatalities was refuted: "This information is untrue. According to data from the Georgian SSR Procuracy, the number of dead comes to 16. Among them are 5 Abkhazians, 9 Georgians, and also two military personnel, a Russian and an Armenian." Take your choice—either miracles are being created in Abkhazia or in the Georgian SSR MVD press groups they do not know to add even 1 to get 17.

However, what more can be expected in a state which up to now has not been able to calculate the precise number who died in camps during the Second World War or even in the most recent one—the Afghan war.

The majority of the Georgian "informants," in the absence of precise information, evidently for reasons of caution prefer to speak of approximately 20 victims, noting only that 5 of the dead Abkhazians bore purely Georgian names and apparently belonged to families which had become Abkhaz only in terms of their passports for considerations of momentary advantage. But Zviadi Gamsakhurdiya, before whose house gate a "lemon" bomb [limonka] was exploded in the night of 24-25 July, asserts that cases are known when the bodies of the killed were burned or otherwise concealed and that the total number of dead and tortured exceeds a hundred. In any case, even on the basis of official data, twice as many Georgians were killed and three times as many wounded as were Abkhazians, despite the inverse correlation of their numbers within the autonomous republic.

Incidentally, concerning population numbers. The assertion of the authors of the "Abkhaz letter" concerning a reduction in the number of Abkhazians rests, apparently, on somebody's intentional juggling with figures. The author of the fabrication compares the number of Abkhazians in 1970 with data which appeared in the "Caucasian Calendar" for 1916, finding a decrease of almost 27,000 persons. But in the "Caucasian Calendar" for 1916 (Tiflis 1915), in the section entitled "The Area and Population of Kavkazskiy Kray as of 1 January 1915

(based on data from the district [uezd] administration, Abkhazians are not mentioned at all. The figure given in the "Abkhaz Letter" (111,780 persons) was arrived at by adding 51,281 persons from graph entitled "Caucasian Highlanders: Moslems and Other Religions" and 60,499 Orthodox souls from a graph with the title "Various Asian Nationalities." Although instruction in the Abkhaz school is limited to four grades, those who have continued their education in Russian should understand that such arithmetic is the kind used in Soviet summaries of the fulfillment of national economic plans.

It is accepted to say that, in the face of death, everyone is equal. But too often this conciliatory formula sounds either naive or cynical. You cannot compare the Armenians who were bestially tortured in Sumgait and those few Azerbaijanis that were killed in the course of desperate opposition during the past year and a half. Just as simple human decency does not allow a comparison of those who participated in terrorism with the victims of this terrorism in our own case. Every person is priceless, but not when he encroaches on the life of his neighbor. In this case, he himself sets his own price.

Incidentally, it is useful to note that my Georgian sources of information have constantly striven to soften the actions of the Abkhaz side. They have emphasized that today's Abkhazians have no motherland other than Abkhazia, they have recalled that they lived for centuries in close friendship, and they have acknowledged that for the past hundred-plus years the Abkhaz people have suffered heavy losses. Concerning the events in Sukhumi, they have said that it was not local residents that were involved in the pogroms, but troops from other rayons which were specially brought in. Instead of six cutters with 900 armed men according to official documents, they told me it was about 2-3 cutters with 200 men... All this is very unlike the way that chauvinism usually looks.

IV. It is time to sum up. One is moved by the touching unanimity with which the western public and Soviet politicians, the excellent natured Moscow liberal democrats and the chauvinistic scoundrels of the "Memorial" [Pamyat] society have taken up arms against the Georgians. Where did this come from? What kind of conductor has been able to blend such different voices into a united chorus?

This can be most simply explained by the fact that the ideologues of the Abkhaz movement were prepared in advance for their actions and were able to carry out a powerful propaganda campaign, somewhat outstripping even the Georgians who were at first taken aback. This, of course, is true. But by itself, agitation produces little. It is necessary for people to be ready to take it in. I am afraid that the deep truth is much sadder.

In fact, all the social and political forces we have named have a single "all too human" characteristic—shortsightedness. Some, we would like to think, from lack of knowledge, but the majority—from a lack of

desire to know the core of events and from an inability to foresee their consequences, not for a couple of months, but at least for several years ahead.

The official Soviet authorities are conducting themselves most artfully of all. They give the appearance that they are trying to observe objectivity, and are themselves instructing the troops that are being sent to Abkhazia that their mission is to save the poor Abkhazians from the aroused Georgians. In the first days, in fact, they defended Abkhaz villages which, in essence, were also not threatened by anything, and the attacks on the defenseless Georgian population continued. However, both the ordinary soldiers and, evidently, even the officers quickly figured out the real state of affairs and now their relationship with the population can be called friendly neutrality. The mass information media, by giving approximately equal space both to pro-Georgian and to pro-Abkhaz statements, are also with such pseudo-objectivity putting both aggressors and losers on the same level. Moscow can hardly be seriously counting on uniting Abkhazia to the RSFSR, and hopes to weaken the Georgian liberation movement on this basis are surprisingly naive: A threat to national existence and territorial integrity is the best way to rally any people. But one can understand the communists; it is impossible to change their minds and we have absolutely no wish to help them with advice—particularly when it is not asked for.

The western public, like our own native democrats, on the other hand, are seduced without funny banalities of the type: "Any nationalist actions in the USSR (besides Russian ones) are always justified," or "The USSR is a large empire, Georgia is small," or "The weak are always right." But it is sufficient to live in a communal apartment (and this is a priceless experience that is not available to people in the West!) in order to understand that very often it is precisely the weakest that terrorize with impunity everyone around them.

And the word "terrorism" appears here not without purpose. Soberly thinking people should understand that the present Abkhaz events, just as Sumgait and Fergana, are the first, learning battles for a whole army of tomorrow's terrorists, which will not be limited to the Soviet Union alone, but will operate in a united front with Israeli, Lebanese, and other "fundamentalists" throughout the entire world. And even if one proceeds from momentary political advantage, it has to be known that, even before the bloodletting, the Abkhaz elders requested at a meeting with the first secretary of the oblast party committee on 14 July that martial law be instituted within the republic. The Abkhaz side also later on constantly demanded the introduction of martial law, particularly in flyers distributed in the city of Gagra in the name of the People's Forum of Abkhazia "Andgylar" (addendum to daily summary No. 214 of 2 August 1989). We would like to know since when do true lovers of freedom seek the establishment of martial law even BEFORE open clashes, which they themselves unleash? And to the benefit of what forces

is the introduction of troops into any region of a country that hopes to change over from totalitarianism to authoritative rule?

As concerns Russian patriots of various hues (and people who sincerely consider themselves such are found both among democrats and among chauvinists), a certain part of them are always tempted, sometimes unconsciously, by the ambitious dream of making Russia happy with subtropical palms and a monkey-house in Sukhumi. But the ancient principle of "divide and rule" in this instance is operating against the interests of the Russian people, because they have chosen as an ally, a partner whom they consider unequal and intellectually foreign.

Yesterday, the Abkhaz nationalists were fighting for union with the Krasnodarskiy Kray in the RSFSR (they still even today are trying to palm off this smooth-sounding enticement to certain simpletons). Now, they are demanding the status of an "independent" union republic. Well, and where is the guarantee that, tomorrow, they will not ask for federation with Turkey? Does Russia really need this? Russia needs a reliable and friendly neighbor to which it is related by history, culture, religious tradition and, by the way, even by geopolitical interests, and not an internally weak, crafty fellow-traveller, always ready to desert completely to different caravanserais.

And this is saying nothing about the moral inadmissibility for our people, after all providential ordeals that have fallen to their lot, of an attempt to snatch a piece for oneself during a fire in a neighbor's home. The Georgians and Abkhazians, having many centuries of experience, in the final account, it can be hoped, will find a mutual acceptable kind of coexistence, but neither the one nor the other will forgive such cultural pillage, no matter what kind of flattering speeches are being delivered now.

And, finally, I will return briefly to where I started. Georgians today, as a millennium ago, comprise an aboriginal majority within an Abkhaz SSR. This land will belong to them just as it will also belong to the Abkhazians. To what can we relate the unusually sharp reaction of the Georgian people to events which, in general, occur almost regularly in almost all multinational countries, a reaction which reached the point of a nationwide strike (from 2 to 27 July, inclusive), of a kind of desperate resolve?

During the past 2-3 years, a whole torrent of catastrophic troubles has rained down on Georgia. Avalanches, which destroyed the villages of a good half of Svanetiya; landslides also hit Adzhariya; the actions of Azerbaijanis demanding autonomy with a capital in Rustavi, 20 kilometers from Tbilisi; the sadly famous slaughter in Tbilisi on 9 April... The list, unfortunately, could be go on.

A people that numbers a total of 3.5 to 4 million persons throughout the entire world, that lives in a small, mountainous country, a people that has an ancient culture and a national Christian tradition, has in fact found itself at

a dangerous crossroads. But peoples are like individuals: In difficult ordeals they will either perish or will take on a new quality. I do not believe in the cultural ruin of the Georgian people. And I do not believe in casual coincidence. One must have too very poor a knowledge of the natural sciences and of history not to see, behind all the blows that have befallen Georgia recently, the special sense, the special challenge, the energy, granted to peoples at critical turning points in their lives.

Without pretending to the role of a prophet, I think nevertheless that, by the beginning of the next century, a perhaps not very clear, but a bright destiny, one important for all mankind, awaits the two Christian peoples of the Transcaucasus—the Georgians and the Armenians.

Kazakhs Demand Sovereign Status as Promised by Lenin

*18320013 Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh
27 Oct 89 p 10*

[Article by journalist Aytan Nusinkhanov, diplomat Bolat Khan Tayzhanov, and demographer Maqash Tati-mov: "A Guarantee—in Sovereignty"]

[Text] "If We Call for Equal Rights..."

One major question become the order of the day as a consequence of perestroika is the question of enrichment of our Soviet federation, which became absolutely centralized during the era of Stalinist distortions, with new content in accordance with Leninist ideas. That is to say, this is the question of fortifying the union of republics, our common house, through its strengthening by way of giving real sovereignty to the fraternal republics. The CPSU Platform Regarding Ethnic Policy adopted at the CPSU Central Committee September 1989 Plenum has become our most important ideological support in this area. Our duty is, taking our guidance from this document, to press forward along the road of political and economic reforms.

At present industries and kolkhozes/sovkhozes in our republic are operating upon an economic basis. Various kinds of cooperatives are being established everywhere and marketplace methods are being introduced. We have begun to make preparations for transition to a system of self-administration and self-financing of the people's economy. The external connections of the republic are being expanded. Attention is being given to problems of inter-ethnic relations. We are organizing discussion regarding how to fulfill the demands of the recently ratified Law on Language which impresses the people with its democratic qualities. We have begun a campaign to prepare for the election of people's deputies to local soviets and the republic parliament. We are continuing to look for ways to become a society of law.

Achieving proper results from all these good beginnings will only be possible under conditions whereby every person participates thoughtfully in perestroika.

With the aim of making a contribution to laying down foundations of worldview, opinion and thoughtful action necessary to the warriors of perestroika, we have established a new rubric in our paper entitled "If We Call for Equal Rights..." We call upon publicists, scientists, specialists and the general reading public to share their thoughts on our political-social, economic, spiritual and cultural life under this heading.

Below we offer for your consideration the first article under this rubric.

The Short Article and Essay Section

Heated exchanges of views and arguments which have developed in recent years on the ethnic question we now observe to have become connected with concepts of "self-government of nationalities," of "sovereignty," and of "official language." Whatever the republic, it seems as if the discussion in essence centers about these problems. There is no reason why the flow of social thought should not pour into such a single channel. It is doubtless logical that it should be so. The reason for this, we think, is the fact that the struggle of the peoples over the centuries has been above all a struggle for political rights, that is, a struggle for nationhood. As long as this question hovers before us unresolved, the question of longing for national rights will remain the order of the day, and honored concepts such as "freedom," "equality," "justice" will remain an unattained hope, and will sadden national thought. Willingness to achieve our goal has taken various forms under varied historical circumstances.

Vladimir Ilich Lenin, who well understood this in this time, wrote a very valuable work entitled "Regarding Rights of Self-government of Nationalities" in which he argued with representatives of a variety of political conceptions. In this work he firmly defended the political rights of the peoples. For this reason, the invaluable role played by this work in mobilizing all nationalities and nations under the control of the Russian Empire in their struggle for freedom is well known to all.

During the new era of history after the victory of the October Revolution, the nationality question remained one of the primary questions drawing the attentions of Lenin. Some Marxists, having undergone the trials of the cruel years, relegated the once highly regarded right of self-government of the nationalities to the category of obsolescence, and saw the need to substitute this right for the right of workers to self-government. However, Lenin was resistant to the complete disappearance of the idea once and for all, and was very much aware of the fact that rejection of the idea of the right of self-government by nationalities under conditions of socialism represented a betrayal of socialism. Likewise, Lenin considered it possible for the proletariat to reconstruct capitalism into socialism and to completely overcome ethnic repression. But he pointed out that this possibility could become truth only under conditions of a complete democratization of all areas of social life, and when

nationalities were guaranteed all rights, including the right of succession. Lenin provided this kind of a theoretical foundation for a union of free peoples on a basis of equality, and he himself became its head.

In our view, the now totally forgotten meaning of "sovereignty," "self-government," and "official language" should be viewed in terms of these Leninist laws. While we have now given capitalism the upper hand, our society remains in a undemocratized state. The Stalinist governmental-dictatorial apparatus has robbed nationalities of the right to govern themselves, given them by the October Revolution. Everything has become "dependent" upon one center. As a result, while the Soviet Constitution speaks of the sovereignty of the republics, this remains on paper, as "dead words." In practice the republics have no such right. There is sufficient evidence to prove what we say. And this evidence is widely known at present. We can visualize completely what a sad state the sovereignty of our republic is in at present just from the words of Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev.

For the time being, it seems no more than necessary to draw attention to a fact witnessed by the authors. Because the center has such a hold over us, is it not true that we trot off to Moscow to get a "seal of approval" for the chief national instrument of the Kazakhs, the *dombra*, that we sit goggle-eyed in the offices of the Ministry of Forestry, waiting for permission before a bored bureaucratic potentate? That such great and powerful persons should even know what a *dombra* is! We laugh when we think that such pompous asses, who have never in their lives taken such an instrument in their hands, should have "control" over the fate of the dear *dombra*, which expresses the spiritual world of the people. We laugh and we break into tears. Now if this is the fate of the *dombra*, what can we say about other things? Does this example not imply that we have lost our very last hold on reality? Unfortunately, damage resulting from centralization of everything in one center has done more than "damage." It has become established as an achievement of socialism, has appropriated the thoughts of at least two whole generations, and has spread into the social fabric of society. Various kinds of dissatisfaction with this tendency have been severely castigated as "nationalism," and punished. White and black have been confused to the greatest possible degree. The most clearly seen indication of the moral-psychological climate brought into being by this circumstance are the measures carried out in connection with the December 1986 Alma-Ata incident, and the propaganda campaign which has been mounted. It is not difficult to understand, if you look at any national paper of the time, that the question of how public opinion was to take shape in the republic was in their hands. Local publications suppressed, and did not pass on materials suitable for the pages of national publications collected by a well experienced journalist like myself, and confined themselves to repeating slogans again and again: such materials with qualities of accusation, assignment of guilt, reproach and blame are proof of the disorder of republic life.

This entire process has gone forward in the name of Lenin. Everything Lenin said about federation, sovereignty, internationalism and the friendship of the peoples has been drastically distorted and made into a sham. Now, in the era of perestroika, we have the duty of restructuring all of this which has taken hold in this manner. There are many measures of the depth and results of this process. But the chief measure must be the state of the sovereign rights of the republic. The word sovereignty is no abstract concept, it is comprised of a number of specific components. One of the fundamental ideas contained within it is that the name of a republic should be related to the language of the people. This question is a difficult one, but seems now to have been solved in the end, after much meandering through various channels. But we cannot say that the republic right to sovereignty has been totally guaranteed through this action. In our view, there are a number of other issues of no less significance than the language question. One is the question of participation in the party structure. It is no accident that this question is now a subject of hot discussion in the entire Soviet Union. In fact is it at all possible to guarantee real republic independence when there is one party? If it is possible, then what mechanism can guarantee this independence? These questions still remain unanswered.

Has it been difficult for Moscow, if it does not like some republic chief, to remove him from office and replace him by another? We know that Genadiy Vasilyevich Kolbin was appointed in a total of just 18 minutes. This being the case, does full authority remain in the hands of the republic government under circumstances where Moscow keeps the reins in its hands and administers from one center?

In this connection we are not speaking of individuals. What we are discussing are laws and mechanism to guarantee civil rights. We have good purpose in noting that if there is a just judge, there are just laws.

Another problem: We think that the party should not be based upon ethnic affiliations, but upon class. Emphasis is given to recruiting into its ranks representatives of the bodies of workers of leading industries. However, the groups of nationality workers are in a sad state in Kazakhstan, and it is no secret that in most leading industries they are as good as nonexistent. Does not this weakness of nationality worker groups in the party, the fountainhead of authority, not damage the civil rights of the people whose republic it is? What guarantee is there that this inadequacy will be compensated for?

Some have sought to trace the problem to the nature of the nationality. There is the stereotype that the Kazakhs are a people which has traditionally been close to its animals, close to the village. They do not wish to become workers and go to the city. We cannot agree with this stereotype. Kazakh young people who wish to remain in the city and who work in plants and factories for years at a time are not fewer than young people of other nationalities. The government of our republic has not had the

power to show them fatherly consideration. The government's authority does not extend to industries directly under the center. And there are many of these kind of industries in the republic...

The importance of democratic factors in completely guaranteeing the civil rights of the republic nationality is considerable. We have put up with the situation as a minority in our own republic at a time when it has become difficult to defend its sovereign rights with constitutional means. We have written and continue to say that we must as a rule put intelligence, active, honorable persons, honored by the people, into our service. However, the results of this, in a world full of ethnic contradiction and problems, has not lived up to our expectations. This has been shown sufficiently clearly by the results of the recent elections. Leaving aside other things, we could not advance the candidature of Olzhas [Suleymenov] from Alma-Ata, our capital. He was barely elected from Ayakoz. Is this something natural? Was not demographic pressure involved in this?

However this pressure has formed cadre policy since the era of Stalin. When various circumstances which have arisen from standards instilled into our minds and known understandings are all taken into consideration, there is no possibility for your nationality to elect its choice. The choosing of a representative for you has in fact passed into the control of others. This is the reason why you easily accept the representation of those who will do what they are told, who are spineless, rather persons who have looked after the people, and not misused them.

If we advance the discussion of republic sovereignty, many will make trouble saying that this rather than "bringing people together, will divide them." The assertion along these lines which we have been hearing a lot recently is as follows: Today the tendency for the one people to grow closer to another is becoming stronger. In terms of economic connections alone, when we speak of the sovereignty of some nation, it is a nice idea, but in truth there is no people which can live entirely on its own. All peoples exist in close connection to one another are dependent upon one another. This is the what they say. Those who make such assertion come to the conclusion that since "we are all exist in dependency upon the other, why is there any need to become independent." They come out opposed to any advance to a law governing the sovereign rights of the republics. We are in total disagreement with this concept. In our view, The process of grouping, of drawing together, or integration gaining ground in the world can only take place among independent countries with equal rights. This movement is a good thing which can only be realized through the nations showing respect for one another's sovereign rights and honoring them. Inequality begins where equality has been violated. And what we mean by inequality is when one is dependent upon another. Under such circumstances, mutual understanding, mutual respect and mutual accommodation become impossible. Vladimir Ilich Lenin, in his time, went deeply into all

aspects of these relations and thoroughly researched them. He laid down the principle of real equal rights as the precondition for the mutual assimilation, accommodation and solidarity of nationalities. And he pointed out repeatedly, clear as a bell, that the real equal rights of the nationalities mean the rights to self-government, that is, sovereignty in the fullest sense of the word.

Unfortunately, very valuable aspects of the extremely rich heritage of Lenin on the nationality question, in particular, those key parts of his works in which he speaks of the sovereignty of the republics, of the rights of nationalities to self-government, have not been found, until recently, in the collected works of our great leader, and have not been propagandized widely. To be sure, there have been times when some of these passages have appeared in academic studies. However, the authors of such studies strove to interpret these passages as honored heritage having value for one time in history only, later annulled, as it were. No people chooses to remain a minority in its own land. That which chooses for them is force, usurpation. This being the case, the question arises logically of what we should do. To tell the honest truth without hiding anything, in our view, we must immediately put a stop to the inrush of people from outside the republic. There are adequate labor resources within the republic. And if we need specialized cadres, we should invite them on a contractual basis, as needed for a set time only. The most important thing is that we must start preparing expert specialists in our own republic. This is because we do not need just specialists, but our own specialists. If it is all the same to others, it is not all the same for us. What hope can we have, what benefit from specialists who, like the toys of the "Qayrat" Command, turn their interests elsewhere as soon as they have received their reward?

A great deal has been said in recent years about the sovereignty of the RSFSR. We think that we should all support this good suggestion. Under circumstances whereby the governmental system of the RSFSR is in many ways different than those of other republics, it seems as if the RSFSR and the Soviet Union have become one and the same. Can we not think that this is one of the reasons while the equality of the nationalities has been damaged? However, some have striven to understand this fact in an altogether different way. In their view, it would seem as if Russia has remained powerless in comparison to the other republics. We think this point of view inappropriate.

In order to strengthen the concord and unity of the peoples living in our great nation, brought into being and formed by Vladimir Ilich with his own hands, we must, in our view, guarantee the real sovereignty of the republics. We must do everything possible to promote the growth of ethnic sensitivities. The ancestral inhabitants of this land must become the real owners of their domains. In this way the process of mutual understanding, mutual esteem and of mutual solidarity will begin. Model teachings positioned in the rich heritage of our great leader teach us this.

Kazakh Outrage at Proposal to Give Northern Oblasts to RSFSR

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[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata LENINSHIL ZHAS in Kazakh on 13 October 1989 carries on page 1 a 2200-word article comprised of two letters, published under the rubric "Viewpoint," written in response to a 13 September Russian-language article published in RUDNYY ALTAY by USSR People's Deputy Stella Georgiyevna Vasilyeva in which she indirectly opposed the making of Kazakh the republic official language by suggesting that Eastern Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk and Pavlodar oblasts are historically Russian and should therefore be transferred to the political control of the RSFSR. The two letters, the first by Mukhtar Nawshabayev, LENINSHIL ZHAS reporter, entitled "Room for Pluralism?," and the second, by Nughyman Bayandin, member of the USSR Geographical Society, entitled "Addition to the Reply of LENINSHIL ZHAS reporter M. Nawshabayev to USSR People's Deputy S.G. Vasilyeva," both expressed outrage at the suggestion and the veiled racism and nationalism which Vasilyeva's views represent (Nawshabayev clearly suggests that she has gone too far). They, moreover, respond in some detail to her attempts to prove the Russianess of the areas in question by proving long term Kazakh occupation and historical connection. Vasilyeva sought to show that Kazakhs were in fact migrants to the area, and that Russians and other Slavs came first. Nawshabayev and Bayandin make it quite clear that the reverse is the case.

Role of Kazakh Unofficial Groups in Election Campaign Discussed

18320018

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN in Kazakh on 21 October carries on page 3 a 4000-word roundtable discussion, chaired by SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN editor K. Q. Duyseyev and recorded

by Zh. Kenzhalin and T. Bitayev entitled "The Sharp Thrust of Political Activism." Participating in the discussions, which focus on soon-to-be-held Soviet local elections and the problem of preparing for them, were Qazyrbek Apsheyituly Ishmukhamedov, chief of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Division for Work with Soviets; May Khakimzhanuly Zhekbayrov, candidate in legal science, secretary of the Central Elections Commission for the Election and Recall of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies; Maksim Temirbolatuly Sarsenov, secretary of the Alma-Ata City Party Committee; Sultan Qabdollauly Sadyqbayev, deputy chief of the Organizational and Instructional Division of the Alma-Ata Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies Executive Committee; Sofiya Baqtiyaqzy Zhumaghazyeva, secretary of the Alma-Ata City Frunze Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies Executive committee; and Nikolay Ilich Akuyev, candidate in legal science, leading research worker of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Philosophy and Law Institute. In their remarks, discussants stress the differences between planned and past elections and the different ways in which preparations for them must be made, including selection of a new type of candidate worthy to assist in the ongoing tasks of perestroyka. The new elections, it is made clear, will be more democratic than those of the past, and will be very much issue oriented, with candidates having, necessarily, to respond to the needs and interests of their constituents (discussants note a reorganization of districts to reflect wider voter groupings). Moreover, discussants make clear, candidates will have to do this effectively if they are to gain the approval of the votes and be elected. In this regard, discussants seem concerned that "unofficial groups" might monopolize the discussions of the critical issues of the present and thus change an election planned to be based on issues into one reflecting the ethnic and other divisions of society. However, it is made clear, "unofficial groups," even if many represent narrow local interests and chauvinisms, still have a role to play in the elections and must participate in election campaigns (participants grudgingly admit). For them not to do so would be a violation of the principles of the new democracy.

Estonian People's Front Appeals for Better Protection of Rural Areas

18150116A Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian
21 Oct 89 p 1

[“Appeal to the Estonian SSR Government from the Estonian People's Front Executive Board”]

[Text] The People's Front of Estonia can no longer be a passive witness to the unbridled increase in crime, including a wave of such obviously organized crimes that are aimed at escalating political instability, undermining the IME [Self-Managing Estonia]-bound economy, and destroying cultural landmarks. Of special concern to us is the almost complete lack of protection for our rural population.

For a decisive turnaround of the situation that has developed, the People's Front wants to express its readiness to cooperate in the formation of a protective system in the villages and cities of Estonia against the violence threatening all of us.

As the most urgent measure, we find it imperative that the government find the means to provide all Estonian villages with radio communications and municipal security guard services.

We also deem it necessary that the Estonian SSR government, without any delay, look into the possibility of using border guard forces to stem the influx of criminal elements across the borders of Estonia.

Turkmen Officials Interviewed on Legal Renewal

90US0284A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 17 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with S. Guneshev, chief of the department for the functioning of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's permanent commissions, and G. K. Podalinskiy, chief of the Turkmen CP Central Committee's State legal department and chairman of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet Legislative Proposals Commission, by TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA correspondent N. Charukhcheva: “Legislative Renewal: The Road to Democracy”]

[Text] The 19th All-Union Party Conference undertook the task of returning power to the Soviets and making them truly democratic, populist, and economically powerful and independent. In accordance with this, much legislative work has been done in the republic as well as throughout the country. In October 1989, the eleventh session of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet approved national laws regarding changes and addenda to the Constitution and on the election of Turkmen SSR people's deputies. These laws provide for a drastic democratization of the entire electoral system, the forming of the supreme organs of government and administration, and the activities of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

Our correspondent N. Charukhcheva talked about the new provisions of these laws with G. K. Podalinskiy, chief

of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee's State legal department and chairman of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet Legislative Proposals Commission, and S. Guneshev, chief of the department for the functioning of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's permanent commissions.

[Correspondent] The first stage of the election campaign is the nomination and registration of candidates for TuSSR people's deputies. According to the new law, how will the nominations and registration of candidates be conducted?

[S. Guneshev] The law has set a period of one month for the procedure of nominating candidates for USSR people's deputies. According to the legislation, which has been passed in our republic, 25 days is allotted for the nomination of candidates for TuSSR people's deputies and for people's deputies to the local Soviets. This is quite enough time for the labor collectives, public organizations, and the electors, according to polling district, to select candidates and to discuss and nominate them.

The right to nominate appertains to the labor collectives at the factories and educational institutions, to the public organizations, to assemblies of electors in their polling district, and to assemblies of servicemen in the military units. Furthermore, an unlimited number of candidates can be considered at the meetings or conferences of the collectives and at the meetings of the bodies of public organizations. And every participant at the meeting has the right to make suggestions, nominate alternative candidates, express his opinion of the candidates, and to support or reject the candidates being considered.

But it must be taken into account that the meetings in the labor collective and in the polling district can only nominate one candidate each.

[Correspondent] Changes concerning the age qualification for a Turkmen Supreme Soviet deputy have been made in the law “On Elections of Turkmen SSR People's Deputies”. Now a person must be 21 years-old in order to become a deputy instead of 18 years-old, as it was in the past. What is the reason for this?

[G. K. Podalinskiy] The people discussed the draft legislation very passionately and with intense interest. The commission working on the draft took their suggestions and comments into account. A large number of suggestions dealt precisely with the change in the age qualification for an elected representative of the people.

A deputy is a statesman, who will have to make decisions of enormous importance. In order to do this, a person must have experience in life, an established world outlook, and political maturity. Experience has confirmed that a person acquires this baggage by the age of 21. This change will make it possible to ensure the election of deserving young people to the supreme organ of government and this is very important.

[Correspondent] Our republic has adopted its own "model" for participation in public organizations' elections, which is different from the union model. Why?

[G. K. Podalinskiy] Democratic laws are created only through democratic means: the republics have the right to independently choose their own model. We relied on the opinion of the people, who participated in the debate of the draft laws.

The system of direct elections of people's deputies by public organizations elicited sharp criticism from the people. The people correctly noted that private groups of voters enjoyed an unwarranted advantage under this system. And this fact alone was a violation of the principle of equal voting rights for citizens. This is the reason that the deputies at the Supreme Soviet session arrived at the unanimous opinion: public organizations must participate in elections on common and absolutely equal grounds.

Only those public organizations that are properly registered retain the right to nominate an unlimited number of candidates, with the candidates being from any district, to render support (excluding financial support) to their own candidates during the course of the election campaign, and to participate in conducting the elections.

[Correspondent] Certain republics have outlawed the conducting of district preelection meetings. Why does our republic allow them to be conducted?

[G. K. Podalinskiy] "Allowed" is not at all the same as "compulsory". If three or fewer candidates are nominated in a district, the law does not allow the conducting of a meeting.

There are approximately 50 public organizations in our republic. And it may come to pass that scores of candidates will be aspiring for one mandate. It is understandable that in this situation it will be difficult for the voters to evaluate the merit of each candidate and make a choice. So, voting in the elections would turn into a formality. District preelection meetings, at which free and extensive discussion of the candidates takes place, will help ensure competitiveness and true democracy during the selection of candidates.

And afterwards, the participants in the district preelection meetings will have the right to decide how many candidates will be permitted to register. In other words, the voters themselves will actually decide the fate of the deputies, instead of the apparatchiks, as some people have feared.

[Correspondent] During the debate concerning the draft legislation, the editorial office received letters, in which the authors expressed doubts: won't the elections in districts with multiple mandates become a loophole for the apparatchiks to force through their own candidates for people's deputies?

[S. Guneshev] Let us clarify this at once: the election laws specify that elections in districts with multiple

mandates can be held only for people's deputies to village and settlement Soviets. In a village where there is a small number of districts, this is advisable in a number of cases. Here is the reason. Let us assume that a small village must elect 25 deputies. This means that it has to form 25 districts, 25 election committees, etc. It is easier to unite and to elect 25 deputies on an alternative basis for the whole district.

[Correspondent] Does the law stipulate changes in the voting procedure?

[S. Guneshev] In principle, the former procedure remains unchanged. But a new electoral procedure envisages great voter responsibility during the polling. In the past, it was sufficient to drop a ballot into the ballot box, but now a voter must "do a little work" with it—cross out the surnames of the candidates whom he does not support and leave only one name. That is why one cannot vote in the place of one's children, parents, and neighbors. This is a violation which could entail having to hold new elections. It is for this reason that every voter must come to the polling station on election day with his passport or identification card.

I should add that when the votes are tallied, ballots and forms that are not in accordance with the prescribed standard, or those ballots, upon which the surnames of more than one candidate have not been crossed out, are considered invalid.

[Correspondent] The new edition of the TuSSR Constitution states, the TuSSR Supreme Soviet is a permanently functioning organ of the government. What does that mean?

[G. K. Podalinskiy] The new legislation has significantly expanded the range of issues, which will be decided exclusively by the session of the Supreme Soviet. The TuSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has been deprived of legislative power. It has been completely turned over to the republic's Supreme Soviet. The status and authority of the permanent commissions and the committees of the republic's Supreme Soviet have increased significantly. It is stipulated that the Supreme Soviet can make decisions on major issues and appoint leaders of the ministries and departments only after preliminary discussion in the commissions and committees.

Special groups of deputies will be created to study problems, arousing acute public interest, and open hearings in the commissions and committees will become a common practice. In short, while draft legislation and resolutions were formerly drawn up by apparatchiks and submitted to the Supreme Soviet for approval, now all analytical and legislative work will be done by the deputies on the commissions and committees. The plenary sessions of the Supreme Soviet will only pass the laws that have been analyzed by every deputy. This is one of the means of strengthening the autonomy of the Soviets.

Today the notion of a "session" includes not only the plenary session of the Soviet, but also the work in the commissions and committees. The deputies' workload has grown considerably, the length of the session has increased, and, for all practical purposes, work will be conducted constantly. Deputies will have to tear themselves away from industrial activities for a prolonged period of time and some may even have to completely give up their principal work for work in the Soviet. The republic's Supreme Soviet will become the permanently functioning supreme organ of government.

I would like to add that 175 districts have been defined for people's deputies elections. This means that the number of deputies in the republic's Supreme Soviet has decreased from 330 to 175. During the discussion of this issue, the commissions of the Supreme Soviet took into account the fact that there is no provision for convening conferences of people's deputies in the republic and the new working conditions and problems demand efficiency in the activities of the Soviets. The specific socio-economic peculiarities of the republic were also taken into consideration. But the present number of districts fully ensures representation in the Supreme Soviet of all regions, cities, and rayons.

[Correspondent] Does the law guarantee activities of candidates for deputy?

[S. Guneshev] Absolutely. They are discussed in detail in the seventh sections of the TuSSR Laws "On the election of TuSSR people's deputies" and "On the election of deputies to the local Soviets of people's deputies". I would like to draw attention to the fact that from the time of their registration by the election committees, candidates for deputy obtain equal rights to appear at preelection meetings and other gatherings, debates, and conferences, in the press, and on radio and television.

A candidate for deputy must not have had criminal proceedings instituted against him, have been arrested or have incurred an administrative penalty imposed by the judicial system, without the assent of the respective republic, oblast, rayon, city, city district, settlement, or village election committee.

In addition, a candidate for deputy is entitled to free passage on all kinds of transportation (except taxis) within the limits of his respective election district.

[Correspondent] A new article concerning the presidium of the local Soviets of people's deputies has appeared in section 14 of the TuSSR Constitution. What brought about this requirement?

[S. Guneshev] Actually, the procedure for forming presidiums in the local Soviets of people's deputies is stipulated in article 129 of the TuSSR Constitution. Now the presidium is faced with organizing the work of the Soviet, permanent commissions, and groups of deputies. In other words, the presidium will perform the tasks, which are currently being performed by the ispolkom,

and the ispolkom will only develop administrative activities. Thus, the people's power will be concentrated in the local Soviet and the ispolkom will become its executive administrative organ.

[Correspondent] According to the Constitution of the USSR, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium will be formed by appointment. The Constitution of our republic provides for its election. What is the reason for this difference?

[G. K. Podalinskiy] Naturally, the TuSSR Constitution, like that of any other republic, cannot duplicate the Constitution of the USSR in every detail. I have already discussed the fact that many of the Presidium's powers are being transferred directly to the Supreme Soviet. But the Presidium is also retaining important functions. The organization and coordination of the work of the deputies, of the commissions and committees, and of the sessions of the Soviet, monitoring compliance with the TuSSR Constitution, questions of citizenship and amnesty, of awards and foreign relations, and a number of other functions. In other words, the activities of the Presidium will not become purely mechanical. It will be an authoritative government body and its formation should be based on the principles of democracy and glasnost, i.e. by means of elections. This procedure will allow the Supreme Soviet to directly influence the Presidium, to more strictly control its work, and to drastically and efficiently renovate its structure. I believe that this is a key factor in the real autonomy of the Soviets.

[Correspondent] What other changes do the laws provide for?

[S. Guneshev] Altogether 63 of 173 articles in the TuSSR Constitution have been changed or supplemented. I will cite some important features. A new position has been created—Chairman of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet. He will represent the republic inside the country and in the international arena. A new position has also been introduced in the local Soviets of people's deputies—chairman of the oblast, rayon, city, city district, settlement, or village Soviet.

The term of office for Soviets of people's deputies has been standardized at 5 years and the term of office for judges in all republic courts at 10 years.

Article 80 states that officials, which are elected or appointed by the Soviets of people's deputies, cannot hold their positions for more than two terms in succession. There is one more very important addendum: officials, which are appointed or elected by the Soviet, cannot be deputies of that Soviet, with the exception of the chairmans of the executive and administrative organs.

[Correspondent] A large number of our readers are interested in this question: how much money does the state spend on conducting elections?

[S. Guneshev] The TuSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium approved an estimate of expenditures to the sum of 3.3 million rubles. For the sake of comparison, I can state that expenses for conducting the elections to the TuSSR Supreme Soviet and the local Soviets totalled 500 thousand rubles in February 1985. Such a sharp increase in impending expenditures is explained by the fact that the state has taken the expenses upon itself. Industrial enterprises, institutions, and organizations used to allocate funds.

I will add that candidates for people's deputy and the electorate do not bear the expenses associated with this campaign.

[Correspondent] And the last question: where can voters obtain legal advice on voting questions?

[G. K. Podalinskiy] Election committees have already been formed at all levels. Information on their location and hours of operation has been published in the republic and local press. The voters can receive an answer to any question from these committees. Advice can also be obtained from the ispolkoms of the Soviets of people's deputies. In addition, legal advice offices have been established at the election committees in Ashkhabad and in the oblast and rayon centers. Legal assistance on any questions will be provided to citizens at these offices.

Ramifications of Newsprint Paper Shortage Considered

90US0245A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Nov 89
Morning Edition p 2

[Article by V. Romanyuk: "The Paper 'Syndrome': How the Printers are Paying for Glasnost"]

[Text] I am loath to dump upon the reader's shoulders this problem as well. But there is no getting around it. We speak of newsprint. Of course, the reader should not get a headache over whether this issue might have been printed on paper which the IZVESTIYA publishing house borrowed from the PRAVDA combine, which at this moment has leftovers. The reverse happens as well. In any case, the newsprint for almost every issue comes right from shipment. And in certain cities, when the long-awaited train car does not make in on time, they haul in the edition printed in Moscow. The glitches grow as a result; the newspaper gets to its reader late...

Such is the problem born of the growing interest in the printed word. IZVESTIYA publishing house paper department chief S. Pekh said that the requests for 1990 could be defended in USSR Gosplan only at the 1989 level. In the meantime, the circulation of the weekly SEMYA is growing to 2.3 million copies; PRAVITEL-STVENNYY VESTNIK by one-half million copies; the publication of a new weekly SOYUZ is starting up, but it is still unclear as to what it will be printed on...

"As usual, in March, the requests will be clarified," says Svetlana Konstantinovna, "And in May, they will find something in USSR Gosplan and they will add it to ours. But how will we get through until that time?"

The paper problem did not come about yesterday. It was exacerbated to extremes when glasnost became the most noticeable fact of our life, when the dam of circulation limitations on popular publications broke under public pressure. I attempted to discuss "reserves" with V. Zhiganov, chief of "Tsentrumprom," and he tersely replied, "The amortization of the basic fund at the Solikamskiy TsKB [Pulp Paper Combine] is 73 percent; at the Balakhninskiy TsKB, 68 percent... New capacity is being readied for use at Balakhna, but will not be brought on line until 1991 at the earliest. It would be possible to transfer one aggregate at the Syktyvskarskiy LPK [forest industry combine] to newsprint, but that would mean taking it away from the book publishers."

However, let us return to the problems of the IZVESTIYA publishing house. After examining its request for 1990, USSR Gosplan confirmed it at the level of the previous year. USSR Gosplan, in affixing the funds allocated to concrete suppliers, cut the request by 7 percent. And the enterprises themselves slashed it by another 3 percent. In addition to these cuts, there were others as well, in the plan development phase.

In brief, in 1990 the IZVESTIYA publishing house will have a 16 metric ton shortfall of newsprint. Where can it be gotten? S. Pekh showed us the correspondence on that

subject. A fresh teletype from the Uglegorskiy TsKB: The order for supplying newsprint was not accepted. The publishing house writes to USSR Gosplan, demanding some sort of resolution. But calm is maintained there: The consumers must work with the suppliers on their own.

A question: Why then all these exhausting agreements and scribbles, which can be measured by the pound? V. Malygin, chief of the USSR Gosplan subdepartment for balances and product planning distribution for the pulp-paper industry is somewhat bewildered: What is the fuss? There is no return communication, the signals did not reach.

One more teletype, this time from the Balakhninskiy TsKB: "With regard to the increase in the state order adopted by the collective we are extending the contract for supply in 1990 in the volume of 90 percent of the allocated funds." A call to TsKB. Deputy director for economics A. Stepanov confirms, that was the decision of the council of labor collectives, and in his opinion, absolutely a well-grounded decision. They wore out the equipment completely; they even stopped doing scheduled and preventive maintenance. Even the most select newsprint, for the cover, went into the plan.

Now, utilizing the Law on Enterprises, the collective has made corrections to the plan. And the state order was already formed from this cut quantity. Some 30,000 metric tons of newsprint remained for open distribution. This is with the preference for enterprises which render assistance to the combine, including financial assistance. The IZVESTIYA publishing house uses the "regime of maximum favorability." How is this expressed? It turns out, in the priority receipt of high-quality paper, but at the export price—R420 per metric ton, R150 higher than usual. At the same time, paper is purchased abroad for hard currency to be sold to illustrated publications for rubles, at an incomparably low price. If we remove that sort of hidden donation of hundreds of millions of rubles, then the picture of prices and the corresponding subscriptions would be quite different from what it is today.

It is possible that the solution of the problem lies in direct relations between the paper's consumers and its producers. The IZVESTIYA publishing house invests no small resources in the reconstruction of the Balakhninskiy TsKB. Thus would it not be sensible to unite the printers and the paper makers in a single concern? Then there would not be intermediary echelons, and the publishing house would be forced to take up seriously the development of its own base.

The situation with the PRAVDA publishing house is somewhat better. On 1 November 1989, IZVESTIYA was shorted 2,000 metric tons of newsprint, and the PRAVDA publishing house, 7,000 metric tons. Neither the one nor the other had any carry-over remnants. In the current year, practically all the TsKBs are frustrating the fulfillment of plans (the lag in the volume of the state

order is 35,000-40,000 metric tons). But that is with so much wastage! The verbatim report of the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies was frequently published in doubled issues—a waste of 3 metric tons of newsprint. The second Congress is in December 1989, and once again, the problem with paper.

Now on the prospects for 1990. V. Malygin cold-bloodedly reported that PRAVDA's and IZVESTIYA's surplus paper will be taken away in connection with the reduction in subscriptions; PRAVDA's by 30 percent, and IZVESTIYA's by 6.5 percent. Yet it should be taken into consideration that PRAVDA is going over to a 6-page edition, and all through 1989, IZVESTIYA was printed wholesale in only 750,000 copies, while the plan was 900,000, and only now is the opportunity presenting itself to return this duty to the readers. Add in the circulation growth among other publications. The publishers and printers unanimously wail about the "free-loaders" with subscriptions which are in no way related to the actual paper resources. To meet the needs of just these two publishing houses, in order to ease the situation at least a bit, 65,000 metric tons of newsprint had to be purchased abroad.

We have said nothing about paper for books, or for magazine covers. The provisions here are at the 50 percent level. In 1990, NOVYY MIR added several hundred thousand copies, but there is not even enough paper for the covers of this year's last issues. In the meantime, the money has been taken from the subscribers, and guarantees have been issued. Where does the solution lie?

Above all, in the rational utilization of the supplies of paper on hand. However odd, its departmental pilfering continues. Despite the reduction in force and even the elimination of many ministries, the same 137,000 metric tons of paper are allocated for departmental publications in 1990 as were allocated in 1988 and 1989. It has happened that the departments have sold surplus paper to cooperatives, and with no small gain for themselves. Is not this here one of the supply channels for the burgeoning "informal" press?

And now in the State Committee for Printing there has been allocated 35,000 metric tons less paper in 1990 than was allocated one year earlier, and is now allocated in 1989. The growing magazine circulation will be supplied at the expense of a reduction of the publication of the, so to say, "less topical" books. After all, that very same paper could be utilized to produce more topical literature. Approximately 20 metric tons of paper goes into a book with a printing of 100,000 copies. That means that about 2,000 book titles on the most topical problems will not get to the reader. A pity.

Fresh news from the IZVESTIYA publishing house: The 16,000 metric ton shortfall has just about been found. The publishing house proposed acquiring from each of three TsKBs 5,000 metric tons of newsprint at so-called export prices. However strange, during an acute paper

shortage, the best quality types are sent abroad. As we see, the printers manage to buy up some of it at an exorbitant price, cutting into their own base, including that of material stimulation. But why must the printers pay for the paper shortage with their fund for economic stimulation? What we get here is a sort of payment for glasnost.

SMENA Staff, Komsomol Protest Planned Format, Periodicity Changes

90US0279A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Dec 89 p 1

[Letters from SMENA staff and Pravda Publishing House workers: "Glasnost Should Not Be Dependent on Technology"]

[Text] It may seem strange that the journalists of SMENA are appealing to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and its readers through KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Strange and insulting. Yet we have no choice.

We must tell the truth to you, our readers new and old. Because this appeal is in hopes that it will still be possible to save our SMENA, your SMENA...

The subscription campaign is over, and we have been informed that according to preliminary figures the size of each edition of our magazine will be increased by 800,000. That means we have acquired new, enthusiastic friends, who currently number over eight million. What can we say: this news simply confirms the fact that young readers are supporting their magazine. And we had already made plans for the first 1990 issue of SMENA, when suddenly... That is precisely the problem: "suddenly." Pravda Publishing House, which prints our magazine, has informed us that beginning with the first of the year it will be unable to print SMENA in its previous format. There is not enough paper, or enough production facilities to keep pace with the increasing number of subscribers. It has been proposed that we switch to a new book-style format which will appear monthly. "But what about our readers?" we asked. "This is a production-related necessity," we were told.

No, we are not complaining. We are simply honestly explaining the situation, as a result of which you may receive an unfamiliar-looking copy of SMENA in January.

This is an insult to a magazine which has been published in the same format since 1924. And you can probably all understand the pain and confusion of our editorial staff. We sympathize with the publishers and are aware of their problems. But why should those problems be solved at the expense of SMENA readers? And is it right today to deprive our subscribers of the only full-color illustrated youth magazine in the country, which is what SMENA has been for 65 years? We have also posed that question to our publishers. Once again they replied: "Production-related necessity."

Well, the struggle is too unequal. Our publication is both legally and *de facto* without rights in this matter. No matter how much we want to we cannot acquire paper and ink, or buy new, up-to-date equipment... But are these problems really so insoluble?

[Signed] The collective of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee magazine SMENA

From an All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Resolution of 4 December

The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee considers a proposal by the CPSU Central Committee's Pravda Publishing House regarding a change in the format and periodicity of the journal SMENA unacceptable, as the subscribers and the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee were not informed of this decision in a timely manner.

Esteemed Comrades!

We, the workers of Pravda Publishing House's printing plant, are appealing to readers through a newspaper for the first time. One year ago we shared everyone else's joy at the lifting of all restrictions on subscribing to periodical publications. At that time we believed that the greater workload would be evenly distributed among printing plant workers, paper makers, machine builders and the staff of the USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade. In fact, most of the burden of keeping pace with the rapidly growing size of mass illustrated journals' editions has fallen on us alone. During this first year of operations under the open subscription system we have had to cope with inadequate production capacities, we have experienced delays in the delivery of paper and ink, and we have been constantly held up by communications workers. Millions of copies of magazines awaited shipment from our printing plant for weeks at a time. We were only able to meet our obligations to readers in 1989 through excessive overuse of printing equipment, as well as through the exhausting labor of our printers, who worked third shifts, Saturdays and Sundays. Our output quotas are substantially higher than all-union standards. The growing intensity of our work resulted in the loss to our profession of skilled printers and printing plant workers in other specialized areas. It was painful for us to watch as a collective which was many years in the making dissolved. Now the publishing house administration informed us of the 1990 subscription totals. You would think that we would be glad to see the growing interest in large-circulation illustrated magazines. But who is going to print them? Once again, we are the ones who are supposed to do it all. For five years now we have been appeased with promises that magazine printing jobs will be transferred to local printing plants. Yet in actuality this has not happened. We have already reached the maximum volume of issues that Moscow printing plants can produce.

We cannot work any more intensively than we have this past year. Our families do not want to see us losing

interest in life because we are always tired. Higher wages do not compensate for loss of health and vitality.

We have had our greatest problems with the publication of SMENA, the publication run of which has increased by one-third. The steps that have been taken toward the purchase of imported printing equipment cannot provide any real relief before 1993. That is why we have found, through the joint efforts of our entire labor collective, what seems to us the sole correct solution: to change the format and printing method used with SMENA temporarily, until the new equipment is installed, shifting from gravure printing to offset printing, changing the magazine's format, reducing the amount of color printing somewhat, yet restoring the total number of printed pages which were published prior to 1989. Only if these steps are taken can we guarantee on-time publication of this magazine, even if the number of its subscribers continues to grow.

Unfortunately, some segments of the media want to give a political overtone to all this and turn the readers against us.

We implore you to believe us when we tell you that it was purely production-related difficulties which forced us to take this extreme measure, one which we as optimists hope will be only a temporary one.

Written at the collective's behest by: V. M. Rumyantsev, printers' brigade leader; G. I. Gnatyuk, printers' brigade leader; N. L. Pronyayev, printer; L. P. Mavrina, assembly line operator; L. Yu. Skvortsova, materials handler; Yu. T. Payevskiy, plate etcher; and A. P. Churilov, printer

From the editors of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA:

There you have the two points of view. Of course both sides' interests must be considered. But we must also not forget the interests of the millions of readers who voted for a full-color SMENA...

We are firmly convinced that glasnost should not be dependent on technology.

New, Declassified Moscow Oblast Map Issued

90US2079B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Nov 89 p 3

[Unattributed report: "The Environs of Moscow Without Secrets: Oblast Map Declassified"]

[Text] The Moscow enterprise of the USSR Main Administration for Geodesy and Cartography has prepared and published a map entitled "Moskovskaya Oblast" [Moscow Oblast] at a scale of 1:500,000 (one centimeter = five kilometers). This general geographical map differs markedly from similar maps released previously, in that it is based on a topographical map of the same scale—the very same map that was once classified "secret," and later "for official use only."

On the new map all sorts of features in the region are indicated more fully. The map is suitable for use by drivers: it shows roads in relatively great detail, as well as routes within Moscow.

This is the first time that a map of this scale has included horizontal representation of local relief or indicated altitudes.

Chairman Explains Estonian Journalists Union Goals, Issues

90US0248A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 10, Oct 89 pp 14-19

[Interview with Myart Myuyur, chairman of the Estonian Union of Journalists governing board, by Tatyana Burlakova, chief specialist and press-attache of the Estonian SSR State Committee on Labor and Social Questions: "We Know Most of All About Ourselves"]

[Text] I listen to the tape cassette of the recorded conversation with Myart Myuyur which I conducted at the request of ZHURNALIST, and once again am amazed at the intransigent freshness of one banal truth: Time flies! It is filled with events, each with its own significance. Great? Small? What is important, and what not very important? What to concentrate our attention on? Our conversation was devoted to the problems of the artist's union, but now the days and the weeks pass by. Do not our strictly professional concerns pale on the background of the new events? On the other hand, who if not journalists are closely and directly tied with everything that is going on everywhere? However, there is cause for alarm...

The USSR Supreme Soviet said "yes" to republic cost accounting. Yet at the same time its Presidium found certain statutes of the republic's law on elections to be unconstitutional. There were strikes at many of the enterprises. The Russian-speaking population is worried by the real threat of infringement on its civil and political rights.

The announcement of the CPSU Central Committee "On the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics", having expressed the multiplicity and contradiction of the realities born in the process of perestroika, has called for consolidation of all sane forces capable of stabilizing the political situation in these republics. In short, the life of our republic is characterized by particular dynamism. So I ask myself again and again, how can we speak about our professional problems, about the activity of the Union of Journalists, at a time so electrified with various events? I assure myself: Who will today risk belittling the role of the press and the role of each of its rank and file members in this time of our awakening—social, national, and civil?

Thus, I present to you Myart Myuyur—chairman of the Estonian Union of Journalists governing board, elected at the recent (5-6 May 1989) extraordinary congress of the republic's journalists.

[Tatyana Burlakova] Where should we begin, Myart?

[Myart Myuyur] Where should we begin? Perhaps with the Congress. A certain fuzziness of the organizational principle, including on the order of utilizing the financial means, does not tie in with the upcoming transition of the republic to regional cost accounting, which presents new political and ideological tasks along with the economic ones. Journalists have stood at the source of the very idea of cost accounting, and their search for a new place under the new conditions is logical. The Congress spoke out most definitely in favor of continuing cooperation on a contractual basis with the USSR Union of Journalists and with the unions of journalists of all republics. It also favored the development of a horizontal system of informational ties, especially through inter-regional and inter-republic correspondent exchanges. It presented the proposal to open a press club at the USSR Supreme Soviet, to provide full access to the international system of direct-dial telephone communications, and to the international network of press agencies. It also stated as the inalienable right of the journalist the possibility of equipping his work site with current technical means, including means of communication and reproduction technology.

The statement as addressed to the colleagues, USSR Union of Journalists members, and adopted by the congress, states: "We hope that the Estonian Union of Journalists, relying on the best traditions of Soviet journalism and in close cooperation with all journalistic organizations, will be able to achieve much. This is what the times demand of us".

[Burlakova] Thus, the Congress has entailed some organizational changes...

[Myuyur] Yes, we must remember how it was: The governing board consisting of 50 people. The chairman was the editor of the Estonian republic newspaper, the deputy chairman—the editor of the Russian republic newspaper (we might add that they are also deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet, and occupy this position by rights, just as the office of deputy in the city soviet goes to the editor of the city newspaper, etc.). Our times have shaken this tradition. Thus, a year ago the Union of Journalists governing board was headed up by Yuri Paalma, who was at that time the editor of a small sports newspaper, and currently—the chairman of Estonian SSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting].

[Burlakova] We should note that there is a similar example of this also outside the boundaries of Estonia. Thus, Leningrad journalists have elected USSR People's Deputy A. Yezhelev, IZVESTIYA special correspondent, to serve as the chairman of the governing board... Possible candidacies to the post of chairman of the new Estonian Union of Journalists governing board, as far as I know, were discussed long before the Congress—at the meetings in the editorial offices, in the House of the Press, in the dining rooms and smoking rooms. Yet it

was your name which resounded from the hall at the Congress. Where you surprised or prepared for this?.. And moreover, were you surprised that the majority voted for you?

[Myuyur] Yes, I was surprised. I cannot hide the fact that I was pleasantly surprised. But I had my doubts until I realized: The majority is no joke!

[Burlakova] So, now we have a liberated chairman of the governing board. The Congress suggested to the popular television announcer that he part with the screen for a time, and "stipulated" a rather sizeable salary for him. Does it not seem strange to you that the editors of the republic newspapers can "combine" [duties], but you cannot?

[Myuyur] This is merely proof of the fact that from now on we are taking a serious approach to the matter, and having spoken out against combination of duties the Congress delegates have expressed their will, which I accepted. I admit that I love my work, and I valued my "popularity", however ambiguous the term, not only as a living person, but also as a professional. But what can I do? I will have to earn my salary, perhaps under less comfortable conditions, but in this pursuit too I hope to earn the acceptance of the people—now for the most part my colleagues, journalists.

[Burlakova] And how does it feel for an active journalist to act in a management role?

[Myuyur] I have already been a supervisor in my time—I worked as chief agronomist in a kolkhoz. So, I hope that experience will come in handy also for managing the journalist's collective.

[Burlakova] Where did you begin on your new job?

[Myuyur] Where does a new broom begin?... I might add, it is a rare broom that admits to starting with that which it sweeps. But... I decided to reduce the apparatus. If the governing board today consists not of 50, but of 15 people, then it is logical to think also about reducing the apparatus rather than copying the structure of large organizations. The mechanics are such: A draft of a staff roster is proposed, along with the duties of each position. Each person may try for one position or another on a competitive basis. The governing board will determine the results of the competition. Is this not an honest method?

[Burlakova] Yes, quite. By the way, the changes will affect not only the upper echelons of the Union and its apparatus. After all, there will be an upcoming "reduction" within the scope of the entire artist's organization. It is laid down in the new charter. Tell us about this in more detail.

[Myuyur] Today the Estonian Union of Journalists unites 1,255 people within its ranks. Is this many or few? It depends. For a republic with a population of 1.5 million it is impressive, especially if we compare it with other artist's unions. The membership of the Estonian

SSR Union of Cinematographers, for example, is only 1/10 that number. But that is not the point. An organization which is too large is cumbersome and difficult to manage. Thus, the tendency to unite into relatively small groups, unions and societies is understandable. Our photographers, for example, decided to create their own union comprised of 65 members. We might add that far from all of them are members of the Union of Journalists. Is this good or bad—their own union? But why be in a hurry to give our evaluations? If it brings benefit to its members—that is excellent! If it does not—it will fall apart by itself. What good is a union to its members if it has no influence on their lives or their attitudes, and if it does not give each of them a sense of stability and social protection?... Moreover, the new charter provides not for the reduction in numbers, but for the differentiation of its members into active, assistant, honorary and foreign.

[Burlakova] The "active" and "honorary" memberships are more or less self explanatory, but what about the "assistant" members?

[Myuyur] The assistant members cannot participate in elections or be elected to any organs of the Union of Journalists.

[Burlakova] It seems to me that here, whether you like it or not, there are grounds for hurt feelings... Well, then, who can become a foreign member of the Union of Journalists?

[Myuyur] Those journalists outside the boundaries of Estonia—in the Soviet Union and abroad—who through their work are tied with the thematics and problems of Estonia. You know, Estonians are scattered throughout the world, and most of them try whenever possible to maintain ties with their Homeland. And, in any case, they monitor what is going on here: There are many Estonian newspapers abroad. In Sweden, for example, the Estonian Tiya Toren works in television broadcasting. I think that she has done much to illuminate the processes of perestroika in our republic, so we may consider her a prime candidate for foreign membership in the Estonian Union of Journalists.

[Burlakova] Myart, let us return to our Congress of Journalists and to the main thing which today allows us to talk about the changes in structure and about numerous other changes which have become possible as a result of the fact that our republic organization of journalists has achieved its independence. I myself am trying to understand, and my friends, specifically Moscow journalists, ask me: What, have you seceded?

[Myuyur] No. We have not seceded. It is simply that, while before we seemed to be a lower-echelon organization in relation to the "big" union—the USSR Union of Journalists, now we are partners. What did we need this for? It is the will of perestroika, it is its regular process. The simplest answer is to resolve our own matters ourselves. Because in order to realize our responsibility and to take much upon ourselves, we need to be independent. How much can a child achieve if he continues,

as the Russians say, to hold on to his mother's skirt as he is growing up? The Estonians also have a similar expression. Here is the simplest example. Last year we handed over 125,000 rubles to the journalistic fund. In turn, we received 3,600 rubles from this centralized fund. Do we need to comment on this? We earn the money ourselves, and we want to spend it ourselves, at our own discretion. We need to give someone fraternal aid? Please, we will evaluate our capacities and allocate a sum to a specific address and for a specific cause, but not to an anonymous common pot. Money is needed for building an all-union house of rest? We can participate on a share basis, calculating how many places we may need there, and not have to ask later in a tearful voice for a travel pass, and for our own money. Or even better: We will build it ourselves and will exchange travel passes.

Already by next year the journalists of Estonia will have their own rest and recreation base—on the seashore near Khaapsal: 18-20 family cottages, and later also a 2-story building with units and general quarters—a bath, hall, dining room and kitchen.

However, it is not only a matter of money, although no one can do without it. What have we been most successful in accomplishing? Direct ties. You must agree that ties with our closest neighbor which must go through the capital are nonsense. And what a lot of paperwork! From Tallinn to Helsinki straight across the bay it is 80 kilometers. So we made use of the proximity. And it is not only territorial proximity which makes us kin, but also the language, culture and history. For the present day we have signed an agreement with three Finnish journalist organizations: One unites radio and television journalists, another—the central press, and the third—the regional press. We are planning currency-free exchange. The Finns have already been in Estonia. Now it is our turn to go there. The condition is that the contacts must be businesslike and mutually beneficial.

[Burlakova] I read in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY a foreign businessman's observations about our entrepreneurs. Our people want to have three things as a result of the contacts with foreigners: Computers, telefax machines, and the possibility to travel abroad. Moreover, we know something about ourselves even without foreign businessmen. The mere possibility of going abroad and buying there...—I will omit the list of items for the sake of saving space—already that we can grab onto. But what is it that interests them here?

[Myuyur] Some things are interesting. They have understood one simple truth about us: We also know how to work, and there are things that they can learn from us.

[Burlakova] Are there ties at the level of a specific newspaper?

[Myuyur] There are. The Yygevasskiy regional newspaper is establishing ties with Finnish and Swedish newspapers in those small territorial units with which the rayon already has friendly partnership ties. The

Estonian Union of Journalists newspaper SPORDILEKHT ("Sports Newspaper") and the Finnish newspaper ILDALEKHT are also cooperating with each other. I might add that they have even installed a telefax line. The Finns are very interested in information. But this is not an unexpected occurrence for us today. The fact is that SPORDILEKHT has concluded an agreement to supply information to one Italian information agency. Our people sell the information, and the Italian agency then manages it.

[Burlakova] And can it re-sell the information?

[Myuyur] Yes, it has the right to do so. But we are happy even at this outcome: For our sports journalists this means both prestige and earnings. Now they will be able to use the currency to buy decent dictaphones without which, you understand, a present-day journalist cannot take a step. For SPORDILEKHT, I might add, we also did a few other things. This is how it was: Once someone saved the honorarium fund of this newspaper and... declined the "excess earnings". An issue used to cost 400 rubles, and then it became 220. Then we took a look—the journalists there, excellent professionals capable of, as we can see, giving production to the world market, are forced to "moonlight" for the sake of earnings, to work in two or three other places on the side, to spread themselves thin. The Union saw to it, first of all, that the honorarium fund was increased to the former levels, and secondly, while before the newspaper came out three times a week, now it comes out 6 times.

[Burlakova] Here is a typical problem, and not only for the life of a journalist: Why is it that one cannot earn enough to provide for one's family at one primary place of employment? My husband, who at that time was a young specialist-engineer, used to work as a groundskeeper. And it was his friend who suggested it to him—a poet, writer, and journalist who worked on the side as a... stock handler in a store. My colleague sweeps streets in the mornings, and another washes floors in the ministry in the evenings. Does this mean that brains are not needed?

[Myuyur] As it turns out, they are very much needed. The Estonian Union of Journalists has concluded an agreement with the Finnish information agency...

[Burlakova] A joint enterprise?

[Myuyur] No. A joint enterprise produces joint production, but here our journalists from the entire republic, from any publication, may present their professional production through our Union of Journalists to the Finnish agency, which will then disseminate it throughout Finland. Only we—to them.

[Burlakova] In what language?

[Myuyur] Preferably in Finnish, because if they have to translate it there, a good portion of the honorarium will go to them. (Their translations cost more, and why give away money we have earned?).

[Burlakova] You must agree, supplying information abroad is still not a solution for all, particularly for rank-and-file journalists. How will the changes in the activity of the Union of Journalists affect the common associates of the mass press—the rayon press?

[Myuyur] The Union of Journalists, together with the publication PERIODIKA, has for now seen to it that, effective 1 July 1989, the honorarium fund of rayon newspapers will be increased by 100 percent. That is not a lot if we consider that an issue costs 50 rubles, but it is something. The republic Ministry of Finance objected, but we were able to convince them that they should not cut corners on journalists. One more achievement: The republic's government has ordered the Tallinn gorispolkom to provide for share participation of journalists in housing construction in the sum of 100,000 rubles per year. We hope to earn money for dictaphones and other equipment, including also in currency. You see, once again we return to the topic of foreign ties, to currency. Why do I speak about this small first doorway abroad for our information? First of all, this is a new endeavor for us. Secondly, this door is open for all, including for the rayon and any rank-and-file journalists, as you call them. Thirdly, the level of interest toward us is high in the world today. We must catch the moment. It may sound mercenary, but then there are many idlers among those who are quick to reproach gain, isn't that true?

[Burlakova] Yet the world is interested in information not only about Estonia. They are interested, for example, in the miners' strike in the Kuzbass...

[Myuyur] Obviously, but here the journalists are holding the cards—give us any information which you have at your disposal and which will be of interest to the Finnish agency. There is only one condition: The information must be first-hand. Not an overview, not a presentation—only the author's materials, only eyewitness accounts. If you have been to Donetsk, to Kemerovo—write, discourse, draw conclusions, and present facts.

[Burlakova] That means it is necessary to travel a lot, to see and hear many things. You will recall that even before, business trips throughout the country were practiced, yet when computed per individual journalist they worked out to less than once a year, and often much less. And that is on the average. That means some journalists did not travel at all...

[Myuyur] So we should not sit like bumps on a log. Move about, make suggestions! For example, a trip to the USA is not such a utopia. One fellow from television, Andres Rayt, is going there to study at the university for 2 years. He was able to get into a group which takes 14 people from around the world—a 2-year course for television journalists.

[Burlakova] Are you saying that this trip for advanced professional training is being made at the expense of the Estonian Union of Journalists?

[Myuyur] We are not that rich yet. The Council of Ministers will help, Gosteleradio will too, and we will give some support. But we have not yet collected the necessary sum, so we are seeking sponsors...

[Burlakova] Let us speak also about internal affairs. In the new charter of our Union of Journalists, the idea of differentiation of its members is in principle prudent: Our Union is not only swelling, it is also getting old. However, I cannot help but be concerned—the veterans of the press who have stepped away somewhat from current problems of the creative organization due to their age or health, need, perhaps, not only the right of decisive voice, but also human participation and specific, oftentimes material aid. By giving them, the associate members, the right of consultative vote, we should repay them for their past activity in some other form. I understand, we are not very rich now, but what about in the future?

[Myuyur] I too have given much thought to our old men. And not so much to them as to the journalist in general as a person with everyday problems. What information can we get about a journalist from his work record card? Age, nationality, education, party affiliation... Yet it should be—his sphere of interests, number of children, grandchildren, state of health, and not at the level of being an invalid, but sooner—his heart is acting up, his stomach hurts, his vision is failing—so that he can be sent to the sanatorium in time. He may have problems with his children—they get married, have children, require housing. Or it may be that he has become divorced from his wife and nobly—been left without an apartment. One races around in his own car on editorial staff business and runs it into the ground, while another only uses his own car to go to his own dacha [summer house] and back. That means we must help the first one—with repairs and spare parts. You see, there are thousands of problems, but on the work card we are all the same. I believe a differentiated approach will bring us maximally closer to the living person, with his "specific traits", and the sacred deed of the Union is to help, to provide the opportunity and the conditions for creativity. If we speak specifically about pensioners, we are planning to make something like a retirement home for our veterans. We even have the address, but it is still too soon to speak about this. We still have to "break down" a number of institutions, which we are currently doing.

[Burlakova] Conditions for creativity—this is not only material provision. Perhaps each of us has been in a situation when we were in extreme need of help, support, and protection in the face of unrighteous forces. And we did not always find this support. Will our artist's union provide support in this sense?

[Myuyur] We want to live in a lawful society. That means we must depend primarily on the law. We need a law on the press. No one refutes this. It is just that they understand it differently.

[Burlakova] The Congress of USSR People's Deputies has demonstrated this. They hope that it will give greater room for glasnost. Others understand the Law on the Press as a law FOR THE PRESS, and only that, a law which can be used to bridle the press.

[Myuyur] We are not indifferent to this problem. You know that a commission has been created in the republic to prepare a draft law. This will be a law not on the press, but broader—on information in general. Aside from jurists, the commission includes representatives of departments and organs dealing with information, as well as a number of journalists nominated by the Estonian Union of Journalists.

[Burlakova] Myart, my colleagues and I are worried about one other ticklish topic—the problem of language. The time is not far off when the Law on State Language adopted in February of this year will find practical application. According to this law, Russian journalists working in Russian-language newspapers and writing in Russian must have a mastery—and a high-level mastery at that!—of the Estonian language. I also found the same requirement for the Estonian Union of Journalists member in the new charter.

[Myuyur] What is it that bothers you personally, Tatyana? Here you and I are talking, and I understand that you have no problems with Estonian?

[Burlakova] I am concerned by the fact that many experienced, talented masters of the pen whose life has turned in such a way that they do not know Estonian may be left beyond the bounds of professional journalism.

[Myuyur] You yourself have noted that the charter does not contradict the Law. But how it will be in real life... It nevertheless seems to me that we must consider each specific case, each individual fate, the reasons and consequences, the level of mastery and degree of integration into the republic's problems—in short, in all cases in resolving a person's fate we must remain human. It seems to me that the new charter makes allowances for this. We do not and cannot have the goal of "infringing" on Russian journalism in Estonia. After all, it is what tells the country about our republic beyond its boundaries. But, considering the reality, our Union assumes the material provision for teaching journalists the Estonian language.

[Burlakova] Russian-speaking journalists have many problems aside from linguistic. We have taken many reproaches in our time both from our readers and from the Estonian community. The most widespread accusation is that of inadequate information. They say, the Estonian press writes one thing, and the Russian—something else. As a result, the Russian-speaking population finds itself unprepared for certain events or decisions of which the Estonians fervently approve. The reasons for such discord have often been discussed and analyzed, and the arguments over it are still going on today. Without belittling the importance and without

denying other reasons for a certain disharmony between the Estonian and Russian press, I will note that there is a significant difference in a purely quantitative sense. There are many journals and newspapers published in Estonian, while those published in Russian you can count on the fingers of one hand.

As long as we are talking about the Estonian press, we cannot overlook the fact that the importance of a certain publication is defined not by its status, and not by its circulation. The authority, say, of the Tartu city newspaper EDAZI, without exaggeration, is weighty throughout the entire republic. Rayon newspapers have a following not only in their own rayon, but by tradition the people who come from one region or another continue to monitor life and events in their native place through their local newspaper, and thus even in the republic capital the "rayon newspapers" have a notable resonance. Obviously, the Russian-language press publishes translations of the most notable speeches and gives reviews, but it cannot possibly squeeze the entire huge volume of information published in Estonian into 2 republic and 3-4 city Russian-language newspapers. Particularly since it must also provide its own materials, primarily oriented toward its readership...

[Myuyur] Tatyana, I have heard much (and not only heard) about one idea proposed specifically by Russian journalists, and it is time I asked you the question: Tell us in general terms about this notion which, evidently, will be of interest to ZHURNALIST readers.

[Burlakova] I would be happy to! A group of journalists writing in Russian got the idea of using a type of newspaper-digest in the republic. It would publish briefs of the most interesting or characteristic materials from the Estonian press, as well as Soviet and world news. Its purpose would be to propagandize the ideas of perestroika and leading experience, and to reflect new processes going on in the republic and beyond its boundaries. The first issue has already been published. The newspaper hopes to establish a readership among the residents of Estonia, the Baltic, and the entire country. The newspaper is published by the small enterprise "Estpress", which was founded by the Estonian Union of Journalists (thanks to the governing board and to you, Myart, as the chairman, for your support! You really have not only heard a lot, but are actively helping), along with the ECP Central Committee Publishing House. But! Any wonderful idea, any enthusiasm (the associates of the small enterprise are working over their basic work day) can be dashed by a shortage of paper, the sad state of the printing industry base, etc., etc.

[Myuyur] What is true is true. Our printing industry base is below all criticism. The Union of Journalists does not have either its own newspaper or its own journal where it may discuss professional problems. We usually passed our announcements and drafts of documents on the Union of Journalists through SPORDILEKHT, of which we are the publishers. By tradition we publish our annual publication—a collection of works by members of the

Union of Journalists, but it is such a long way from the writing desk to the bookstore shelf that interest in the annual publication is retained only by the authors and their friends. We must correct this. We have a plan to build a new publishing house in Rakvere. The Finns are ready to provide the equipment, and our people will in exchange build for them a recreation area here. The Estonian Union of Journalists wants to become one of the stockholders. This, of course, is not a solution to the problem, but a small brick in the overall brickwork.

[Burlakova] There is one more problem which was raised both at the last and at the preceding Congress of Estonian Journalists—the problem of communication. We must have the opportunity to get to know each other not only through publications, broadcasts, and the television screen. Communication is after all the treatment of future materials, the birth of truth in arguments, the honing of debates, and perhaps even the recognition of misconceptions.

Russian language journalists have their own club. On Thursdays the bar area of the Russian Drama Theatre is at our disposal (I might add, in the evenings after 9:00 o'clock the members of the Society of Russian Culture gather at the bar). Our club is not only for Russian journalists. Russian is merely the language of communication. We also invite our Estonian colleagues.

[Myuyur] Yes, I have been there. But, of course, the Estonian Union of Journalists needs its own club. We have our own views in regard to the accommodations, but that is not the only problem...

[Burlakova] Undoubtedly. I remember about 2 years ago the idea of a press club was born, but things never went past meetings of the governing board.

[Myuyur] There, you see? For Tallinn journalists there is at least somewhere to go—the House of the Press, the House of Radio. But where can a colleague from the heartland go when he finds himself in the capital?

And moreover, we need communication on a country-wide level. What has been, has been: Creative and social organizations invariably mimic the structure of the state arrangement. There is the "big" union—the USSR Union of Journalists, and then there are offshoots from it—"local" unions of journalists. All the ties, all the communication, must go through the center. Today, however, life itself suggests the need for developing ties along the horizontal.

Closer to fall of this year we hope to conduct a meeting, or seminar, or a summer school—whatever we call it, that is what it will be—where we will invite colleagues from other republics. This is the level of personal contacts. However, there is also the level of means of mass information with access to the reader, listener, and viewer. How much would we learn about the Lithuanian Komsomol Congress or about the events taking place in Georgia if we did not send our own correspondents there? And even about the Congress of People's Deputies

almost every rayon newspaper had, aside from the TASS and ETA (ETA—Estonian Telegraph Agency), also its own information. We were able to organize this through our own deputies. Just take a look, is the same vertical not apparent also in the press: The central press—the peripheral press? Yet I would like to see, aside from a central, also an all-state television and radio program which would not be put on by Moscow journalists, but by those "on site", which would not be filtered through the capital, and which would have specified only the time and scope. Then we would learn about Georgian events from the Georgians, about Armenian from the Armenians, and so forth.

By the way, an extensive discussion on this topic was held at the meeting of Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee Secretary V. Medvedev with Estonian journalists during his visit to the republic in July of this year. Our proposals were met with full understanding. I will emphasize that it is not just a matter of hot current events. It is just that there is so much to learn about each other, and not only through dances in national costumes and travelogues shown on the television screen. I would like to read—and make—an ALL UNION (not a central) newspaper, where all the republics would have a page and where they would compile their columns at their own discretion. After all, it is we ourselves who know the most about ourselves! I do not aspire to the palm of priority in this idea. It is borne in the air. Many of our colleagues are speaking about it.

[Burlakova] In my opinion, it is worthy of discussion on the pages of our professional publication, ZHURNALIST. But allow me, Myart, toward the end of our conversation, to, as they say, bait you a bit. We have said so much about the material in regard to our renewed union, and it is by pure accident that we have not used the word "business". I would like to ask you: What do you have to gain, what benefit do you derive from this idea of an all-union newspaper?

[Myuyur] Please, I am not offended. I will answer thus: Who if not we journalists know better through our own fate that man lives not by bread alone?

[Burlakova] Thank you for the interview. I wish you success in your endeavors.

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Ukrainian CP Considers Changes in Republic Press Structure

90US0245B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 1
Nov 89 p 3

[Ukrainian CP Central Committee Press Center report: "What is to Be the Structure of the Party Press?"]

[Text] The Ukrainian CP Central Committee secretariat preliminarily reviewed the proposals of party committees and mass information organs on certain changes in the structure of the republic's party press.

The necessity of such changes is dictated by the profound perestroika processes in the spiritual life of our society, and the need to take into greater consideration the informational inquiries of the population, the expansion of democratization and glasnost.

First and foremost, having a single print organ of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee was recognized as being necessary. It was proposed that a newspaper of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers be opened, which would fully respond to the spirit of the demands of the 19th CPSU Conference on the elevation of the role of the soviets of people's deputies, and the expansion of glasnost.

The system now existing is leading to a state where the newspapers RADYANSKA UKRAINA and PRAVDA UKRAINY duplicate one another to a significant extent; they are saturated with official material, with a narrowed thematic spectrum. The proposed structure of the publications will allow the opportunity to distribute official information and problems between them. It is proposed that the volume of both newspapers be increased as possible. The reorganization is planned to start with the second quarter of 1990.

Which newspaper will be the organ of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee? Since 15 June 1918, traditionally and unchangingly, such a role has been played by the newspaper RADYANSKA UKRAINA (original title: KOMUNIST). It would be quite logical for this newspaper to continue the tradition.

The title is another matter. At the meeting of the Central Committee secretariat, opinions differed here (editors of republic newspapers and magazines, leaders of a number of ministries, departments, and institutions also participated in the discussion). RADYANSKY UKRAINA is more suited for a newspaper of the soviets. In this case, it would be possible to return to the very first title for the Central Committee organ—KOMUNIST. Or, finally, to think about a completely original heading. In the latter case, the newspaper of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet could be entitled "TRIBUNA of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet and the UkSSR Council of Ministers," or something else.

It is completely obvious that both newspapers should be published in Ukrainian and Russian.

As far as SILSKI VISTI and RABOCHAYA GAZETA are concerned, it was acknowledged as advisable not to change their status at this stage, but by gradually increasing their volume to 6 pages and reporting in them a minimum of official materials, to significantly expand and diversify their thematic trends.

It is worthwhile to allow both republic party magazines to remain, while starting with January 1990, increasing

the volume of the monthly KOMMUNIST UKRAINY to 2.4 conditional printer's sheets, in order to start here a special section, "Herald of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee."

The magazine POD ZNAMENEN LENINIZMA is in need of a change in function. It would be timely, starting next year to reorient the magazine toward a broader readership, not just toward an ideological aktiv. In such a case, it would be possible to retitle this publication ("Politika i zhizn," "Politika i vremya," etc).

It is proposed that the departmental press in the republic be reorganized in the future. Yet the issue of expanding the thematic spectrum of newspapers and magazines of individual ministries, elevating their status, is already exceptionally topical—KULTURA I ZHITTYA, and RADYANSKA OSVITA. Cultural and educational issues cannot be limited to the framework of the branch. They are of interest not only to specialists, and must be resolved by the common efforts of ministries, departments, soviets of people's deputies in the provinces, party and other public organizations. In the opinion of N.A. Shibik, chairman of the board of the UkSSR Journalists' Union and USSR people's deputy; A.T. Zonenko and I.V. Spodarenko, editors of the newspapers PRAVDA UKRAINY and SILSKI VISTI, it would be quite logical to lead these publications away from the influence of a single ministry and reform them into the newspapers of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, as is already the practice in the central publications of the CPSU Central Committee publications, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA and UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA.

Also discussed at the meeting was the proposal for merging these two newspapers into one (let us say, KULTURA I OSVITA) in the form of a Ukrainian CP Central Committee and UkSSR Supreme Soviet daily or weekly newspaper, introduced by the Ideological Department of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and supported by F.M. Rudich, director of the Institute of Party History of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. Such a version has its advantages, since it is calculated for the realization of the concept of acceleration of the spiritual development of the Ukrainian people at a new stage in our history, where culture and enlightenment are viewed as organic components of a single, popular national task. The newspaper could also have a Sunday supplement for the traditional educational worker readership.

In addition, the issue of creating in 1990 a republic trade union newspaper "Golos trudyashchikhsya" is being reviewed.

It is also advisable to continue the definite reorganization of the local party press, primarily in the oblast echelon, on the basis of the principles:

—one party committee;

—one newspaper (each party obkom is to have one organ; where there had been two newspapers, one

should be left and it should be published in Ukrainian and Russian; a number of party obkom newspaper-organs should be started);

—to meet the immediate needs of the national groups in certain oblasts.

At the aforementioned meeting, a decision was already adopted to start on 1 February 1990 city newspapers in Druzhkovka, Donetsk Oblast, and Novovolynsk, Volynsk Oblast. As we know, the same decision was made somewhat earlier by the city of Zheltye Vody, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

In eight oblasts each having two newspapers published, it would be expedient to transfer the limits on paper and staff of one of them to the party gorkoms which do not have their own organs, including oblast centers. Under such conditions, in the cities of Lvov and Zaporozhye, it would be possible to found an evening newspaper. In the event that city party newspapers are opened in oblast centers, the evening publications could be transferred to the gorispolkoms.

The secretariat acknowledged it possible to instruct:

- the Odessa party obkom to introduce a proposal on starting Bulgarian- and Moldavian-language weekly supplements to the oblast newspaper;
- the Zhitomir party obkom to introduce a Polish-language weekly supplement to the oblast paper;
- the Donetsk party obkom to introduce a Greek-language weekly supplement to the Mariupol city paper.

At the meeting were examined issues of improving the party leadership by the mass information media under conditions of perestroika, and the strengthening of their material-technological base, the transfer to new technologies, and the improvement of working and living conditions for journalists and print workers. Speeches of the RABOCHAYA GAZETA and other publications on these matters, and spectacular questions examined at recent plenums of the UkSSR Journalists' Union received support. The Ideological Department and the Administration of Affairs of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee were instructed to introduce the appropriate proposals for the consideration of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

The secretariat of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee adopted a proposal of the Central Committee's Ideological Department on the organization of the weekly television program, "What worries you today," during which members of the Politburo, secretaries, Central Committee department heads, leading workers of the UkSSR Council of Ministers, and public organizations will respond to workers' questions.

The work of republic radio broadcasts and the Institute of the History of the Party under the Ukrainian CP Central Committee in creating the broadcast "We are

Reading Lenin: The Theoretical Legacy and Modernity" was evaluated positively. It was recommended to editorial boards of newspapers, RATAU, television, and radio, and socio-political magazines that the publication and broadcasts dedicated to the 120th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin show the practical significance of the Leninist legacy in resolving the problems of perestroika.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee supported the proposal to submit for public discussion via the mass information media the draft of changes in the structure of the party press. It was recommended that the proposals of journalists, party and soviet workers and all readers be published in the press. They will be related to the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and taken into consideration upon preparation of the corresponding resolutions.

New Moscow TV Commercial Programming Reviewed

90US0280A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Dec 89
Second Edition p 8

[Article by B. Pipiya: "Two Times Two Equals Five"]

[Text] **Commercials, thrillers, adventure films, trailers for new movies, cartoons, concerts by pop stars, circus shows, performances by comedians, fashion shows and crime news. It is an incomplete list of programs of the new commercial channel on Moscow television. Businessmen get valuable information while the channel keeps its numerous viewers entertained.**

The idea to set up a commercial channel came one day in August to employees of the Main Economic Department of the Main Office of Television Programming for Moscow Oblast and the Television Technical Center of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio. "It will be as easy as two times two to produce the program," said S. Mubaryakov, chief director of the office. "The difficulty will be to get it approved." This was how the new commercial channel came into being two months after the idea was conceived. To keep things simple, it was called "Two Times Two".

The problems of staff and equipment were more difficult to solve. The studios in Ostankino have no idle equipment. This is why late at night, when the Moscow studios shut down, the new-style television businessmen take over the premises. It takes the entire night to put together the next-day edition of "Two Times Two".

The channel is based on economic accountability. The State Committee for Radio and Television charges it hundreds of rubles per hour for the use of equipment and premises. The channel broadcasts from 7:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. or 7:30 p.m. every day except the first and the third Tuesday of each month. Those nights are scheduled for the airing of the studios.

Advertising is its main source of income. The price of one minute of air time is R500-R780. Commercials can

be made at the studios for an additional charge or are supplied by the client. The price of running a commercial is highest in prime time. Repeats are half-price and steady customers get a discount.

"Two Times Two" broadcasts are beamed to the capital, Moscow Oblast and adjacent regions. According to preliminary data, the number of viewers is 38-to-40 million. The channel's business telephone numbers are 215-7665 and 215-0065.

Let us state that "Two Times Two" does not work on the principle "whoever pays the piper calls the tune." People call them with a wide variety of offers. Balladeers, amateur groups and lesser known artists are eager to promote their work on television. They often offer to double the meter, to use taxi drivers' expression. But this is unacceptable. As a businessman, the artistic director of the commercial channel knows that if he pollutes the airwaves with uninteresting shows, he will lose viewers and risk going out of business.

Indeed, there is no room for poor taste on the small screen, nor is there any for advertisements of goods which fail to meet consumer standards. This does not refer only to "Two Times Two". The unhealthy state of our economy has made the Soviet people suspicious of advertising in general, because people think that a quality product needs no praise. Naturally, we must get rid of stereotypes in thinking, but we must also remember that information must be thoroughly checked and not everything could be allowed in advertising.

"Two Times Two" ran a commercial for the "Ural" motor vehicle several times. In it, the announcer listed many advantages of that "tender beast". However, one shortcoming went unmentioned: the vehicle consumes 45 liters of gasoline per 100 kilometers. Plus, it runs on a high-quality gasoline, AI-93. Such "tender beast" could easily ruin its future masters.

What is the conclusion? Television journalists can not act as state inspectors or ask for an okay every time they go on the air. But it is clear that all aspects of the problem should be reviewed to make sure that only true information gets to the screen. Only then will viewers begin to trust advertising.

There has been a proposal to hold auctions for unsold goods. Many millions of rubles worth of equipment is scattered over immense areas and lies there like a dead weight, rusting under rain and snow. This useless scrap includes machines purchased for hard currency. Some enterprises do not know how to get rid of this burden, whereas others are looking far and wide for such things. TV auctions could help clear out those dumps and get equipment to those who need it.

In addition to its commercial activities, "Two Times Two" is engaged in various charity work. The channel broadcasts daily law enforcement bulletins of the Main Department of Internal Affairs of the Moscow city ispolkom. The commercial channel is always willing to

broadcast announcements for the Soviet Fund of Culture, the Children's Fund imeni V.I. Lenin and the Fund of Charity and Health.

When I was in Ostankino, a woman telephoned the "Two Times Two" office. In a highly emotional voice, she told them that she found a dog on a cold winter street and asked them to help her locate the owners. Her request was granted. Some time later, a notice appeared on the screen: "Dog found in Otradnoye Rayon. A red collie with white markings around the neck, wearing a collar."

"Two Times Two" plans to stage contests "Moscow Beauty" and "Young Mother-Young Daughter", game shows and concerts. Foreign television networks have contacted it with interesting proposals.

In short, many projects are in the works. But to try to implement them using mere enthusiasm would not be serious, to say the least. Now, the channel must bolster its position by formalizing its economic and legal status. This will help it stand on its own feet and find its image. Let us not rush to grade "Two Times Two", even though it does deserve a highest mark for the idea.

Why would oblast, kray or other studios not set up their own commercial channels? There is some experience already, however small. Those who created "Two Times Two" assure us that it is as easy to start this new project as to answer the question how much is two times two.

Tajik CP Official Views Perestroika in Party's Republic Press Organs

90US0280B Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 10 Nov 89 p 2

[Interview with T. Dzhurabayev, director of the Mass Information Sector of the Ideology Department of the Tajik CP Central Committee, by V. Vorobyev, T. Tychiyev and M. Shakhobiddinov: "Living with Society's Concerns is the Current Duty of Journalists"]

[Text] The media needs to reach a qualitatively new level at the current stage of perestroika. The press, radio and television must focus on the work of party committees and soviets of labor collectives fighting to overcome difficulties arising in the course renewal of all aspects of society's life. The duty of the press is to promote respect for the law, state discipline and constitutional rights of citizens. Today, it is no longer enough to report facts, phenomena and opinions in society; we need a profound analysis and finely calibrated political and moral standards.

This was the subject of our conversation with T. Dzhurabayev, director of the Mass Information Sector of the Ideology Department of the Tajik CP Central Committee.

[Question] Democratization has touched all areas and processes of society's life. It would be interesting to hear how it affected the party's work of monitoring the press.

[Dzhurabayev] In October, a meeting of the Politburo of the Tajikistan CP Central Committee thoroughly reviewed the work of the editorial board and the collective of the republic newspaper TODZHIKISTONI SOVETI. A resolution was passed on the issue, which was published in the press.

This conscious analysis on the part of the party of the work of its press organ under the conditions of perestroika is not yet a common phenomenon. Of course, individual instances have been known, usually stemming from the need to support a controversial article or related to errors on the part of a newspaper, but such a detailed and businesslike analysis of the coverage of social and economic issues by a newspaper seems unprecedented in recent years.

What is typical today in relations between party committees and press organs? Direct orders to editorial collectives have become less common. I can even say that they disappeared altogether. There is more mutual trust, openness and respect for each other's opinion. At times we, party workers, must insist that editors show more initiative, independence and, of course, responsibility.

[Question] You have mentioned democratization in the area of party management of the press. What actual examples can you cite?

[Dzhurabayev] First of all, there is more openness and trust in relations between party committees and their press organs. Party leaders and journalists meet more often, exchanging information, opinions and proposals. Outside meetings of our sector at editorial boards have been introduced. Such meetings have recently been held at the editorial office of the journal KHORPUSHTAK and the weeklies ADABIYET VA SAN'AT and OМУZGOR. Party officials actively participate in business, party and editorial board meetings of journalists. On the other hand, editors frequently speak at party bureau meetings and plenums, as it happened recently in Matchinskiy, Proletarskiy, Gissarskiy and Tursunadevskiy rayons. Now, a journalist who commits an error is never called to the party committee, or to the carpet as it was called. Finding the causes and correcting the situation is now the prerogative of the editorial collective. Every editorial office has its own editorial board, party bureau and primary party organization of the Journalists' Union, who have the right both to assess the penalty and to find a way out of the conflict situation on their own.

However, I would like to point out that conflict situations have become more frequent. Some articles and broadcasts are dominated by emotions and attention-seeking statements, often bordering on tactlessness and uncalled-for attacks. When shortcomings are publicized, it is not common sense and the desire to see the essence of life's collisions but certain obstreperousness and omniscience that often guides the journalists, which can lead to mistakes and, if individuals are involved, to

insults to their human dignity. Such tactics devalue the printed word, produce annoyance and ultimately turn not only against the writer himself but against the good cause he espouses. Criticism must be objective and constructive; we must always keep this in mind.

[Question] The Committee for Party Control of the CPSU Central Committee studied the effectiveness of criticism in the press and reaction to it on the part of party leaders in Leninabad Oblast. What is the situation in this area in other regions of the republic?

[Dzhurabayev] It was great help to us in making criticism more effective. It is well-known that many party leaders still close their ears to criticism and some party committees ignore this and often themselves fail to react to legitimate, healthy criticism.

A study conducted by the Committee for Party Control and the Ideology Department of the Tajik CP Central Committee showed that these shortcomings exist in rayons reporting directly to the republic and in Khatlon Oblast.

However, it was noted that journalists themselves make mistakes. Many of them continue to criticize for the sake of criticism and not common good. The level of criticism is especially low in rayon newspapers. But what is alarming is that many party raykoms do not react to criticism in the press and on local radio for years.

Currently, press and ideology departments of party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms are instituting permanent controls over criticism in the press. Reviews of the effectiveness of criticism in rayon newspapers and enterprise organs are being prepared for publication. We, in our sector, will continue to hear selective reports by newspaper editors and hold meetings at editorial collectives. Before the end of the year we will hear the report of the editorial board of the satirical journal KHORPUSHTAK, whose content unfortunately does not fully satisfy its readers. We are reviewing the level of criticism in television and radio broadcasts.

[Question] Is the distance between party officials and journalists being maintained? In essence, our goals are identical.

[Dzhurabayev] I would like to phrase the question differently. There are differences in the style and methods of our work, and they will probably remain. We should begin with the fact that journalism is a sociopolitical activity. Party officials and journalists do the same party job. This is why examples of workers being moved from party committees to editorial offices and vice versa are so common. For instance, in the Khatlon party obkom, the ideology department is headed by a former editor of the oblast newspaper and in Fayzabadskiy rayon the editor of the rayon newspaper was recently voted chairman of the rayon soviet ispolkom. Among party raykom secretaries in charge of ideological issues many are former journalists. This says a great deal. The issue

today is how to ensure effective interaction between party committees and press organs to benefit perestroika.

[Question] What are the concerns of the grassroots press? Do those who work at enterprise newspapers feel the solicitude of the party?

[Dzhurabayev] This year, new newspapers came out at the Kayrakkumskiy rug complex, the Ura-Tyubinskiya outerwear plant and the Dushanbe division of the Central Asian Railroad. Now the republic has a total of 20 enterprise papers. Their goals are the same as those of the so-called "big-time" press and the two are inseparable: to lend active assistance to perestroika in labor collectives, foster the sense of being masters in the workers and disseminate new forms of labor organization and principles of enterprise independence. These are only a few of the goals of the grassroots press. Of course, party organizations pay constant attention to these organs, even though I must say that their editorial collectives have plenty of problems.

[Question] A recently published resolution of the Tajik CP Central Committee announced the publication of several new periodicals, the journal TODZHIKISTON, the newspaper SHOMI DUSHANBE and others. What is the reason for this? In particular, our readers want to know what connection there is with the recently adopted Law on Language.

[Dzhurabayev] There is, of course, some connection. However, I must say that the talk of publishing these newspapers and journals began long ago. This included a municipal paper in Tajik for the capital. There have been many proposals and we finally decided that the city newspaper SHOMI DUSHANBE should be an independent, totally new organ. This meets the demands of the readers.

Currently, we are thinking of starting independent oblast newspapers in Uzbek in Leninabad and Khatlon oblasts, to be published three times a week. This would allow us to make the newspapers KHAKIKATI LENINOBOD and KHAKIKATI KHATLON fully Tajik language papers.

Let me remind you that in our republic there are many bilingual rayon newspapers. For instance, in Dzhrigatal the rayon paper is published in Tajik and Kirghiz, in Isfar and Ordzhonikidzeabad in Tajik and Russian and in Tursunzade in Tajik, Uzbek and Russian. Publication in these languages will continue in accordance with the norms of respect for all languages used in the republic set by the Tajik SSR Law on Language.

[Question] How would you assess coverage of problems in interethnic relations by the media of the republic?

[Dzhurabayev] Extremely close ties have been set up between our sector and the Department of Interethnic Relation of the Central Committee. We discuss nearly every piece written on this subject and exchange views.

I want to note that articles appearing under the rubric "How Do You Like Living in Tajikistan?" in the newspaper TODZHIKISTONI SOVETI and a number of articles in the newspapers KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA and ADABIYET VA SAN'AT and the oblast paper KHAKIKATI LENINOBOD are noteworthy for their truthfulness and timeliness. But it would be a mistake to say that there were no wrong articles on the subject. Yes, there were such articles. In particular, some articles in the journal ILM VA KHAYET and on the pages of some other industry publications were a vivid proof of this. In general, however, the republic's journalists are working to strengthen the friendship among the peoples and create the right public opinion. This is very important.

Currently, we are preparing for the Central Committee plenum on nationalities policy. We expect interesting articles from our journalists.

[Question] Much is being said and written now about economic accountability. What to do with loss-making newspapers that have long been supported by the state?

[Dzhurabayev] There are many problems in this area. The "Matbuot" industrial complex has been set up in the republic, at the State Committee for the Press, to address these problems. Measures are being drafted to make a number of publications profitable. But we must be honest and say that much depends on the editors themselves.

[Question] The subscription campaign has just concluded. What is the situation with circulation figures?

[Dzhurabayev] The picture is mixed. In a number of towns and rayons, subscription figures were below last year's volumes.

The situation is especially poor at a number of party and Komsomol publications, such as the journal AGITATOR TADZHIKISTANA and the newspapers KOMSOMOLETS TADZHIKISTANA, PIONER TADZHIKISTANA and others. I think that it is not only the indicator of subscription levels but a measure of popularity of some publications. This means that editors must take a close look at the content, the combative spirit and the appeal of their publications.

Turkmen SSR Editor Faults Central Press Coverage of Republic Problems

90US2079C Ashkhabad *TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA* in Russian 22 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by A. Yusubova, USSR Journalists' Union Prize laureate and editor-in-chief of the journal AGITATOR TURKMENISTANA: "Behind the Facade of the 'Middle Ages', or How the Central Press Sometimes Covers Local Problems"]

[Text] Everyone knows that articles in central publications on various problems in our republic evoke heightened interest among their readers. That is understandable: the articles are written by skilled individuals with experienced, nimble "pens."

Articles in PRAVDA on reports given at oblast party conferences, the series of "salvos" aimed at social injustice—these and other examples are graphic evidence of how the press can and should point out current problems and help solve them. As a rule party organs from the Turkmen CP Central Committee on down to raykoms react to articles in central publications much more seriously than they do to similar articles in the local press.

As evidence of that I would like to cite one typical example, one connected with the "women's question." (Incidentally, I could give numerous similar examples on other subjects as well.) Many years have passed since LITERATURNAYA GAZETA published an article by the late writer T. Esenova entitled "Detested *Kalym*." This article, which evoked a strong public response, was reprinted in virtually every local newspaper at the republic, oblast and rayon levels. The article was discussed by the Turkmen CP Central Committee Buro, with a special decision subsequently issued. At the time this delighted many people and raised some hopes for the possibility of positive change.

But I would like to talk about the other side of the coin. Long before that writer published her article in the central publications, the newspaper YASH KOMMUNIST here in Ashkhabad did a series of three articles containing analytical commentary by Academician Sh. Tashliyev under the overall title "The Components of *Kalym*." The way in which the issue was presented in those articles was no less incisive or imbued with civic significance than the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA article. The academician, attempting to direct the attention of republic party organs to his work, was actually received at one point by the Central Committee's secretary for ideology. Yet the secretary remained deaf to all of his conclusions.

However, the most depressing result of that wave of attention was that since the writer's article and the decision adopted by the Turkmen CP Central Committee *kalym* [bride price] has, strange as it may seem, actually grown in influence and scale. Worse, it has taken on hidden forms and begun to take root in regions where it was previously unknown.

In short, I know of no other campaign which has produced such a negative, actually counterproductive, result. Let us face up to the truth: we have not yet found the correct strategy in our notorious struggle against *kalym*.

In this connection I must also mention one other aspect of the problem. The first act in the crusade against this "vestige of the past" was to destroy (in a political sense) certain leading cadres. Places where individual cases of

kalym just happened to surface were treated as if the plague had broken out there; the formula that "ideological work had been allowed to drift" functioned flawlessly, and one after another individuals parted with their official positions, even when the positions they held corresponded to their abilities.

During the noisy and ill-planned "struggle" a no less noisy and ill-planned alternative appeared in the form of the so-called "Komsomol weddings." Conducted according to a standardized script created by god only knows who, these were intended to replace all the things that had developed over centuries, had a life of their own, and had been handed down from generation to generation. In the profanation called "socialist rituals" there remained no trace of the customs which had existed since time immemorial; therefore it came as no surprise that the people did not accept this innovation. In actuality the "Komsomol weddings" became nothing more than camouflage for drunken parties.

There is no doubt that all this provided a unique source of support for *kalym*, fertile soil in which it could flourish. Firstly, the "new-style wedding" provided a reliable screen behind which transactions involving the buying and selling of brides could go on undisturbed. When the parents of the groom, who arrange the wedding, announced that they would be having a "Komsomol wedding" it was assured that bribes would be paid. Since *kalym* was associated with vestiges of the past people looked for it where it was supposed to be: in homes where the national *toy* was celebrated, i.e. where a wedding was conducted according to folk tradition. Secondly, under the guise of this "modern ritual" it was also possible to play some more serious tricks, for example inviting some dubious individual calling himself a mullah to come in the morning and perform *nika gyymak*, the wedding ceremony. That was fine, the "Komsomol" evening with its rows of heaping tables of food and an abundance of strong drink would conceal everything: the deals, the buying and selling of young women, the hiring of a spiritual charlatan, and much more.

Let me say frankly that when we declared war on *kalym* we took the wrong approach. One of the reasons for our helplessness in the face of this problem lies, in my opinion, in our unwillingness to see the social causes and extent of this ill. This also attests to a clear lack of sociological research, as a result of which the struggle has been conducted in a superficial manner, within the limitations of stereotypical thinking, fruitlessly, in an episodic manner. Today, just like yesterday, we have little control over the situation.

Since I am on this subject there is something else to which I would like to direct attention. The fact that the central press has drawn attention to the problem of *kalym* is good. But the requirements made of the authors writing on this subject are often minimal, as is their ability to penetrate to the heart of the matter. So what happens? In the race for a sensation, in the search for

something "exotic" in our, quite frankly, grey reality, my colleagues, well-known and simplistic publicists, sometimes create a fuss which, to all appearances, corresponds to their perceptions of restructuring in our republic. Then things which have been repeatedly discussed in the local press and considered by party, law enforcement and other organs are suddenly presented by Moscow like the discovery of some heretofore unknown phenomenon and portrayed as the very model of glasnost.

These fabrications and conclusions "built on sand" threaten to create an effect exactly opposite to the one desired.

Some authors who have written about *kalym*, self-immolation and the costs of our past try to portray themselves as experts on our ethnic problems. An outsider's view, no matter how insightful it might be, inevitably leads to a one-side approach and to a superficial, descriptive treatment of the subject matter, unless it is balanced by an insider's view. When a new article appears there is naturally a commotion, either large or small, and in no case does this help come to grips with the problem, much less resolve it. All that is created is a sense of indignation and of embarrassment for the author who thus flaunts his incompetence. Plus an aftertaste of insult on account of the opinion which is consciously or unconsciously being formed about our republic as a place which is hopelessly mired in the middle ages.

In this category of article I would include the article "Kalym" by Yu. Chernichenko, a USSR people's deputy and a well-known writer whom I respect; his article was published last year in OGONEK. Why does that journal deem it necessary to distort reality and portray an entire people (!) in an ambiguous light? It is clear that one will not win respect that way, only cheap popularity.

Incidentally, neither the Chernichenko article nor other "analytical" articles such as appeared in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA contain any reference to the real progress made by Turkmen women over the past 70 years. They are no longer oppressed slaves, an image which people are trying to transfer wholesale to the present day. The modern Turkmen woman is truly mistress of her home and enjoys respect in everyday life and on the job. She is a human being, capable if need be of defending her honor and dignity, a person for whom the doors of both party and law enforcement organs are open. The bizarre cases of self-immolation are no less bizarre to us than are the cases of suicide reported in other regions of the country. The causes of suicide among the women of Russia, Turkmenistan and other republics and krais where tragedies have occurred and continue to occur are related. Those causes should be sought not in supposed ethnic traits or religious dogmas, but rather in a fundamental human inability to cope, in the sociopsychological and socioeconomic turmoil which weighs on women's spirits day after day like a heavy burden.

Incidentally, a word about what has been said about religion. When they attempt to identify the torches of self-immolation with manifestations of religious fanaticism, the authors of "sensational" articles demonstrate a clear departure from the historical truth. For history tells us that the greater part of the Turkmen people raised livestock for many centuries and led a nomadic way of life. Therefore the Turkmen people had relatively little opportunity or appropriate circumstances as compared to the other Eastern peoples to build mosques and zealously worship a supreme being.

Essentially, that is just a cop-out, blaming the results of the deception, nepotism and dirty dealing that we inherited from the recent stagnation period on the distant prerevolutionary past. Similarly the past is used to "explain" Turkmen women's persistent attraction to sorceresses and fortune tellers.

Esteemed research writers, bear in mind that it is not a higher level of piety that drives some of my countrywomen to dubious individuals, but rather the lack of development in our present-day medical system, and the inability of social protection institutions to protect children and their mothers from misfortunes from which truly developed countries have long since liberated their citizens. The fact that suicide most often occurs in rural areas is no secret to anyone, nor is the fact that rural areas still do not have a well-developed social services network.

Furthermore, the problem of positive human interaction (especially among young people) is one of the most pressing problems in Turkmen villages. As a result of incompetent work by cultural institutions and a lack of skills on the part of their staff young men and women have no place to meet, dance or engage in cultural activities. The lack of such opportunities in combination with the harshness of rural life gives rise to negative phenomena and depression which in turn are reflected by a corresponding number of tragedies.

Thus the passions that are aroused by inadequately studied situations and aspects which have not been properly interpreted and by "profound" pronouncements and which occasionally burst forth in the pages of central publications merely confuse readers throughout the Soviet Union as a whole, while they either astound or enrage readers in our republic.

In December of last year SOVetskaya Kultura published an article by Turkmen writer Atadzhan Tagan. There is no need to summarize its content, especially since the title—"A Wonderful Retouching Job, or What Hampers Restructuring in Turkmenistan"—speaks for itself. Suffice it to say that it lists the negative phenomena which flourished during the stagnation period; if the article had been published three-and-a-half years ago it would have been thoroughly timely.

I will not argue with the fact that there are still more than enough subjects in our republic which deserve the most searching critical attention. Consider this, for example:

one-fifth of our republic's able-bodied population is not engaged in socially beneficial labor, and of that group the absolute majority is comprised of middle-aged and young women (it should be noted that approximately one-half of the unfortunate women who committed suicide were not employed in the economy). Moreover, men today have "occupied" and are tenaciously hanging on to jobs in the purely "female" professions.

There are several ways of solving the employment problem. Turkmenistan, as is well known, is a supplier of raw materials for spinning and weaving enterprises, yet only seven percent of the fiber we produce is processed here. How many additional jobs could be created by the establishment of new enterprises and renovation of existing ones! This is also fully applicable to the establishment of a silk-spinning factory and opportunities for home employment. The latter in particular would encourage the revitalization of ethnic arts and crafts.

Quite a lot could be said about the moral costs. What immediately leaps to mind is the image of Kizylgul Annamukhamedova, former chairman of Kommunist Kolkhoz in Turkmen-Kalinskiy Rayon. What Turkmen woman did not adore her and believe in her, a Hero of Socialist Labor? It is no exaggeration to say that she embodied our pride as women. Now this woman has defiled our pure sentiments and the faith of thousands upon thousands of people. Clearly the account-padding, theft and deception of the party and the state for which she was responsible did not happen overnight; it took place over many years' time. Everyone who worked with her or had close contacts with her guessed this, knew this, yet pretended not to notice.

There is a question which keeps nagging at me: why did Atadzhan Tagan while working on a book with the remarkable title "Kizylgul" not uncover any of the things which came to light a short time later? Furthermore, he was awarded a prize established by the kolkhoz for the best book about... yes, indeed, Atadzhan Tagan received his award for "Kizylgul" from Kizylgul herself!

I, too, was once assigned to sing the praises of this "heroine," but I refused the assignment after I had talked with her and with Ovezov, party raykom secretary, after

I had seen their attitude toward people and toward their work, after visiting their homes—museum-palaces filled with rugs, crystal and massive amounts of expensive furnishings. Unfortunately these facts did not stop my colleagues from the central publications.

One final thing. I recall a meeting with USSR people's performer Sabira Atayeva and her scathing comments: "When we resolved to put a stop to *kalym* we started screaming at the top of our lungs about it, but all we really did was increase it." At that moment a group of young Turkmen women walked by, animatedly discussing something. "Tell me, can you believe that people could put a price on them like they would cattle? They would tear out the eyes of anyone who tried! Just try to sell them! The problem is that they... set the prices themselves! They want nice things; they acknowledge neither religion nor atheism. Whether stagnation is responsible, or all the advertisement for *kalym*, the fact remains that our young people are infected with the bacillus of consumerism. Our primary task must be to find a way to cure them..."

Can you honestly tell me that there are really very many negative aspects of our lives which are not rooted in the same causes: consumerism, acquisitiveness, the desire to solve one's own problems at the expense of others? But, I repeat, the most important reason of all (and one that is typical of many union and autonomous republics) is the poverty and underdevelopment of the socioeconomic realm and its corresponding lines of communication, from transportation to intellectual relations.

What we expect from articles in the central press is assistance in the search for constructive solutions, not incitement or exaggeration of the problems that were cultivated on the basis outlined above, not a narrow, one-sided approach. Let us talk about our defects openly and soberly, but not hastily. Uninformed, hasty criticism does a disservice to all of us, to all of society.

There are many tender shoots of renewal springing up in our republic. If these esteemed writers had opted to see them and write about them, then that would have been a genuinely objective reflection of reality. Especially since glasnost provides all the conditions required for doing so.

LITGAZ Debates Possibility of Return to 'Enemy' Syndrome

90US0268 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 48, 29 Nov 89 p 13

[Discussion by Aleksandr Yakovlev, USSR people's deputy, doctor of jurisprudence, and Igor Gamayunov, editor, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Department of Morality and Law: "The Manichean Myth: Who Creates the 'Image of the Enemy,' How, and Why"; time, place not given]

[Text] Knights of hatred

[Gamayunov] I just received a letter from a relative in Saratov Oblast. She writes, "I do not understand it—how disgraceful things are, and no one is at fault! Train cars are not unloaded. The warehouses are bursting with laundry detergent, but there is none in the stores... What is going on? When will they find that clan of millionaires which wreaked such havoc?" And here is a phrase from an author's article, published in a central newspaper: "'Leftist radicals' are trying to sink everything alive in the country...they hurry, like burglars penetrating someone else's home...haven't the 'radicals' overplayed their suit?...the enemy has not allowed us to build genuine socialism;...the enemy has not allowed us to democratize the party..." And right then, in a publication of another orientation, a word which has been seen somewhere before strikes the eye: parasites [zakhrebetniki]. Where? In the yellowed newspaper files of the thirties. True, at that time, they were writing about what were clearly landlords: "kulak-parasites," but here, it was about bureaucrats. In a word, having immersed myself in this lexicon, I seemed to be falling into those rather terrible years. Aleksandr Maksimovich, how do our fellow citizens come by a need for the "image of the enemy"?"

[Yakovlev] Do you think that its origins lie specifically in the thirties?

[Gamayunov] And do you think it was the twenties?

[Yakovlev] I think that the origins are in the mechanisms of social psychology. After all, our self-recognition as the community "we" took place while one group of people was in opposition to another, "they." "They" were considered the source of all misfortune. For example, the Australians attributed any illness or death to the sorcery of an alien tribe. And the Tungus hunters in the Siberian taiga would kill anyone they came across who had an "alien" tattoo.

[Gamayunov] Certainly we have not come such a short distance from the savages?

[Yakovlev] Yes, of course we have. Of course we are already completely different. In any case, we do not immediately demand that the "enemy" be put up against the wall. Yet, for the time being, there is still in us that which was inherent in the heretical sect of Manichaens. It has existed since the time of Christ. These sect

members thought in two categories: "black night" and "white light"—and nothing in between. To this day, such a view of reality is called the Manichaen myth.

[Gamayunov] Nevertheless, reality has probably given some basis for such a view. Development is a rejection of something. Apparently, that which interfered with people's lives fell into the class of "black."

[Yakovlev] You are right, man cannot live without an ideal, without something sacred, immaculate. Yet as soon as man attempts to divide complex reality into black and white, into the holy and the terminally evil, then such a division becomes a program of actions, and the consequences prove horrifying.

[Gamayunov] But if the Manichean myth recurs, it means that social conditions are conducive to it. What conditions?

[Yakovlev] The myth emerges at break-through moments in history. For example, a people living through a burden of social shocks believed in the utopian idea of an "earthly paradise." It is easy to instill in such a people that concrete individuals are hampering the incarnation of the idea. The mythical "they" arises. The crowd demands, "Crucify them!" Signs are carried: "Death to Bukharin!" The crowd is triumphant when it reads in speeches of Stalin's legal specialist, Vyshinskiy, the words "foreign spies," "mad dogs..."

[Gamayunov] Well, it seems that we have not gotten up to spies. Yet we are already up to "dogs," which are understood to be radicals, with their "gaping maws"!

[Aleksandrov] There is still another reason, something ageless in human nature.

[Gamayunov] What do you have in mind?

[Yakovlev] It is natural for man to ascribe to someone whom he does not like many negative features. And the more features he ascribes to this "person," the higher his own self-opinion, the more furious the exposition and the demand for violent measures. Yet in history, violence resolves nothing. In the extreme version, the executioner and victim trade places, and everything is repeated from the beginning, no matter what knightly armor the executioner dons.

[Gamayunov] We have already "covered" that. What do you think: When Stalin and his comrades-in-arms destroyed political opponents, did they seem "knights of ideas" to themselves? Or was this a frankly criminal means to maintain the seized power?

[Yakovlev] Both the former and the latter, I think. Naturally, Stalin and his circle consciously exploited the mechanism of the "image of the enemy." Yet the image itself was formed long before they seized power, even in the years of war communism. This was the first bloody attempt to introduce utopia into reality. After Lenin's attempt to correct the error through NEP, Stalin, in effect, returned to the methods of "war communism."

And the mechanism of the "image of the enemy," which had not yet managed to rust over, began to work again. Is there anyone who did not at one time fit that image: kulak-parasites, special wreckers, industrial parties, Trotskyites, Bukharinites, cosmopolitans, and so on. They de-cossackized and de-kulakized, tortured and killed, all for the sake of the bright future. The Manichean myth flourished.

[Gamayunov] Many feel that all of this is linked to the peculiarities of Stalin's character.

[Yakovlev] The fable of the born villain! Yes, you take a look at what Iosif Vissarionovich was like from 1917 to the twenties! A nice sort of Georgian, a pleasant face, mustache, a benevolent smile. He makes speeches like everybody else. Well, he says something; sometimes it is appropriate, sometimes not. He is not distinguished by anything in particular. He is given over to the idea. And in the final analysis, he becomes the expressor of the already-formed structure of forcible involvement of the people in the realization of utopia. He is the product of his own structure, and there is no need to make of him a demonic personality. Such a tendency toward the personification of the mass crimes of those years is not harmless. First of all, through it we recede into the shadow of the mechanism generating the tyranny; secondly, it is as if we are trying to underscore that there is absolutely no Stalinism in us normal, undemonic people. A self-deception! Just take a good look at how we conduct dialogues with each other, how we speak. Suddenly Stalinist impatience, assurance, and final judgments will cut into the voice. And the passion of exposure? The desire to take an opponent to the whipping post?

[Gamayunov] "We are the children of Russia's terrible years..."

[Yakovlev] The children of the command-administrative system. Who have grown up, and it seems, have become a little smarter. It would seem that we must give an accounting for what we are creating. As soon as Interregional Group of deputies appeared, its members started to be considered almost renegades. Why? Just because they have their own view of the path and deadlines for the resolution of perestroika problems, not coinciding with those of the majority? Where do we get this deification of the majority? Is it not from the Stalinist decades?

Villains behind the counter

[Gamayunov] I recall the Supreme Soviet debates on cooperatives. That was some flood of emotion! The perception that cooperative members with good earnings would seem to be our chief danger. A deputy gets up to the tribune, and instead of an analysis, there is a scream. Instead of an attempt to understand, hatred. And there is my relative's letter from the hinterland of Saratov... Yet this is no longer the sticks, but the center of Moscow. At the Hall of Columns, when the economists were convening, there stood pickets with signs "Shame on

Abalkin." Surely after all the misfortunes we can do without the "image of the enemy"?

[Yakovlev] And you would want to discard this legacy, like an old trunk?

[Gamayunov] I would like to.

[Yakovlev] I would too. But it isn't working, because this is not grandma's trunk, but an inherited trait, seeing the world in black and white, without any gradations.

[Gamayunov] But after all, we are all worse off for the prohibition on wholesale-trade cooperatives!... I turn on the television. Dead center is a shot of vegetables rotting in Central Asia. There is no one to ship them to! In the cities, empty counters. The people are already beginning to curse perestroika—a lot of promises, but nothing to eat....

[Yakovlev] ... Yet the 'individuals' and the "cooperative members" are as hated as before. Incredible blindness! But our law is "good." Imagine: An old woman asked a neighbor to sell her potatoes at the market. He buys them from her at 20 kopeks, the rayon cooperative wholesale price. He transports them off to the city and sells them at the market price. He has to be recompensed for the transportation, for his labor as a middleman. They get him—for speculation! Legally! There is such an article in the Criminal Code: The purchase and reselling of goods for the purpose of profit is a crime. The article's year of "birth" is 1930, and it lives to this day!... I take it upon myself to assert that buying and selling "for the purpose of profit" is the ABC's of the free market.

[Gamayunov] But in your opinion, what, then, is speculation?

[Yakovlev] It is the purchase and accumulation of goods for the purpose of becoming a monopoly, inflating market prices, and receiving an illegal profit. Who is our chief monopolist now? The state! The result? Prices grow; there are almost no quality goods; the store shelves are empty. Well, the state cannot be the middleman between producer and consumer—try to deny it. Transfer this function to the cooperative members. You collect a progressive tax from those who genuinely receive excess income (due to our economy's absurdity, with the products and goods produced with the assistance of state subsidies). But do not prohibit! Prohibition is a dead end.

[Gamayunov] Yet they say that certain cooperative members give "the necessary people" bribes, and that they do not exactly conceal this.

[Yakovlev] Why conceal it? We ourselves have put them in such circumstances. Processing cooperatives and goods-producing cooperatives have been created. And where are the cooperatives for obtaining raw materials? There are none. Where to purchase raw materials, from the state monopolist? It allocated raw materials among state enterprises. What is left for the cooperatives to do?

Go to the black market, offer bribes, propagate bureaucrats, stuffing their pockets with money? The people do not see the bureaucrats, but the cooperative member, there is the villain, trading in trousers and grilling his shashlyk. Down with him!

[Gamayunov] But one can understand the people, especially the old people. They live their lives on a R150 salary, and here the cooperatives are pulling in thousands.

[Yakovlev] I understand. It is shame to acknowledge in old age that all your life, the state has undersupplied you, that you have been subjected to the cruelest exploitation. And then passions are inflamed. People invested with power capture them, intensify them, and supercharge them. After all, the cooperatives are the first economic units functioning within the command-administrative system according to the laws of the market economy. Their existence terrifies the adherents of the command style. Power is slipping through their fingers!

[Gamayunov] Meaning that the "image of the enemy" is now becoming a means of maintaining power?

[Yakovlev] For the most part! Take the AUCCTU's anti-cooperative declaration: This is a most typical attack on the cooperatives. Our valiant trade unions winked at the miners' strikes, not once seriously promoting workers' rights. And here, an activity like this. Why should they do this? Because in fact, the anti-cooperative action is speculative. Manipulating emotions is easy. Of course, they should be directed toward weaning enterprises from the state [razgosudarstvennie predpriyatiya], toward the development of economic independence. But after all, it costs the state enterprises to become independent; for example, if the mines to go over to a leasing system, to self-financing, the workers will not need the current bureaucratized trade unions. That is why the AUCCTU is creating of the cooperatives the "image of the enemy."

[Gamayunov] Yet all the same, the tenacity of such "images" is surprising. I heard the opinion: Economic non-freedom, the lack of private property wraps a person into the state to the point where he is, in effect, made a slave of the state. And as we know, a slave is a potential rebel. Mighty reserves of aggression accumulate in his subconscious. The aggression seeks an outlet. Just point to the "enemy," and that outlet is found. And then in Saltykovka near Moscow, a cooperative pigsty goes up in the flames of a deliberately set fire. The writers, who are capable of screaming, but not of thinking, help spread the fire with appeals such as "The cooperatives are robbing us!"

[Yakovlev] Instead of helping to dismantle the system and begin to live more humanly, rather than slavishly.

[Gamayunov] Are you certain that a free economy will completely remove the "enemy syndrome"?

[Yakovlev] I do not doubt it! The peasant's real, rather than fabricated enemy will be drought, soil erosion, obsolete equipment, and the need to not lag behind the better-versed neighbor-competitor. And the worker will have the same concerns for equipment and quality, for ecologically harmless production, and the sale of his production on the world market. The one and the other will immediately begin to improve their labor, and they shall soon feel that it is upon their will that the fate of their cause depends.

[Gamayunov] And in your view, how will this be reflected in ethnic conflicts? After all, the "enemy syndrome" is especially vital in these.

[Yakovlev] It is vital. Because the easiest thing of all is to make an imaginary "they," to create an "image of the enemy" out of people who speak a different language. The transference mechanism works here without a hitch: We have a bad economy; we do not have enough of this or that. Who is to blame? That "clan of millionaires" over there, selling tangerines in the market. Get them! And it really gets going. What the result is, we have seen in Fergana, Novyy Uzen, and Karabakh.

The Kashpirovskiy effect

[Gamayunov] Now, of course, everyone has hopes in the Supreme Soviet. Are these hopes in vain? After all, the "enemy syndrome" affects its work as well.

[Yakovlev] On the whole the Supreme Soviet sessions comfort me. I see how the very logic of the work of this democratic organ forces a transition from emotions to reason. This is a very noticeable tendency.

[Gamayunov] Yet another thing is quite noticeable as well: Obviously incompetent people are speaking on complicated problems.

[Yakovlev] Many are just now beginning to grasp the basic truths of economics.

[Gamayunov] By rejecting them?

[Yakovlev] Not all at once. The new is always accepted with difficulty. And the adherents of the command system cannot now say directly that "they don't like it." And they begin to paste the "image of the enemy" on, say, those who aspire to regional economic accountability. They become bitter, and scream. I have noticed that at such a moment, the majority of the deputies have a guarded feeling: If he is right, they why is he shouting like that?

[Gamayunov] And he shouts to the entire country on TV channel 2! And our people, as they say of us in the West, are extraordinarily emotional. Could such a scream generate in the mass consciousness the regular phantom of the "enemy"?

[Yakovlev] It could, and does generate it. Yet such a scream should not be stopped by some sort of sanctions.

The negative reaction of those sitting in the hall, a quiet word in response—that is the chief regulating factor.

[Gamayunov] I saw how you presented the draft law on court structure at the Supreme Soviet, how you responded to serious and not-so-serious questions. I saw real parliamentary work, how maximally precise formulations are created in the collision of opinions.

[Yakovlev] Well, in the first place, the deputies were prepared by publications on legal problems in recent years, including LITERATURNAYA GAZETA articles. Secondly, in my opinion, the very school of creation of legislation is a great school of rational thought. When one of the orators began to rant and rave, they proposed to him, look, bud, here is the text of the draft law, propose a correction. And the emotional layer is removed; a person begins to think.

[Gamayunov] While watching on television how people spoke "for" and "against," and how during the voting there was not a single vote "against" (a rare fact in the current work of the Supreme Soviet!), I thought: Perhaps the main principle of court examination of a case, the principle of the competition of sides, the accusation and the defense, is universal?

[Yakovlev] An absolutely correct conclusion. The principle of competition is the alphabet, the algorithm of constructive political dialogue. And an antidote for crowd infection with the "enemy syndrome."

[Gamayunov] About the crowd... Somehow or another I was at a rally. Next to me is a young dad with his son on his shoulders. Off to the side a bit, an elderly man in glasses, apparently from the next building; he came with a chair and is sitting. A group of students is cracking jokes. Suddenly, there is a noise on the right side. Some tall person with an escort to part the crowd walked to the tribune. He got up to the microphone. He flashed a smile. He pronounced his opening line. He was applauded right then and there. Everyone liked his tall figure, his measured voice. And he was making accusations. True, he spoke of facts long known, but temperamentally, raising his voice to a shriek, ending each phrase with the word "Shame!" and the crowd echoed back: "Shame!" During this he would throw up his fist. And the crowd did so as well. This lasted for about 15 minutes. I saw how the old man had climbed onto his chair in order to see better, how the dad with his son raised his fist, how the students waving their fists shouted excitedly, "Shame!" A state of ecstasy captured all. Had the orator called them into the "bright distance," the many-headed mass would have followed him blindly.

[Yakovlev] Crowd psychology is a special phenomenon. People will do in a crowd things which they would never do on their own. The effect of infection is functioning. Have you seen Kashpirovskiy's seances? People in a hall, ceaselessly shaking their heads—a terrible sight. And how many more in front of their screens—after all, millions watch Kashpirovskiy. With the help of TV, he

has made a transition from individual psychotherapy, applied only in a clinical setting, to mass hypnosis, bordering on mass psychosis. Could it be that on TV they do not know what they are doing? The consequences of this will still have their effect, but now I want to talk about the rallies. They can also turn into something like these seances, if they are made into just monologues.

[Gamayunov] Well, it seems that we have not yet grown up to a dialogue of people speaking with each other, and with those surrounding the tribune.

[Yakovlev] That is where the danger lies... People who have come to a rally cease to be a crowd when they start to think. And this will happen if various orators come to the tribune, representing various points of view. Comparison and choice; that is already thought. But for the time being...

[Gamayunov] ...for the time being, the Kashpirovskiy effect is tempting the orators.

[Yakovlev] A very strong temptation! An obedient crowd, its rapture and devotion; this intoxicates more effectively than vodka does an alcoholic. You perceive a surrogate for immortality. A leader intoxicated with success may easily lose self-control, he may himself be led along in this element.

[Gamayunov] There are already precedents: In Kishinev, a crowd broke windows at the MVD.

[Yakovlev] Yet all the same I think that with time, our rallies will become a powerful, broad-scale school of civic mindedness, manifesting a multitude of interests and opinions, and blocking ignorance and demagoguery. After all, it is demagoguery, leading to usurpation of power, which is one of the most terrible dangers lying in wait for democracy.

[Gamayunov] As far as I understand it, that same principle of the competition of opinions may save us from demagoguery. But let us imagine the situation: The prejudices of the majority are strong for the time being, and common sense has turned up only in the minority. We make decisions by majority vote. What is to become of the minority?

The "cudgel" of the majority

[Yakovlev] I do not know whether it is true, but they say that at the Novgorod Veche, when the majority made a decision, those remaining in the minority were beaten with cudgels if they did not run off in time. Unfortunately, for the time being, that is our model: the victorious majority slights the minority. Do you recall, at the first Congress of People's Deputies, how they applauded the speakers whose viewpoint was alien or simply incomprehensible? I think that a guarantee must be legislatively granted to the minority. The minority must advocate its views, otherwise political dialogue will cease. It is necessary to fight for the right of the minority, if, of course, it does not appeal for violence or force.

[Gamayunov] Aleksandr Maksimovich, has the "enemy syndrome" ever bothered you personally?

[Yakovlev] I admit that it has arisen within me, as it probably has for any living person. Until I stopped studying criminology—that was in the late fifties, early sixties. I studied groups of thieves, read thousands of criminal cases, talked with prisoners. It would seem, without a doubt, that this was society's enemy. But as soon as I became more closely acquainted with criminals, even this "image of the enemy" began to dissipate. In its place, I gradually began to see complex, living, disparate people. Yes, each of them was a criminal who had committed a heinous crime. Yet I saw that a man and his action are entities linked, but also distinct. Do you understand?

[Gamayunov] That is, a man in action is not an entirety.

[Yakovlev] Not an entirety! He may be terrible in this action, it is never him in his entirety. After all, there is in him something else; perhaps the remnants of something human, giving him hope of human rebirth. This is so in all other spheres of life: The temptation of simple decisions controls you. You have overcome it, you look into reality, and you see that it is multicolored, and does not bear simplification. Black and white reality is self-deception.

[Gamayunov] That is, the truth is needed in everything, nothing but the truth. So tell the truth, why are the perestroika processes going so slowly? In your deputy view, what is hampering them?

[Yakovlev] Is this really what we are talking about now?! We cannot, of course, encompass everything... But of we speak concretely, for example, on agrarian reform, then here is my opinion: The opinion of a solidified bloc of those in the Supreme Soviet who are principally opposed to the fate of the kolkhozes being decided by the peasants themselves is interfering with it.

[Gamayunov] I have not heard any such assertion.

[Yakovlev] And do you suppose that in the current climate anyone would be brave enough to declare this directly? Advocates of this opinion usually speak about something else, but it is hard to hide their desire to leave everything the way it is, just changing the surface of the internal kolkhoz structure a little bit.

[Gamayunov] Do you have the feeling that now you want to call them, well, if not perestroika's enemies, then at least its opponents?

[Yakovlev] Of course not, how are they enemies? They, just as you and I, were formed within a certain system—the command-administrative system. We all became convinced of its inefficiency. Therefore we all are for changes. But specifically for what kind of changes? This bloc is for minimal changes. For example, renting within the kolkhoz. They are certain that this will yield results. I feel that this will not yield results, because the lessees subordinate to the kolkhoz will not have real economic

independence. So, because our opinions do not coincide, we are supposed to grab each other by the lapels? I am certain: Perestroika has no enemies. There are difficulties in working out new approaches. There is a varying level of understating the problem. And there are opponents. But an opponent cannot be my enemy. After all, in a polemic with him, I give my position better ground.

[Gamayunov] But certainly, in spite of the discussion which has already taken place in the Supreme Soviet, it is clear to your opponents that the peasants themselves must decide how to manage?

[Yakovlev] The thing is, that it is not clear. This is their logic: Yes, our agriculture is in a catastrophic state, a number of kolkhozes and sovkhoses operate at a loss. But are there any that are flourishing? There are. Why cannot the rest become like that? We will teach them to, we will force them. For 60 years, we have been teaching and forcing—for what? Of course, no one is fighting to break up the major farms. But for how long can the unprofitable ones be maintained on state subsidies?

[Gamayunov] But after all, the laws on land and property must solve the problem.

[Yakovlev] And take a look at the disputes are heating up around them. Here I have the draft Law on Land. Glance at article 17, on the creation of a land fund for peasant farms and cooperatives. Do you know what kind of land they are proposing to give to our farmers? Land "from state reserves," that is, worthless land. We read further: For said fund, the local soviets may (note, may, not must!) confiscate from the kolkhozes, sovkhoses, and other enterprises unused or irrationally used lands. And who proves whether they are used rationally or not? Yesterday, they were not; today, we have built a barn there, so it is already "rational." I state that if article 17 remains in that redaction, the peasants will not receive normal land.

[Gamayunov] That is, the braking mechanism is laid in the article itself?

[Yakovlev] Of course. We are the world's greatest specialists when it comes to laying such mechanisms into laws! I am convinced that our domestic farmers must receive the land of those kolkhozes and sovkhoses which the peasants themselves have decided to break up the farms. If they decide to break up, I toast their health; if it is a model farm, let it exist.

[Gamayunov] Let us imagine, the peasants do not receive normal land... What then?

[Yakovlev] In the best case, bread coupons, then, an attempt to reanimate the command system. But another thing could happen: A massive explosion of popular wrath, blind and destructive. An end to the process of democratization. A search for new "enemies of the people." A demand for their trials. And on the posters of

the rally attendants, instead of "Shame on so-and-so," there will appear other, painfully familiar words, "Death to so-and-so."

[Gamayunov] A rather wild warning. But after all, the general discussion of these laws is still to come...

[Yakovlev] Judging by appearances, its main hindrance will be the "image of the enemy" in the person of the peasant-proprietor of his own land. Oddly enough, I have never heard of a rally taking place in defense of the peasants' right to choose their own form of management... A key problem, after all! Why is that?

[Gamayunov] In closing our discussion, let us ask that question of those who organize the rallies, and those who attend them.

[Yakovlev] Do you think that they will respond?

[Gamayunov] We'll see...

From the Editors:

In your observation, does the "enemy syndrome" threaten the fate of perestroika?

Is rivalry, so natural in human nature, possible without the "image of the enemy"?

In your opinion, to what extent does the "enemy syndrome" interfere with the work of the Supreme Soviet?

Can those who speak against radical reforms be called "perestroika's enemies"? Or those who fight for immediate changes, who have not yet brought out the trust of the majority?

How can a political polemic be turned from an exchange of labels and insults into a constructive dialogue?

For you, has the "enemy syndrome" cropped up in your relations with anyone? If so, how did you get rid of it?

Those who wish to express their opinion on telephone may call on Tuesdays and Wednesdays from 3 to 5 pm. Igor Gamayunov will answer at 208-91-64.

Views Conflict on Collectivization, Treatment of Peasantry

90US02665A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Dec 89 pp 2-3

[Articles by Pavel Galkin, philosopher: "The Class of the Kulaks Rose in Rebellion Against the People," and by Pavel Voshchanov, economist: "Anger and Envy Condemn Us to Poverty"]

[Text] "Kulaks"—that is what the material was called which was published on 8 September of this year. It called forth not only words of gratitude, but also sharp criticism. Letters were sent to authorities in high places demanding to hold the author strictly responsible and "to compel [the editors] to publish material containing the opposite point of view."

Pavel Galkin: The Class of the Kulaks Rose in Rebellion Against the People

I have been subscribing to KOMSOMOLKA since I was young. At one time it corresponded to its name, but now it is becoming more and more a mouthpiece of anti-Soviet and anti-Komsomol forces. Some of their representatives are even maintained as regular correspondents. My article is about one such scribbler and his writing.

There is no stopping the daubers. Two years ago I thought: They will be laughed at and made fun of, and they will get quiet. But no, they continue with growing zeal. Now it has become clear—they continue to mock our heroic history... I am not acquainted with P. Voshchanov, as, however, he is with me. I do not know whether he is young or old, whether he was born in the city or in the village, behind the Urals or on the Solovki Islands. But after his article "Kulaks," I became convinced—he is a Kulak offspring. Perhaps not by blood, but by spirit. And that means we are his class enemies.

Who today calls the people "back to capitalism?" Who brandishes about slogans of "Down with the CPSU?" Who urges the workers to go on strike? I assert it is they—former kulaks, Nepmen, enemies of the people, and, of course, their offspring. They, whom Soviet power once touched "in a sore place," cannot forgive it for this up to now. It has forgiven them, but they cannot! They have been carrying their Kulak psychology, ideology, and morality for generations! They are filled with both subconscious and fully deliberate hatred for the heroic history of socialism. They burst with enthusiasm for the times when it was permitted "to ride" on others. Today they are literally enraged by the lustre of bourgeois shop windows, and they repeat over and over again, like in a delirium: "Why are we not the masters of all this?"

At the time when the so-called "simpletons", who advocated the ideas of equality, strained all their forces on the construction sites of communism, the smart alecks among the "offended" and "oppressed" rehabilitated during the Khrushchev period, with all the truths and untruths, got into the VUZ's were seated in comfortable office chairs, and forced their way into science and culture. They knocked together clans and clan members, blackmailed, bribed, and lined their pockets. Now they heart-rendingly vow fidelity to restructuring, hysterically fulminate against bureaucratism, which they themselves practice, and cleverly recruit those possessed by naivete, the lackeys who are drunk with glasnost and their own stupidity, boldly throwing them into the battle for their filthy cause.

The class struggle is flaring up! Yes, the time has come when the class of the kulaks has again risen in rebellion against the people. Having snatched a moment when socialism is weak, it provokes, organizes and directs people blinded by democracy and glasnost to undermine it from within. And Voshchanov does not conceal his ideological kinship with this class. On the contrary, he vehemently brings down his anger on the heads of those

who carried out a noble and just revolution in the village, and in so doing pours out rivers of heart-rending tears, washing the dirty back sides of the kulak ideals dear to his heart. He does not believe a single word of the veterans, who demand the guarding of the history of the kolkhoz movement against defilement. But on the other hand, both the writings of "the offended" and "the oppressed" are carefully read, each word of theirs is devoured, as if these letters are not from former kulaks and their offspring, but from heavenly angels. He selects and cites such horrors that your hair stands on end and you shiver... You think about it, it turns out, they seized the kulaks for no reason at all! They drove them, the unfortunate wretches, into the stinking cattle cars, drove them out into the fierce frost in the bare steppe, and forced them to work to exhaustion. They, imagine, scoffed at them, to their heart's delight! And really, of course, those who seized, drove, and forced are real animals... Does anyone really believe all this delirium?!

Once there were no kulaks, there was also no dekulakization. There was, it turns out, "dispossession of the peasantry!" There were those who were talented and worked—they were repressed. They were those who lacked talent, who were lazy-bones and drunkards—they were driven into the kolkhozes. Such is the tenor of the writings, which shamelessly garble our history. For the benefit of the counterrevolutionary drones, its real makers, part of whom are still living, are insulted and belittled.

According to the reference works, in 1928, out of a population of 150 million, the Nepmen and kulaks constituted a total of 7 million. And it was precisely they who, by right of the dictatorship of the proletariat, were repressed during the process of collectivization. But the remaining 140 plus million, through their heroic labor, created socialism, enduring in the name of this incredible hardships and deprivations. This is why our generation, by sacred right, demands: "Stop blackening our past! The kolkhozes are the result of the heroic efforts of the people!" Precisely in this lies the sacred truth on which I insist. I am against the dead kulak "truth" of Voshchanov. In it there is a heap of lies and the hypocrisy of the overthrown class, which in its new generations is endeavoring to take revenge.

As far as the facts are concerned which supposedly "convincingly" prove that the kolkhozes were created on the blood and suffering of the peasants, up to now in the entire world press not more than 100,000 of them have been published. So that 6.9 million still remain unknown. As you see, there is plenty of dirty work left for many generations of such scribblers.

The overthrown class has attained a great deal. Every collective has begun to think only about its own interests. All of them are inspired with the idea to go out into the world market, to feed above all themselves—even if at the expense of others. Here it is—the kulak self-seeking aspiration! Kulak egoism is setting in. Celebrate, scions of 7 million overthrown, but don't forget: The third

generation of 140 million heroes of the revolution is also alive, and the future is for them!

History moves in the struggle of opposites and through the negation of the negation. At present the generations of "the offended" and "the oppressed" have the ball. But they will not succeed in winning over the twenty-fold majority of the creators of socialism for the benefit of the long overthrown kulaks. The battle continues, and the whole question is to what extent it will take a painless course. It is shameful and outrageous to defile the sacred morality of the people, substituting kulak morality for it. It is monstrous when people who dress themselves up as Marxists and Leninists elevate those who were overthrown by the revolution to the rank of martyrs and sons of the Fatherland, and its creators—of criminals. The people feel this hypocrisy, but up to now have not fully discovered its secret intention. But I am convinced that they will discover it. And then, having recognized in their offenders those who are dreaming of turning life back, to kulak servitude, will obliterate them.

Pavel Voshchanov: Anger and Envy Condemn Us to Poverty

In acquainting yourself with today's letters from readers, it is easy to note how diverse public opinion has become. That which seems completely justified and just to some, is perceived by others as blasphemy and slander. And nevertheless, the letter of the philosopher P. Galkin from Odessa, in my view, differs from the others. It is a distinctive indicator of the perception of the adherents of the old political system that the agonizing process of democratization, which is under way in the country, is based on half-truth and carefully thought-out deception, on anger and envy, and on the suppression of the very freedom of the human spirit.

How should the peasant be treated today who has a plot of land, cattle, agricultural implements, a house of good quality with outbuildings, and who for the sowing or the harvest hires day-laborers? If we remain in the positions developed in 1929 by the conference of Marxist agronomists, the answer will only be as follows: "To declare war to the death, and ultimately to wipe him off the face of the earth!"

No better fate awaits the present-day rural cooperatives, who defend their right to manage not in accordance with orders from above, but to be guided by the laws of the market. In general it is possible to wage the struggle against them from solid theoretical positions, basing oneself on the opinions of the classics. One can, for example, cite the proposal introduced by V.I. Lenin: Peasants, he said in May 1918 at the session of the Sovnarkom devoted to the state policy of grain procurements, who conceal their production and refuse to sell it voluntarily "are declared enemies of the people and are subjected to imprisonment for a period of not less than 10 years, confiscation of all their property, and expulsion forever from their village commune." I admit that even

today zealous fighters are found who are ready to perceive what was said as a guide to action, for the genocide of the peasants, which was carried out during the first post-revolutionary 20-year period, has in fact not received an exhaustive political and moral assessment in our country.

In support of what has been said, I will cite one extremely typical opinion. An inhabitant of Kurgan Oblast, K. Esaulov, writes: "Collectivization is not a war against the peasants, as you try to imagine, but a continuation of the October Revolution! As far as the voluntariness of entering into the kolkhozes is concerned, at the end of the 1920's this principle was really not everywhere observed. But the party, as is well known, condemned the extremes, and in the 1930's, when the basic mass of kolkhozes was created, already nothing of this sort was permitted. No pulled 'memoirs of eyewitnesses' can refute this. What is more, are they reliable? I will not be surprised if it turns out that you simply made them up."

Of course, one can make up a great deal. But how can one invent the half-empty shelves of today's food stores? This is, indeed, not only the result of someone's mismanagement of "unprecedentedly difficult weather conditions."

Neglected fields, overgrown with young forest, formerly deep rivers and streams, which have been turned into sewage ditches, depopulated villages with dead izbas, nailed-up schools, and ravaged temples—all of this has one reason. The dispossession of the peasants. It is both the poverty of life and the poverty of spirit. This is the miserable solitude and the never-ending hangover syndrome. For many years we brushed this off and were moved to the model lustre of the "beacons", created by the agroindustrial generals for their own and the leadership's enjoyment. And they themselves did not notice how, like a snake, a very real danger crept up to our house: Tomorrow no one will feed the country! I doubt that then the words spoken by the Muscovite A. Bespyatko will convince and reassure anyone.

"Mistaken is your assertion: Expedient is everything that makes it possible to feed the country, to create an abundance of food products. For this it was not necessary to make a revolution, to bring enormous sacrifices. . . . Man lives not by bread and meat alone. The economy must be educational, and what is more, not simply educational, but in the communist spirit!"

Hundreds of thousands of ruined peasant fates are laid at the foundation of the economy, which, according to the design of its creators, ought not so much feed and clothe, as educate. And although this education was not given without difficulty, the "educators" themselves manifested an enviable persistence. Every time when they encountered the resistance of the village, they went for temporary indulgences, proclaiming everything carried out previously as bungling, tolerated at the local level. But it was worthwhile for the situation to improve

somehow, the pressure resumed with new force. Hardly had one wave of repressions receded, when another already rolled over the village. This is how it was in the 1920's, and nothing changed in the following decade.

Beginning in 1929, almost in every issue of the central newspapers admonitions were published—it is necessary to accelerate the tempo of collectivization, to intensify the attack on the kulaks and their accomplices! At the local level, these directions became transformed into a much more definite slogan: "Whoever does not enter a kolkhoz is an enemy of Soviet power!" So did the peasant, seeing all this, really count on any indulgences? I think already not. Which is exactly why in 1930 the outflow of peasant families from the village began. Many sold off their farm and to get out of harm's way moved to the city. The slaughter of cattle becomes especially massive at this time. For practically all types, their total number fell below the level of the prerevolutionary year 1916.

For any other economy, this would have been almost a catastrophe, but our "educational" economy reacted to what was going on in its own way: For the slaughtering of one's own cow, horse, or even goat without sanction by the authorities, the confiscation of all of one's property and deprivation of freedom for a period of up to 2 years with or without expulsion to remote regions was due. I cannot name a precise figure, but according to some sources, in Russia and the Ukraine alone about 12,000 peasants during the 1930's were convicted of "injurious slaughter" of cattle. The story of one of them was told by B. Zolotarev from Perm Oblast in his letter:

"...Father had a rather strong farm. This is probably precisely why they scheduled the agitators sent from the cities to us for billeting. Mother tried somehow to placate them and every day ran to the neighboring village for vodka. They did not refuse to be treated, but after the drinking-bout became only more vicious—they threatened father with expulsion if he did not enter the kolkhoz 'in an amicable way.' On the advice of these same agitators, the village activists came first to our house. Mother cried and begged father: 'Let's go away anywhere!' In the end he agreed. They started to sell little by little, but they only slaughtered a cow—and they took father away and evicted us to an abandoned khutor not far away. There we lived for a number of years, until we moved to the city. Mother frequently journeyed to the rayon procurator, she tried everything to find out something about father, but the first line we received from him only in 1941, already from the battle-front. He was lucky—he stayed alive and returned home. But then not all of us were lucky—to the very end of his life, father drank a lot and did not want to work anywhere..."

The official reaction to what had happened did not leave the village any hope. At the high levels of authority, they already divided the peasants into those suitable and unsuitable for the new life. If the former were subject to obligatory unification in large collective farms, the latter, depending on the level of "social danger," were prepared

for a much more unenviable fate. They were sorted into three categories: "Counterrevolutionary activists"—they were subject to immediate arrest, and their families to concentrated settling in remote regions; "large kulaks and former semi-landowners"—they were forcefully evicted with their families to remote regions and taken there under strict the strictest administrative surveillance; finally, "remaining kulaks"—they were sent to settlements with special administrative regime within the bounds of the rayons of their former residence. In February 1930, the government issued a special planned order: Approximately 240,000-250,000 families were projected to be "encompassed" by the end of the year by the measures established for the first two categories. For the third—the number of the contingent to be repressed, it was recommended, was to be determined independently, proceeding from local conditions.

To whom were such tasks and recommendations addressed? To anyone you like! To the secretaries and activists of the local party organizations, to ispolkom officials and their countless representatives, to the armed officials in charge of procurements, who carried out devastating raids on the village granaries, to the village collectivization enthusiasts, and, of course, to the "fighters of the invisible front," ready to "render harmless" anyone at whom the finger of the authorities was pointed. Any official to the slightest degree invested with power could pronounce a sentence, determine the subsequent life, or altogether deprive a person to the right of it. And no law, investigation, or court of any kind... Only "class feeling," "proletarian resoluteness," and "unconditional following of directions from above." In this intoxication of sanctioned arbitrariness frequently the kind of thing happened that is extremely distant from the reorganization of the village and sooner falls under the category of purely criminal deeds.

"... All of this I have before my eyes to this day. I remember my frightened father, my crying mother, the face of my older sister, white like chalk. But best of all I remember his ugly mug. I remember how he threw his cigar on the floor and said through clenched teeth: 'If you don't send your daughter to me, we will kulakize you tomorrow!' In response, my father hurled a stool at him. He grabbed his head and leaped behind the door... But after a day they took my father away, allegedly for terror against village activists. After another couple of days, together with other 'kulaks,' we, too, were driven to the city under guard. My sister did not prove to be in the column. My mother cried, she begged to let her go to search for her. 'I will not run away! I will leave the children as guarantee!' But the militiaman, in answer, pulled his rifle from his shoulder. . . .

"After half a year, already in Kazakhstan, we found out that my sister hanged herself. I am guessing that there was a reason for this. During my childhood I dreamt about returning to the village to kill him. I lie in bed at night and imagine all this. Fortunately (can one in such cases write about any sort of 'fortune'), we were prohibited from

leaving the bounds of our region. If you run away, they will punish all your relatives..." (T. Ukhartsev, Crimean Oblast).

I foresee the accusation: "You completely repudiate high intentions, and you put some vile motives first and foremost!" No, I do not repudiate high intentions, but more precisely—high illusions, noble delusions. I am ready to agree that they predominated in the consciousness of the majority of rank-and-file participants of collectivization. But I assert there was also something else. There was also envy and anger, old wrongs and humiliations. There was the desire, for years repressed in the soul, to settle accounts... From posters and transparencies, from the pages of newspapers and journals, from big and small platforms, in the soul of people, exhausted to the extreme by the disorders of everyday life, it was disseminated: "Death! Let's pull out the filthy sting! Let's break the spine!" And these, very likely, are not the most embittered appeals of that time. Society sank to the swamp of the general animosity. It was not easy to resist this.

...I am reading the copy of a certificate of rehabilitation sent to the editors: "Case of the accusation of Martemyanov, I.M., born in 1873, native of the village of Blagoveshchenskoye of Rovdinskiy Rayon of Arkhangelsk Oblast, who prior to his arrest worked as assistant to the accountant in the Krasnyy Oktyabr Kolkhoz, was reviewed: The decision of the troika of the NKVD Administration for Arkhangelsk Oblast of 10 December 1937 is repealed and the case is discontinued because of the absence of a corpus delicti." Under the document the date—15 September 1960. Almost a quarter of a century separates the day of arrest from the day of rehabilitation. And for what crime? It has a direct relationship to what is written above. This is what they arrested the 64-year old peasant for: Standing in the street with men from the village and having seen a village activist go by in a new fur coat, he made mention of the fact that this fur coat previously belonged to a fellow-villager of theirs, who not long ago had been dekulakized and evicted from the village. Who reported this "free-thinking" is a mystery to this day. But the result is well known—10 years of camps without the right of correspondence. All of a sudden nine "children of an enemy of the people" appeared at that time in a deserted northern village. Who thought about them? Who rose to their defense? No one. Even today they cannot obtain the truth: Where and when their father met with his death...

A former official of the procuracy whom I showed the letter from Arkhangelsk was exasperated: "That cannot be! There was probably still something else about which the relatives either did not know or did not want to talk." But the more deeply I buried myself in the readers' letters and in memoirs of eyewitnesses, the more I became convinced—maybe. During the years of collectivization and dekulakization any village inhabitant, whether he was poor or rich, was not insured against arbitrariness. A carelessly thrown out word or glance was

at times sufficient for you "to be written out a ticket" to those regions from where few had the occasion to return. I. Rodin, a reader from Ryazan, related about his grandfather, whom they arrested and exiled to Northern Kazakhstan for only one phrase, uttered on the occasion of a kolkhoz that had just been created: "Well, we are half-starved now!"

Tragic is the finale of the reorganization of the village. In 1930 more than 115,000 families were evicted to remote regions, and already during the next year—more than 265,000. Another 400,000 to 450,000 families were settled in special settlements within the bounds of their krais and oblasts, and about 250,000 "self-dekulakized"—they liquidated their farm and moved to the city. The overall result of just these 2 years—more than a million families, about 6 million people, torn from their place by a cruel whirlwind

But even this is not all. During the winter of 1932-1933, in the grain regions of the country—in the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, the Lower and the Middle Volga, in the Southern Urals, and in Kazakhstan—a massive famine broke out. Not only whole families died out—[but whole] settlements. The official statistics to this day cannot name the precise number of the dead, while individual researchers give various estimates—from 3 million to 7 million people. To feel sorry for the starving peasants, to help them, to give them any kind of even temporary indulgences. Nothing of the sort happened. On the contrary, in August 1932 the government adopted a decree on the protection of kolkhoz property, in which it is written: "As a measure of judicial repression for the embezzlement (theft) of kolkhoz and cooperative property—execution with confiscation of all property and with replacement, given mitigating circumstances, by deprivation of freedom for a period of not less than 10 years. In the 4 months following the adoption of the Ukase alone, which among the people received the name of "the ukase of the three little ears of corn" more than 50,000 people were convicted. According to some estimates, by the mid-1930's there were already more than 3.5 million former peasants—7 out of every 10 camp inmates!

With what surprising lightness P. Galkin writes about 7 million ruined lives! As if not people were at issue, but withered trees, which should be cut down in order for the others to grow better. But where are the fruits of that garden? Where is that prosperity which would, as it were, justify the inconceivable sacrifices?

Anger and envy could not give rise to anything else but poverty. Poverty led to even greater animosity. For many years already this spiral has been coming undone.

Any collapse does not happen by itself. It comes from man, from a collapse in his head and in his heart. It is obvious, this is also where the restoration of what has been destroyed must begin.

Uncovering of Shchelokov's Corruption Detailed

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[Article by A. Petrushov and V. Usanov: "The Face and the Mask: How the King of Political Blackmail was Exposed"]

[Text] They will rebuke us: writing again about dead people! And they will quote the well-known saying: About the dead, either say something good, or nothing at all. However, this is the way people are—they need the truth. Both about the living and about the dead. And while justly honoring the knights of Conscience and Good, we also have no right to consign to oblivion those who have outraged our ideals, who have revived "grasping instincts," who have sowed lack of faith and have led to degradation, in a word, those who have cultivated the "flowers of evil" and poisoned people's souls.

Who doesn't know the name of Shchelokov? It has become a synonym for cupidity, for bribe-taking, for moral dissipation. A synonym for stagnation in its most distorted forms. At the end of the 1970's, the country's minister of internal affairs was transformed into a force dangerous to society. They were afraid of him, this man who was initiated into all the secret sides of life of the highest echelon of power. All the ins and outs of the Brezhnev family were known to him. But unsatisfied ambition gnawed at Shchelokov. He felt cramped within the walls of the ministry; he dreamed of more. It has been shown that the rumors that circulated in Moscow about his rapid advancement to a higher post in the government were fed by the minister himself. But these rumors, happily, were not destined to be realized. In those years when the absolute powers of the ministers had reached their apogee, forces were found within the party which entered into battle with him.

The General's Special Coupons

Letters had reached the Party Control Committee long before. These were anonymous letters from Moldavia. They told about certain machinations of the former first deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers. It was difficult and sometimes impossible to check such signals, and they were filed away for better times. However, there was not a single letter concerning the Moscow period, not a single phone call. Although it is specifically at this time that Shchelokov's abuses reached their peak, having grown to monstrous proportions.

What is wrong here? Why did people remain silent. They were afraid. In those years, the escalation of fear was already a sad reality. However, there is also another reason. Paradoxical as it may seem, the mass information media had become supporters of Shchelokov. The minister himself ascribed great importance to them. Day after day, the Soviet militia was toasted on the pages of newspapers and journals, on television screens, and on the radio; the deeds of its rank-and-file and of officers in the struggle against crime were sung in a variety of ways.

Naturally, Shchelokov himself was also frequently and loudly named as a firm and energetic leader who was doing so much to strengthen law and order within the country. The minister surrounded himself closely with the most authoritative (in his view) servants of the press and spoiled them generously with words and gifts, awards and honorary diplomas. It is sad to say, but this is how it was: With the help of the mass information media and of a "tangle of bribe-takers" entrenched in the bowels of the MVD, he prolonged for himself a quiet and abundant life.

In the Party Control Committee [PCC] under the CPSU Central Committee, they learned as follows about the cancerous tumor that infected the staff of this most powerful department.

I.S. Gustov, former first deputy chairman of the CPSU Central Committee PCC (recently retired):

Sometime in the middle of March 1978, Arvid Yanovich Pelshe invited me to come see him. He asked directly whether I knew anything about the special coupons for private automobiles that permitted violation of road traffic regulations. I shook my head no.

An investigation was necessary. I assigned this matter to a responsible investigator at the Party Control Committee, Valentin Stepanovich Sevastyanov.

V.S. Sevastyanov

It soon became clear to me that the special coupons were not imaginary. There were two types of these. I had known even earlier about one type—for workers of the KGB and MVD. The second, for private car owners, had appeared recently. They had been thought up by the chief of the State Automobile Inspection (GAI) of the city of Moscow, Nozdryakov. I learned that he kept a card file, and also the blank coupons themselves. He himself filled them out and distributed them. I had a great stroke of luck: At the USSR Procuracy I got to see a "live" coupon. Its number was far from being in the first hundred. The coupon had been confiscated some time earlier from the arrested chief of a gang. And it was with this sort of "dossier" that I set out for the GAI...

Frankly, General Nozdryakov did not receive the Party Control Committee employee graciously. He even demanded identification. Striving to show that he was considerably more important than some kind of PCC inspector, he took a out of his safe a printed photo album, with a large portrait of Brezhnev in his marshal's uniform on the cover. Then, with deliberate carelessness, he opened the album. An inscription on the title page struck the eye: "To my esteemed Aleksey Petrovich Nozdryakov, with gratitude. L. Brezhnev." Somewhat later, Sevastyanov would clarify the history of this inscription. Nozdryakov had gained the confidence of the chief of Brezhnev's guard and had asked him to arrange a souvenir inscription for him. As is known, Leonid Ilich loved to show signs of attention to people who were faithful.

Of course, Sevastyanov had to look through the album. Later, however, he again brought the conversation around to the special coupons. The unhappy general then took a file from the safe and said: "Take into account, I am going to report that you have exceeded your authority." As soon as Sevastyanov had opened the file he understood: "You have not given me what I asked for." Nozdryakov laid another file on the table. But this too was not the right one. And then the general gave up: There is a kind of card file, but this is maintained by a worker who is on vacation right now. But, in about two weeks... But the chief of the GAI underestimated the persistence of the Party Control Committee worker. A secret card file, hidden in the lower part of the safe, passed into the hands of Sevastyanov. He politely asked permission to take it with him in order to brief the PCC leadership and promised that it would be returned to its owner in two hours.

V.S. Sevastyanov:

Of course, I kept my promise. But I managed to make a copy. This was, in truth, an "interesting" card file. Altogether, 900 special coupons had been issued to private persons. Among their owners, there were directors of large gastronomes, stadiums, and resort hotels, directors of medical institutions, sports and hunting societies, cultural and scientific figures, and journalists.

And, indeed, what kind of special coupons were these? The militia were forbidden to stop the automobiles, to subject them to inspection, and to take measures with regard to drivers who had violated traffic regulations. Moreover, Nozdryakov had issued coupons without any names and these had "wandered" around Moscow without any control, sometimes falling into the hands of criminals. This is apparently how a certain S. Ivanov acquired two coupons. Following the robbery of a cash collector's car, he hid out for about nine years from the militia. He committed a series of other robberies. And he lived, incidentally, in the city of Podolsk, not far from Moscow. His private residence, with an area of two hundred square meters, had everything—a pool, a sauna, a billiards room, a wine cellar, a four-car garage, guards. One can imagine how this thief consciously thanked the inventor of the special coupon when, following his latest criminal action, he sped around the city without the risk of being stopped even for breaking traffic regulations.

I.S. Gustov:

After several days, Sevastyanov presented the leadership with a list of the abuses of official position committed by CPSU member Nozdryakov. Besides establishing the system of special coupons, which distorted the system for motor vehicle traffic movement, he connived to develop the criminal practice of extorting bribes for obtaining driver's licenses. During two years alone, 600 divers received licenses in return for bribes. Nozdryakov distorted state reporting on accidents and injuries on Moscow's roads. In a word, enough facts had been collected to exclude him from the party. It was proposed

at a session of the Party Control Committee that MVD Deputy Minister N. Rozhov, the chief of the Administration for State Motor Vehicle Inspection, V. Lukyanov, and others also be summoned. But something unforeseen took place.

V.S. Sevastyanov:

On 30 March 1978, at 11:25 a.m., the city line telephone in my office rang: "Comrade Sevastyanov?"—"Yes."—"Valentin Stepanovich?"—"Yes."—"Leonid Ilich Brezhnev will now speak with you." I honestly admit that I didn't believe it and even wanted to hang up the receiver. After 25 seconds, I heard a familiar voice: "Greetings, Comrade Sevastyanov! You are involved there in checking out an anonymous letter about Nozdryakov; you have him worried, you are getting on his nerves. It is not necessary to check out this letter, to worry Nozdryakov. And in general, it is not necessary to check out anonymous letters. We don't check out anonymous letters, or statements in general. We interest ourselves with specific problems...—Well, all the same, it is not necessary. End the check."

It was almost as if a practical joke was being played. But the voice! I quickly transcribed the conversation from memory and took it to Ivan Stepanovich. He, in turn, reported to Pelshe.

I.S. Gustov:

No matter what, it was necessary too confirm that it had really been "him" that had called. I decided to contact Chernenko, who was always in the picture. Konstantin Ustinovich promised to clarify things. After some time he advised that the call was from Brezhnev and that it had been arranged by Shchelokov, who had himself dialed the number and handed the phone to Leonid Ilich. This is how we learned who stood behind Nozdryakov. This episode revealed an entirely different face of the minister of internal affairs. And from then on events developed differently. Shchelokov insisted that all materials concerning Nozdryakov be sent to the MVD. There was nothing left to do but to do this. Of course, we had no doubt that not a single strand of hair would fall from Nozdryakov's head. And this is how it turned out. They only "pointed out" shortcomings to him. Soon, it is true, they sent him into retirement. However, to this very day, he is walking around with a party card.

And what about the minister? Shchelokov did not rest content. Rumors and provocations were set in motion. Thus, at a meeting of his deputies, he once announced that the question of his selection... as chairman of the Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee was preordained. This news, of course, quickly made the rounds of all Moscow. Or the following example. On 21 April, before a festive session dedicated to the 108th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birthday, the minister of internal affairs, in the presence of the large number of people who had come to the meeting, turned to me and intentionally rudely and loudly said: "Who was it that phoned your worker to check on members of

the Politburo and their families. The is no place for such people in the central party apparatus and they should be removed." And further: "I am going to write a memo to the CPSU Central Committee on this question."

Naturally, Shchelokov did not write any memo. But this was not thought up for the sake of pretty words, but rather in order to frighten us, to provoke incautious words and acts, to force us to reveal ourselves. Oh, how he would have liked to know what else the PCC possessed, how much it knew about affairs within the MVD, and from whom to expect the next unpleasantness.

Organ of Conscience

We will interrupt here for a time our transcript of recollections about days past. And we will interrupt them in order to think a moment about something: about the role of the Party Control Committee, about the renewal of our party. Many letters and comments have been coming to the PCC and PRAVDA on this topic. People are seriously concerned that perestroika become irreversible. It is their judgement that laws worked out by the Supreme Soviet and approved by the USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies might come to serve as guarantees within society of this irreversibility. And within the party? Intra-party democracy, glasnost, unity of the actions of communists, their activeness, discipline, party comradeship? But indeed, as history has shown, these party principles are themselves in need of constant protection, of the same kind of firm guarantees.

Noting the efforts of the Party Control Committee in the struggle for the purity of party ranks, the proposal has been made to make this into an effective organ of the party conscience, for which it is considered necessary to remove the prefix "under" [the CPSU Central Committee], which was thought up by Stalin back in 1934. This was also discussed at the 19th Party Conference. It is necessary to return to the Leninist concept of party control, which "irrespective of individuals" must see to it that no authorities of any kind, that neither the general secretary nor any of the other members of the Central committee, can stand in the way of unconditional provision of full information concerning and the strictest correctness of all matters. That is, what we are talking about here is having the highest control organ of the party elected at a congress and being subordinate to the congress. And this, in the opinion of communists, must necessarily be reflected in the CPSU Charter. And something else. Finally, we should recall the political experience of the activities of the Central Control Commission (TsKK), particularly in the first years of its existence. It was conceived by Lenin as being a democratic and effective institution within the party.

These are the kind of thoughts that welled up when we heard the stories of the PCC workers about their opposition to the all-powerful member of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR minister of internal affairs. However, let's return to the years of stagnation.

The Minister's Milk Cow

It seemed to Shchelokov that the Nozdryakov affair ended happily. But they thought otherwise within the Party Control Committee. For the committee, it was only a beginning. The true face behind the mask was beginning to be perceptible. A review was made of all letters that had ever come to the committee. Special attention was given to new ones. Other workers were involved in checking them out. And it is certain that the minister began to feel the pressure growing around him. It was not by coincidence that he decided to promote Churbanov, who became his first deputy and a colonel-general. Behind Brezhnev's son-in-law was like behind a shield. A "sense of proportion" was lost before our eyes. It was later established by investigation that Shchelokov took everything, without ceremony—from Mercedes cars and suites of furniture to a crib for his grandson and powder compacts for the household servant girls. He also showed a weakness for crystal chandeliers. He took antiques, books, pictures, gold and silver.

As a result of his "stormy" activity, the state suffered losses of 500,000 rubles. It was possible to retrieve what had been stolen only in the course of the investigation. A personal architect, a personal tailor, a personal stomatologist, a personal masseur... But how else should the king of bribes live? Other than royally. Naturally, one must have menials. And they appeared, and multiplied. The stove-maker becomes at the same time a major, the tinsmith—a lieutenant colonel, and he himself even higher—a general of the army, a Hero of Socialist Labor, a doctor of economic sciences. But a secret always comes out. Seemingly unexpectedly, the Gokhrana (State Depository of Values) case surfaced. No longer on the level of conversation, but on the level of facts. A closer look was taken at the work of the economic administration (KhoZU), Shchelokov's "milk cow". The circle was tightening. It was still only the small fish which were ending up in the nets that had been cast; the pikes avoided them, trying to go deeper where it was murkier. Enmeshed by mutual guarantees, the "king" rushes about. If only to get out of the net alone, but no, another, in fright, smashes him with his tail.

I.S. Gustov:

Before the arrival of Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov in the highest post in the Central Committee, we were practically ready for the most decisive measures. Incidentally, he knew about this. Indeed, Andropov had excellent relations with Pelshe and thought highly of him. While he was chairman of the KGB, Andropov often dropped in at the PCC. Usually on Saturdays. They used to talk one-on-one for hours. It is not accidental that one of the first acts of the new party director was to remove Shchelokov.

This happened in December 1982. And an inspection of the MVD KhoZU began at once. From the first days, those doing the checking clashed with the chief of the administration, General Major Kalkin and the members

of his clique, who personified the abuses. And behind them stood the figure of the Minister. During the past three years alone, Shchelokov had purchased furs worth 42,000 rubles for the needs of his family. Thousands of rubles in expenditures were written off (at state expense) for perfumes and live flowers. He even acquired rare books at MVD expense. "Sexual Psychology," "The Beauty of the Female Body," "The History of Corporal Punishment in Russia," "Concerning the Question of Western Influence"—These passions cost the department a pretty penny. Thus, 125 rubles was paid for "Sexual Psychology."

In June 1983, Shchelokov was removed from the CPSU Central Committee. However, still more than a year was necessary in order to deprive him of his rank as general of the army and all his awards, besides military ones, and the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. In our view, the delay can be explained only by Andropov's serious illness.

V.R. Mirtov, chief of the USSR Chief Military Procuracy department for investigation of particularly important cases:

I became involved in the investigation of Shchelokov's abuses on 19 February 1983, following the suicide of his wife. At that time he was a military inspector—an advisor to the Ministry of Defense Group of Inspectors General. Shchelokov later complained to me that none of the generals would even greet him. At that time he no longer was either a member of the Central Committee or a deputy of the Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless, he behaved confidently. I remember that I was struck by this: Does he really not have hopes for something or somebody? I soon became convinced that he did have hope. One does not have to be Napoleon to understand who was the chief "hero" in the criminal case against KhoZU chief Kalinin. Of course, Shchelokov. His testimony was needed, but they didn't let me see him: "Lower down, as much as you want, but do not approach Shchelokov." So, I worked there eight months. Without waiting for official authorization, I began to act on my own, at my own risk. I phone Shchelokov—he refuses to appear. I phone a second time, a third. And suddenly he agrees. He comes. After the first confrontations with arrested former workers of the KhoZU, he flagged and became what he was before his ascent—obsequious and ingratiating. However, as it seemed to me, he refused to believe right to the end that he would be arrested and tried on criminal charges. He lived with some kind of incomprehensible hope. I should say that it would have been difficult to complete this case without the help and support of workers from the party Central Committee and the Party Control Committee.

I.S. Gustov:

Shchelokov remained in the party. Evidently this also gave him hope. Like a drowning man grasping for straws. This is how he was. But this was not a case of our own sluggishness here. Nobody was "holding onto our sleeve." On the contrary, under Andropov we acted completely

independently and brought a whole series of compromised management workers to account within the party. Two factors held us back. Vyacheslav Rafailovich has already spoken of the first. We also did not understand why a criminal case was not brought against Shchelokov, and why he was walking around as a witness in the criminal case of the former chief of the KhOZU. Moreover, for a long time, nobody examined the facts behind the suicides under Shchelokov of his first deputy, General Paputin and of the chief of the MVD academy, General Krylov. The position of the minister himself was unclear and contradictory here.

The second factor. In recent years the PCC has decisively begun to refuse to rubber-stamp the results of "outside" investigations. We have striven to find out everything for our selves, to reach our own judgments. We have conducted a party-like investigation. But this has demanded more time, greater efforts. No emotions, but facts, precise and verified—this is what has guided us in the investigation of cases. We also approached Shchelokov from this position although, frankly speaking, he could have been excluded from the party long ago for crude violation of the principles of selecting and assigning personnel. We have been in possession of a series of well-verified facts concerning cases when Shchelokov absolved of responsibility

officials who had committed acts which bordered on the criminal. But it was necessary to recreate a complete picture of his degeneration. This is why the Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee reached its decision only on 7 December 1984. I will recall the text of its resolution:

For crude violation of party and state discipline, of the principles of selecting and assigning management cadres, and for abuses of official position for selfish purposes while being USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, CPSU member Nikolay Akisimovich Shchelokov (party card No. 00139000) shall be excluded from the party.

After this decision was approved and read, they turned to him: "Do you have any questions?" Shchelokov dejectedly answered: "No."

A week afterwards, on 13 December 1984, at the age of 74 years, Shchelokov, while at his home, ended his own life with a shot from a hunting rifle.

We have recounted here only one episode from our recent history. In the struggle to cleanse itself of what is bad, the healthy forces of the party rallied, having taken upon themselves the responsibility for its fate. April 1985 was drawing near...

Chernobyl Commission on Fact-Finding Tour of Ukraine

90UN0478A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
15 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by A. Sokol: "We Live by Hope..."]

[Text] The press has already reported that the government commission on abolishing the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl atomic power station held its outside sessions in the Gomel and Mogilyov Oblasts (Belorussian SSR), the Kiev and Zhitomir Oblasts (Ukrainian SSR), and the Bryansk Oblast (RSFSR) between July 26 and September 13. The commission was in session in our republic for three days. It familiarized itself with the Chernobyl atomic power station and the "cover" for the troubled unit, met the inhabitants of the regional centers of Poleskoye (Kiev Oblast) and Narodichi (Zhitomir Oblast), living in the areas that had been subjected to radiological contamination. In Slavutich, the problems were discussed related to the rising town of power engineering workers.

The commission was headed by V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Its members included V.V. Marin, first deputy chairman of the bureau for the fuel and energy complex under the USSR Council of Ministers; V.F. Kononov, minister of the atomic power industry; Yu.K. Semyonov, minister of the USSR power engineering and electrification; Yu.A. Israel, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology; A.I. Kondusev, USSR deputy minister of public health; Colonel General N.F. Grachyov, first deputy head of the USSR Civil Defense; B.V. Kachura, secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party; Ye.V. Kachalovskiy, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers; K.I. Masik, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers; the leaders of the Kiev and Zhitomir Oblasts - first secretaries of the Party Obkom committees, G.I. Revenko and V.M. Kavun; chairmen of the Oblast executive committees I.S. Plyushch and V.N. Yamchinskii. Many problems were examined together with scientists, experts and economic leaders. Members of the government commission engaged in an open dialogue with the people. It was occasionally sharp, but nobody concealed the truth.

Poleskoye

The house of Culture turned out to be too small to accommodate all those who came on foot and arrived to attend the meeting. Therefore, it was decided to broadcast it outside.

Fate has put Poleskiy Rayon through a most difficult ordeal. It will be remembered that its inhabitants received the first evacuees. Almost every house had a disaster-stricken family. The hosts shared house space and meals. But the hosts themselves had to leave later on. Ten villages have been vacated. In two of them - Yasen and Shevchenkovo - the people are being moved

only now, three years after the tragedy. It has been explained to the peasants that the resettlement is caused by a new long-range concept of safety, that their health would not be affected three years after the accident. The villagers have their own opinion, however. It can be understood since it had been shaped amidst official silence and by their own doubts.

They say that one day a helicopter landed in the village of Yasenevo to take ground samples. The guests "gasped" on seeing the locals: "Why haven't you been evacuated?" Geologists came later on to do their work, bringing dosimeters with them. They, too, asked with alarm on having done the sampling: "How can you be living here?" Highly agitated, the sixteen families left the village, thanks to the aid provided by the Oblast leaders. Now comes the official departure. One can appreciate the feelings experienced by those who are living.

The inhabitants of other villages are not leaving their nests, but they feel anguish all the same. Virtually the entire rayon lives on food brought from outside, since most of their own is "dirty" and cannot be used. This cannot but give rise to sad thoughts, with uncertainty and ignorance of the real situation taking their toll. People feel exasperated by incoherent explanations they have been hearing for three years, like "does not exceed the norm," or "within the permissible." More accurate information has penetrated of late, but it is very scarce and has done little to change people's views. To make things worse, the mixed and unconvincing words of consolation, pronounced by occasionally visiting officials and experts, only aggravate the nervous situation.

It is this sense of anxiety that the residents of the Poleskiy rayon conveyed during their meeting with the government commission. The arrivals from the neighboring rayons of Ivankovskiy, Vyshgorodskiy and others "contributed" to this.

The dialogue lasted for more than four hours. All questions boiled down eventually to one - is the radiological nuclear contamination hazardous for people's health? People asked: "Tell us in a nutshell, should we continue living in Poleskoye or should we leave?" First Secretary of the Kiev Party Obkom G. Revenko, who chaired the meeting, reiterated this specific question: "I would also like to hear a clear answer - yes or no," he said. The USSR Deputy Minister of public health A. Kondusev did not clarify the issue, although everyone demanded that he would. He said that the radiological contamination of Poleskoye was of a "patchy" nature, being hardly visible in one area, evident but not dangerous in another and above the norm in a third.

The customary "shortcomings" aggravate the situation. A gas worker told the commission:

"It was only before your arrival that the radiological debris was removed from our economic yard. 'Dirty' topsoil had not been removed. And the 'spot' radiates three milliroentgens an hour. You can check right now if

you want." "Can you report similar instances?" a member of the presidium asked.

"Yes, we can!" the audience answered in chorus.

Every person in the audience knew that a tremendous amount of decontamination work had been done. But everyone knew that its quality differed from place to place. The commission found out that the hosts had not even signed the acceptance documents for decontaminated homesteads. A decision was made to establish public decontamination headquarters and use its help in specifying contamination levels, taking appropriate measures. The criterion to be used is as such - perform decontamination if it helps and to resettle people if it does not...

Mothers were full of anxiety and concern. One cannot but share those concerns since last spring some first year students in Polessiye school No. 1 fainted standing near the blackboard. It turned out that the classroom had not been aired for fear of them catching cold. Besides, the children were not allowed to go home during the day as efforts were made to give them meals that were guaranteed to be clean and to keep them off the contaminated areas. This did not affect their condition to the best either. But these factors alone cannot explain everything, since children, for example, had frequent nose bleeds and many had their eyesight deteriorate. The all-Union center of radiological medicine conducted a survey of children but failed to report the findings even to the local doctors.

The children in Pollesskoye have been deprived of their usual fun things. They are not allowed to roam in the forest in some areas; it is dangerous to swim in certain places, to kick a ball or just to play. A mother with many children lamented: "How can I keep an eye on everyone, while doing house work?" The common opinion is that what has been lost should be compensated for somehow. If a kindergarten is to be built, it must have a swimming pool, and the school needs a gym. Playgrounds and a game of gorodki should be made available outdoors. It is health and not fun that is at stake. Besides, children do not get summer vacation accommodations in the best of places. It is high time they had pioneer camps of their own, and not necessarily on the seashore, where everyone is eager to go today. Doctors recommend rather a clean forest, a river, and the mountains. The problem cannot be solved through local initiative and effort alone. This is the task not for a village or for a rayon to handle.

Many people remember that medical workers used to be a source of guidance and of hope right after the disaster. The same attitude to them prevails today as well. It is with good reason that the audience expressed its concern, asking: "Why have the doctors left?" A local paramedic stood up and responded: "I've stayed with you, as you can see. And not only me." Some of them did run away, but they have been replaced. The rayon allocated more than 30 apartments to medical personnel.

Things leave much to be desired, nevertheless. People complain about the lack of adequate medical care. Medicals for everyone remain just on paper, because the local personnel is not sufficient to carry it out. The all-Union center of radiological medicine caters to its patients only. Moreover, the local practitioners, few as they are, are burdened with its tasks. There is a dearth of medical instruments, although they have been allocated by the country; Chernobyl received many things from abroad. But all those things were misplaced, stored somewhere or got lost. About 60 million rubles have already been spent on decontamination. But not all work had been brought to completion. Some of the villages that have had gas mains laid out after the accident still have stoves for heating, since there is a shortage of pipes and batteries to convert to gas. But timber ashes accumulate radioactivity. People drink water from wells in 24 villages, although water works were laid there, because tap water is "of iron." So, either iron-removal stations should be built or deeper wells should be sunk...

Narodichi

The Chernobyl accident affected six rayons in the Zhitomir Oblast, but the Narodicheskiy one suffered most of all. The local troubles are the same as those experienced in Kiev Oblast. First Secretary of the Narodichi rayon party committee V. Budko reported many things to the commission. A detail that attracted attention is that while 18 villages in the rayon were placed in the strict control zone in 1986, there are 69 of them now. This could but affect the psychological climate.

It aggravated a great deal this spring. The facts testifying to the radioactive contamination about norm leaked to the press. Attempts were made to dispute them. Experts from the center of radiological medicine tried to convince the villagers not to believe grim reports and that no evacuation was required. But the government decided to resettle 12 villages later on. But these are the villages where social and cultural amenities were under construction, gas and water pipes were laid as part of the decontamination effort and roads were being paved. Over 15 million rubles have been wasted. What about the people? They still show their concern since resettlement will not have been completed before 1993.

"Clean" products present a pressing problem too. They are brought according to the degree to which soil and air have been contaminated. Often these indices are favorable but one cannot drink milk, for example, because it contains too much cesium. The quality of other products is on the borderline. The same situation is observed in several rayons, in Narodichi and Luginsk in the first place.

Food is delivered by ordinary transport, while specialized transport is required because milk and meat turn bad on the way. The villagers demand milk with a long period of conservation, but these requests have been filled but partially. It also happens that the trucks sent from Narodichi to the Kiev No. 2 plant come back

empty. Very little fruit is shipped here. They used to eat their own, but now it is unsuitable. Those brought from outside are out of reach since consumer cooperatives charge an arm and a leg. The situation is the same as regards jam and preserves. Children need vitamins. It is hard to believe that state trade cannot help them.

The inhabitants of Narodichi, like those in Polesskoye, protested the use of "average" contamination readings, saying that this resembled an "average hospital patient's temperature", making it possible to conceal the areas where habitation is dangerous. Chairman of the USSR State Committee on Meteorology Yu. Israel supported the proposal to conduct a house-to-house survey in the villages. It is not clear, however, who is going to perform this - either the Ministry of Hydrometeorology or the organizations performing decontamination. Yet this responsible job requires highly professional people. It cannot be done without a clear-cut administrative instruction.

People have already faced uncertainty in this matter. The "dirty" plow land was removed from cultivation, for example, last spring, and trees were planted in its place. This decision was made by the Ministry of Agroindustry. Nobody could say anything definite as what was to be done with collective farmers' vegetable gardens lying next to the plow land. They turned out to be no-man's land. People had a hard time and went through a lot of anguish at that time. It is still unknown who is blame for this. The blame for such confusion is often placed on the local authorities, usually represented by a village Soviet. But it is helpless.

They talked in Narodichi about the infamous freak animals. More of them have appeared in some areas. It will be remembered that the village of Matiyki had quite a stir at the beginning of the year. Collective farm's vet assistant P. Kudin told the following story at that time:

"We have had 37 deformed piglets and 27 calves in 1987-1988, an unheard-of event. They had three to five legs and grotesquely big heads, and the internal organs open...

Similar anomalies have been observed in other villages as well. According to the studies being conducted on the pilot farm in the Polesskiy rayon, deformed animals are ruled out in the contamination zone. But they are ignorant of this in the villages in Narodichi. The cases observed here require a real scientific analysis. The government commission has spotlighted this, since any event of concern to the people should be explained with arguments and in a professional manner.

The people living in the contaminated areas are in no hurry to resettle. On the contrary, they would like to remain in their native places if they can. They are not daunted by the existing conditions and the forthcoming hardships. But they need support. The more so since three thousand hectares of land have been put out of use in the Narodichi rayon. Out of safety considerations, they do not sow flax, grow hemp, nor breed sheep there.

These were the sources of considerable income. Now money has to be earned doing something else. The rayon plans to start mink farms, but help is required to do this, help which has not been even promised. Specially organized pastures are required. In order to receive "clean" meat, the collective farms are forced to send the young cattle to the uncontaminated areas to complete breeding, suffering losses in the process. The entire breeding could be accomplished locally, but some fodder would have to be brought. And where should one get them?

The accident turned people's lives upside down. Not everybody understands this however.

The rayon party committee is concerned about the personnel problem. Only slightly more than one third out of the 160 young specialists that were sent to the rayon within the three years after the accident have remained. Characteristically, 53 out of the 63 who remained, are the local people who came home after their studies. The conclusion that one can make is that the rayon itself has to send people to colleges and technicums. There is a shortage of medical workers, with almost every second position not filled. It happened that they had to close down centers manned by doctor's assistants and obstetricians. The quota for doctors, that cannot be filled, should be probably replaced with an appeal to the graduates of medical schools. They did have devoted medical workers in the past. But material stimuli are required as well.

...The government commission was appraised of many facts testifying to the lack of amenities in the afflicted areas. A single house of 30 apartments was built in Narodichi after the disaster. Nothing is under construction now, while 120 families have been on the waiting list. They also face an acute problem of gas and water supply, and of the lack of paved roads. Plans for this type of work have not been fulfilled in certain areas, while no plans have been made in other areas at all. It is alarming that, like in the Kiev area, these measures are often taken for report's sake rather than for the sake of people's health.

Examples were cited when the oblast leaders and the republican commission to eliminate the consequences of accidents, disasters and calamities displayed passivity and did not pay heed to the villagers' needs.

On closing the meeting, its chairman expressed his desire to meet those in the audience once again so as to finally decide and approve everything.

Zone and Around It

The commission inspected the atomic power station. Briefly, about the "cover" which came to be known as "sarcophagus." They dropped the name later on, and I do not think it was for some formal reasons. "Sarcophagus" is a completed burial, while work is still underway at the fourth unit. Radioactivity is still high there. Shorter work shifts are used, and general work schedules are regulated so that people do not become affected.

About 16 thousand people have been interviewed over 18 months by the expedition of the I.V. Kurchatov institute of atomic engineering. They have done a lot.

"We know already how fuel sits under the 'cover', how much of it we have and what is its condition," expedition head I. Kambulov told the commission. Using the obtained data, Academician S.T. Belyaev drew the conclusion that the object was profoundly subcritical, at any cataclysms at that. This means that a spontaneous chain reaction and consequently a nuclear explosion are ruled out.

But the "cover" contains up to 150 tons of fuel. The storage of tremendous radioactivity should be maintained in an appropriate manner. Some construction structures have been reinforced, and automatic monitoring of others is being introduced. And the studies essential for the forthcoming operation are not stopping. Last year, 60 million rubles were spent on the work performed, with another 40 million allocated for this year. One does have to spend money.

The government commission spoke in favor of elaborating a long-term program, encompassing alternatives, of dealing with the "cover."

The job of the atomic power station is to generate electricity. The operation of the station causes no doubts, it was stressed. The commission supported the proposal to alter the management structures established after the accident. The atomic power station, the town of Slavutich and a transport "corridor" linking them are to be taken from under the "Kombinat" production association to form a separate entity. Power workers will be able to handle all their affairs without an intermediary. The "Kombinat" will be transformed from the production association it is today to become a scientific and production association to take care of the zone alone. Extremely important work is to be done there.

We heard about the existence of "tombs," a sort of storages for radioactive waste, but we did not know that there were 15 of them, plus over 600 makeshift dumps. They are safe today, but "dirt" can penetrate the soil and seep into the subterranean waters in the future. Therefore, all dumps have to be recycled, a job that cannot be done without a specialized recycling facility. The expediency of its construction was emphasized in Kiev, from the high rostrums in Moscow and during noisy rallies. Many lances have been broken. The government commission made its point as well.

It was pointed out that the attempt to shroud the construction in secrecy so as not to stir public opinion had backfired. Ignorance bred rumors. One of them has it that the facility is intended not for Chernobyl alone. The experts dismissed this version. They reported that geological conditions in the zone preclude a burial of highly radioactive waste there... It is not the plant but an association unit that is in question. The conclusion was made that its construction is a must. It cannot be avoided.

The evacuees continue to ask in bitterness: "Does it mean that we are not coming back?" One can understand the way they feel. But the reality is harsh. The level of gamma radiation is 15 times above norm in some areas and 1,500 times above it in others. The soil containing cesium-137 and strontium-90 is 10 to the eighth power dirtier than it was before the accident. The calls for return represent a dangerous attempt to lull public opinion.

The commission discussed the future of two cities - Prip'yat and Chernobyl. Their lives have been and are continued to be fought for. But what are the results?

They are unequivocal as far as Prip'yat is concerned - people cannot live there, even temporarily. The city can be used only as a testing range; a small plant to take care of local needs can be put up here. The future of Chernobyl instills more optimism. It is on the borderline of having no future, in the "yes" and "no" neighborhood. Right now 3,700 shift workers live there. Time will tell how things will turn out in the future, but one cannot count on the supernatural.

Today, the problems that sprang up beyond the 30-km zone are more acute. In addition to the nearby territories, Chernobyl affected several oblasts in Belorussia and made inroads into the RSFSR. Individual regions in the Rovno, Vinnitsa, Chernigov and Cherkasy Oblasts, and several villages in the Ternopol and Bukovina Oblasts have been contaminated. A total of 293 thousand and 93 thousand people live in the contaminated areas in the Kiev and Zhitomir Oblasts alone respectively.

According to the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology, the contamination with cesium-137 is characterized mostly by the following figures: 0.1, 0.7, 1.3 and 2.4 curie per square kilometer, the temporary norm being 15 curie. The situation in the Kiev and Zhitomir Oblasts is more complicated. Here, 174 populated areas have been placed under what is known as rigid control, with their residents living off mostly imported food. The residents enjoy such privileges as a 25-percent bonus to salary and 30 rubles per member of family or just a 30-ruble allowance per family member.

Decontamination work has been going on for more than three years in the areas of unfavorable situation. This is a hell of a job. And organizational snafus do occur from time to time. The biggest one is lack of coordination. An officer in charge of a contamination unit told the commission indignantly: "I provide people, somebody else supplies equipment and still another person conducts construction work. As a result, they cleaned everything around the house but left the radioactive roof untouched."

Lack of a comprehensive approach to some types of work, with them geared to the solution of immediate problems only, has had a negative effect as well.

It was reiterated more than once that the 30-km zone has not been assigned a status for over three years and has become a no-man's land as a result. Different solutions

were offered. Under one of the versions discussed, a zone where no habitation is envisaged in the foreseeable future is to be delineated (this includes the atomic power station and the nearby territory) and put it under full charge of the USSR Ministry of the Atomic Power Industry. The remaining areas targeted for resettlement as well as the territories where rigid control has been established are to be turned over to the republics and conduct all the necessary work under their supervision. A reservation made in that plan provided for giving the entire resettlement area to the ministry of atomic power engineering and making the republics responsible only for the populated areas. Another alternative idea envisages the establishment of a single all-Union program and of a single scientific and production association to carry it out.

Academician E.P. Velikhov, who worked in Chernobyl and who heads now the V.I. Kurchatov institute of atomic energy, described the situation in the following terms during our interview:

"The atomic power station is relatively clean. It is more difficult to work at the fourth unit. It is the surroundings that count. Our traditional shortcomings exacerbate the prevailing situation. We need a single organization that would be in charge of everything."

In his interview to PRAVDA UKRAINY, Chairman of the government commission and Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers V.Kh. Doguzhiyev specially emphasized the problem of glasnost. He pointed out that the objective information of required volume was lacking and the objective is to provide it. We also mentioned the fact that the press has cooled towards the Chernobyl story.

At the same time, the official information about Chernobyl lost much of its credibility. It should be restored. A suggestion was made to the commission to have electronic boards displayed in the contaminated zones that would report gamma-radiation, like a thermometer. They discussed privately owned dosimeters. This idea was dismissed in the past, since this instrument was claimed to be hard to use. Then the argument revolved on whether it should be blind or display direct readings. A scientist and an Academician enjoying high prestige tried to prove during the recent press conference organized by the Ministry of Health of the Ukrainian SSR that the gauge was ruinously expensive for the population. The government commission finally decided that the instrument was acceptable and should be manufactured.

During the meeting in Slavutich, USSR Minister of Atomic Power Industry V. Kononov said that ten types of the dosimeter had been developed, and the first batch will be produced this year, while the industry's enterprises will turn out about 100,000 of them in the future. The republican plants could have joined the program but they keep silent so far. The only commitment was made

by Yu.N. Samoylenko, head of the "Spetsatom" association operating in the 30-km zone, a man who was awarded the Star of Hero for his efforts to overcome the consequences of the accident.

...The discussions that took place are not sufficient to make final conclusions. Studies to be made by scientists and experts are required as well. The decisions made will become known at the end of autumn.

Structure, Purpose of Belorussian Ecological Union Summarized

90US0276A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 19 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Aleksandrovich Satsevich: "Belorussian Ecological Union"]

[Text] *Strange as it may seem, nobody can tell me what the Belorussian Ecological Union is. I would join it, but I first want to clarify two points: Is this a new informal organization, or is it simply the next rostrum for empty talk?*

M. Zhiznevskiy, Minsk

We have to admit that this question from a reader took us by surprise. Our doubts were cleared up by Vladimir Aleksandrovich Satsevich, chairman of the Ozdorovleniye Ecological Club from Kobrin and a member of the Belorussian Ecological Union, who dropped into the editor's office and explained:

The charter of the Belorussian Ecological Union was approved by the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet after a founding congress held in the summer. B. P. Savitskiy, a doctor of biological sciences and a professor at Gomel University, was elected president of the BES [Belorussian Ecological Union]. The following were elected to the managing organs: I. N. Nikitchenko, correspondent member of the BSSR Academy of Sciences; R. G. Goretskiy, academy member, director of the Geophysics and Geochemistry Institute; Ye. P. Petryayev, doctor of chemical sciences, professor; V. T. Yakovenko, writer, publicist; and other well known people, including USSR people's deputies.

The task of primary organizations in the BES is to gather data on ecological violations in each city, rayon and village and to present them to the presidium. Thus, broad circles of public opinion will constantly get a reaction from responsible state organs. In our opinion, real action is possible through this encounter.

Human health is impossible without a healthy environment. However, everything begins with people themselves, with their moral makeup and ability to keep order in their own house and enterprise. In essence, our present ecological situation is the result of the immoral use of nature.

The compilation of a data bank on ecological violations will take its normal course. However, other practical

steps are also important. Kobrin is a good example. For several years now a group of enthusiasts has been keeping people in Kobrin intense about this. M. M. Kotlyarov and A. B. Yegorov, well known advocates of a healthy way of life, visited Kobrin. We gradually organized a club. Under the slogan "Plant a Tree with Our Own Hands in Our Own City," every spring and fall we carry out actions that are remarked about in Kobrin. Citizens are well aware of our stand of photographs "Window to Nature." By issuing one photo newspaper after another showing scandalous ecological violations, the club made its contribution to the comprehensive program, Ecology, approved by the city soviet. Now we have become the first organization in the Belorussian Ecological Union.

The BES operates in two directions: Environmental ecology, in which the problems of Chernobyl are most important, and human ecology. The address of the Belorussian Ecological Union is 220029, Minsk, Ul. Storozhevskaya, 5. Its telephone number is 39-46-61.

Chardzhou Residents Receive Gas Masks to Counter Chemical Dangers

90US0276B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 26 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by L. Vorobeva: "The Air Monster Raged"]

[Text] On an October day Chardzhou children living in the central sections of the city were disturbed by an unusual innovation: At bus stops they were given gas masks, completely free of charge. When the mama of a "lucky one", who got a mask and brought it back home, questioned him about it, he explained: "They said that we had to put it on if there were an emergency at the chemical plant."

Giveaway gas masks, with directions provided by people unknown, have shown up in many homes. This did not cause any special concern among adults. Perhaps everyone accepts the possibility as completely reasonable. Inhabitants of the village of Komsomolsk and the Khimik, Bakhar and other microrayons are quite aware of the dangers from their neighbor when the wind blows towards the oblast center.

Chardzhou is one of those cities where there are special health dangers. Anomalous phenomena are not rare here. For example, white blizzards howl on summer nights. Or, when you wake up in the morning, garlands are hanging from the wires. Guests are sometimes afraid, but the hosts are calm about these wonders. The hosts know that such things are caused by workers at the cotton gin, whether steaming or concerned about the plan, they have gotten rid of products from cotton processing. The enterprise is right in the center of a densely populated area. For 20 years there have been discussions about the need to move the plant outside the city limits: the correspondence is very active, but nothing real has happened. This year the oblast newspaper posed the question directly to the leaders of the

party gorkom and the gorispolkom: When will the cotton processing plant leave the city? This is all the more important in that specialists assert that the situation will not be improved even by the installation of highly efficient dust removers. It is practically impossible to make the plant ecologically clean. This is due to the fact that the old buildings are not intended for modern equipment and to the equipment itself. The Zagotkhlopkoprom [Cotton Processing Industry] Association has given its approval to the elimination of the cotton plant. However, local authorities have their view of the situation. This year they officially announced that the question of its removal would possibly (?) be resolved sometime during the 13th Five-Year Plan.

The cotton gin managers admit their guilt. However, the city is no better off for that. The directors of the chemical plant take another position, a very militant one. When the oblast paper started printing reports about the condition of the air in Chardzhou, all of them contained reports about the exceeding of maximum permissible standards for sulfur dioxide. How did the chemical plant people react? They sent the editors an angry letter several pages long, in which they asked them not to arouse the population against the plant as their enterprise is ecologically clean. They had come to believe this to such a degree that they did not want to reckon with the obvious.

At the beginning of the summer there was a sizable spill of sulfuric acid. Ninety-six hectares of crops were damaged; losses totaled 63,100 rubles. The 27 member oblast commission set up at that time requested that special laboratories make reviews. They compiled a document, but plant representatives refused to sign it. Associates at the oblast control and toxicological laboratory worked for 2 more weeks. They concluded that the sulfuric acid content of the soil and plants exceeded maximum permissible norms by 1.91 and 2.74 fold respectively. But even after this the plant representatives did not sign the document.

The board of the Kolkhoz imeni Ilich, whose land was damaged, then went to court. If it is established that the chemical plant is guilty, it will pay for the damage to the land. But what about the people? After all, poisons are as harmful to them as they are to plants. How can this be evaluated?

The Kolkhoz imeni Ilich signed a contract with a group of scientists from the TGPI [Turkmen State Pedagogical Institute] imeni Lenin. This group is working on the theme "A study of the dynamics of pollution of ground level atmospheric strata on the land of the Kolkhoz imeni Ilich and the development of measures to assure the health of the population." Candidates of science discovered that 46.2 percent of the kolkhoz farmers suffer from hypertrophy, while in a control group from Farabskiy Rayon the rate was only 7.7 percent.

To discover the city's "sores", one must look at the city dump, an unsanitary and irresponsible tsardom! Municipal workers have not determined who among them is

responsible for it. All the time this stinking heap is ceaselessly growing, smoking day and night.

It is not so easy to frighten the "grave diggers of nature." Evidently, a global catastrophe is needed to make the city fathers aware of this simple truth. The ecology problem is above all a moral problem. However, it has not reached that status, at least for us. All violations,

errors and slowness are explained by economic difficulties. There are not enough resources and people to handle them.

City dwellers are waiting for improvements. They believe the promises, but ecological predictions are still alarming. It is as if the monster in the air were confident that it cannot be punished and continues raging.

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